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#### I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

#### I.I PROGRAM HISTORY

In 2012, the California Public Utilities Commission ordered the California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to allocate \$75.2 million to kick-start and test multiple innovative energy efficiency (EE) financing pilots over an initial period ending June 30, 2022. In 2013, via Decision 13-09-044, the CPUC specified that only \$65.9 million of those ratepayer funds would be initially allocated to the financing pilots, the remaining \$9.3 million would be held in reserve until the CPUC conducted a mid-point review of program performance (in August 2017 via working group). With the allocated funds, the California Alternative Energy and Advanced Transportation Financing Authority (CAEATFA), launched the California Hub for Energy Efficiency Financing (CHEEF) to administer the financing pilots across multiple customer segments and strategies.

Decision 13-09-044 also specified that \$25 million in ratepayer funds would be allocated to fund a loan loss reserve¹ (LLR). The LLRs improve residential customer access to direct and indirect local and regional financial products for adoption of eligible energy efficiency measures (EEEMs) with enhanced terms.² In 2016, CAEATFA launched the Residential Energy Efficiency Loan (REEL) Assistance Pilot, to increase access to financing for residential EE improvements, particularly among underserved customer segments. The REEL Pilot offered loans up to \$50,000 ("standard loans"). In March 2017, the CPUC issued Decision 17-03-026, giving CAEATFA flexibility to modify the REEL Pilot to maximize pilot performance. In December 2017, the CPUC issued Resolution E-4900 to establish metrics for measuring financing pilot success and require regular evaluation, measurement, and verification (EM&V) of the financing pilots to monitor pilot performance. Opinion Dynamics completed the REEL Pilot's first evaluation in January 2020.

The CPUC expanded the REEL Pilot into a full-scale program via Resolution E-5072 pursuant to Decision 17-03-026, issued on April 17, 2020. In August 2021, the Program was renamed the GoGreen Home (GGH) Financing Program as part of a renewed marketing effort. Decision 21-08-006, issued on August 5<sup>th</sup> of 2021, mandated the completion of a second evaluation of the GGH Program by April 30, 2024. In September 2021, CAETAFA introduced micro-loans to the Program. Micro-loans differed from standard loans in that they had different underwriting rules and were only available for select EEMs up to \$5,000. Although an option for all lenders, Enervee built the first formal micro-loan offering in coordination with select lenders via the Enervee operated, Southern California Gas (SoCalGas) Marketplace.³ In October 2021, CAEATFA and the IOUs issued an Advice Letter to the CPUC requesting additional funding for the CHEEF suite of programs. With nearly \$24 million remaining in its initial budget allocation (per Decision 13-09-044), CAEATFA and the IOUs requested \$51.2 million in incremental ratepayer funds to finance the CHEEF suite of programs from July 2022 through June 2027, equating to a total budget of \$75.2 million. These incremental funds were approved by CPUC via Decision 21-08-006 via Rulemaking 20-08-022 in August 2021. In June 2023, Enervee introduced micro-loans to Southern California Edison (SCE) marketplace. By March of 2024, micro-loans were available in Enervee`s own California Marketplace, and available to customers who receive electricity from SoCalGas, SCE, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E).4

Figure 1 illustrates the history of the GGH Program rulemaking.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In this context, loan loss reserves are ratepayer funds set aside by the program implementer to cover losses on the eligible portions of the GGH loans.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> A list of eligible energy efficiency equipment can be found at <a href="https://www.gogreenfinancing.com/residentialmeasures">www.gogreenfinancing.com/residentialmeasures</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Southern California Gas. 2024. https://marketplace.socalgas.com/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Enervee. 2024. https://ca.enervee.com/

Figure 1. GGH Program History

2012	CPUC allocates \$75.2 million in ratepayer funds to test financing as a mechanism to make energy efficiency improvements more affordable; \$25 million is reserved for residential LLR
July 2016	REEL Pilot issues first loan
March 2017	CPUC D.17-03-026 gives CAEATFA flexibility to modify REEL Pilot
Decembe r 2017	CPUC specifies program performance metrics and EM&V process via R. E-4900
March 2018	• First REEL Pilot modifications go into effect
January 2020	Opinion Dynamics completes evaluation of REEL Pilot period
April 2020	• R. E-5072 pursuant to D. 17-03-026 expands REEL Pilot into full-scale Program; calls for additional rulemaking process
August 2021	CPUC approves additional funding requested by CAEATFA and IOUs     Program is renamed to the GoGreen Home Financing Program (GGH Program)
September 2021	• CAEATFA introduces micro-loans, Enervee developes first formal micro-loan offering via Enervee operated, SoCalGas online marketplace
September 2022	GGH Program changes go into effect based on evaluation and stakeholder feedback
June 2023	<ul> <li>Micro-loans relaunched, available on SoCalGas and SCE online marketplace operated by Enervee. By March 2024, micro-loans are available on Envervee's own website, available to customers of California electricty IOUs.</li> </ul>

#### 1.2 PROGRAM OVERVIEW

The GGH Program leverages financing to make EE improvements more affordable to residential customers, focusing on reaching underserved customers. CAEATFA administers the GGH Program statewide, as one of its CHEEF programs. The GGH Program connects California homeowners and renters with lenders to finance their energy efficiency projects through two types of loans:

- Standard loans: Up to \$50,000 for major EE improvement projects typically implemented through GGH contractors.
- Micro-loans: Up to \$5,000 for eligible EEEM purchases. Offered through the SoCalGas (starting in 2021) and SCE (June 2023) Marketplace, operated by Enervee. By March of 2024, micro-loans were available in Enervee`s own California Marketplace, and available to customers of SCE, SDG&E, SoCalGas and PG&E who are legal residents of the State of California.

Borrowers must use at least 70% of their GGH loan to fund EEEMs. The claim-eligible portion of the loan amount includes the cost of the EEMs and up to 30% of the cost of additional home improvements and any costs incurred as part of EEM installation (e.g., permits, electric panel upgrades, etc.). For each project or equipment purchase financed via a GGH Program loan, CAEATFA puts money into LLR accounts equal to a percentage of the claim-eligible portion of the loan amount. This percentage is set at 11% for loans distributed to market rate borrowers and 20% for loans distributed to borrowers who meet at least one criteria under the GGH Program's definition of underserved: (1) credit

score below 640,<sup>5</sup> (2) property in a low-to-moderate income (LMI) census tract (i.e., the area median income [AMI] of the census tract does not exceed 120% of the AMI of the metropolitan area, county, or state), and (3) household income is LMI (i.e., household income is at or below the current annual income limit as determined by the California Department of Housing and Community Development according to county and family size). The LLR account mitigates a large portion of lender risk, allowing lenders to offer loans with better terms (i.e., lower interest rates and longer payback periods) and broaden loan eligibility to market segments that otherwise may not have access to financing with favorable loan terms. In addition to the GGH Program loans, borrowers may qualify for utility rebates to further lower the upfront cost of eligible equipment. Table 1 compares key features of the GGH Program's standard loans and microloans during the evaluation period (July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2023).

Table 1. GGH Program Component Comparison

Program Feature	Standard Loan	Micro-Loan		
Eligible loan size	<\$50,000	<\$5,000		
Eligible program measures	EEEMs installed by a GGH participating contractor	EEEMs purchased on SoCalGas or Enervee California marketplace		
Number of participant loans	3,320	567		
Average loan amount	\$18,253	\$1,498		
Average interest rate	4.9%	9.2%		
Average loan payback terms	106 months	60 months		
Number of participant lenders	8 (2 statewide, 6 regional)	2 (currently 1 active participant)		
Default rates	1%	16%		
LLR account (equal to a percentage of the claim- eligible portion of the loan amount)	11% for market rate borrowers 20% for underserved borrowers			

During the evaluated period, the GGH Program saw significant growth compared to the REEL Pilot. Table 2 lists the key accomplishments of the GGH Program during the evaluation period. Since the REEL Pilot, the GGH Program saw greater uptake in loans overall, but specifically for fuel substitution projects, encouraging gas-using customers to switch to electric equipment, in line with California's clean energy goals.

Table 2. REEL Pilot and GGH Program Activity Comparison

Highlighted Performance Metric	REEL Pilot Activity (July 2016 – June 2018)	GGH Program Activity (July 2018 – June 2023)		
Average program loans per year	106	777		
Average Ioan size	\$17,246	\$18,253 (standard loan) \$1,498 (micro-loan)		
Average financing generated per year	\$1,828,067	\$12,289,839		
Average Ioan payback terms	117 months	106 months (standard loan) 60 months (micro-loan)		
Loan default rates	<1%	1% (standard loan) 16% (micro-loan)		
Number of participant lenders	4 total lenders: 2 statewide 2 regional lenders	10 total lenders: 2 statewide lenders 6 regional lenders		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> A May 2021 rulemaking removed the Fair Isaac and Company (FICO) credit score as the credit score source for the GGH Program, making the GGH Program credit reporting platform neutral. Given that FICO scores are the only measure of credit score included in participant tracking data, all analyses of participant credit scores rely on said FICO scores.

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Highlighted Performance Metric	REEL Pilot Activity (July 2016 – June 2018)	GGH Program Activity (July 2018 – June 2023)		
		2 micro-loan lenders (currently 1 active participant)		
Number of participant contractors	282	959 (including contractors that disenrolled, or were suspended or removed) 786 (enrolled as of September 30, 2023)		
Annual program energy savings	63.7 MWh 1,262 therms	556 MWh 80,740 therms		
Energy savings per standard loan participant (compared to baseline energy usage)	5.4% electricity reduction 1.5% gas reduction	3.0% electricity reduction 5.7% gas reduction		

#### RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODS 1.3

#### 1.3.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The evaluation period covered GGH Program performance from July 1, 2018, to June 30, 2023. The purpose of the study was to reassess the performance of the GGH Program since scaling from a pilot to a full-scale program. The evaluation sought to address the following research objectives:

- 1. Assess whether GGH is scalable
- 2. Identify whether GGH is leveraged by private capital and support
- 3. Gauge whether GGH reaches underserved Californians who would not otherwise have participated in EE upgrades and explore the possibilities,6 benefits, and drawbacks of modifying how CAEATFA defines "underserved"
- 4. Verify that GGH produces energy savings
- 5. Gauge if Resolution E-4900 metrics (see Appendix B) remain valid performance indicators for the current/future GGH Program, if there are new metrics to track, and/or if original metrics should be modified.

#### **RESEARCH METHODS** 1.3.2

The team undertook the following tasks as part of the evaluation:

- Data Review and Program Staff Interviews: The team reviewed existing program materials/data and conducted indepth interviews with CAEATFA and Enervee staff to confirm details of program design and implementation, inform evaluation tasks, and understand program participation.
- Participation Analysis: The team analyzed primary participation data from CAEATFA including loan details, demographic details of participants, and EEEMs installed with loans; details of participating contractors, and details of financial transactions between CAEATFA and participating financial institutions to assess program accomplishments over time and characterize participants in terms of borrower characteristics.
- Impact Analysis: The team verified energy savings produced by GGH-financed measures via a consumption analysis, applied per-unit savings deemed appropriate by the California eTRM to micro-loan equipment, and

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<sup>6</sup> GGH regulations define underserved borrowers as those whose property is in a Low-to-Moderate Income (LMI) census tract, whose household income is LMI (<120% AMI), or who have a credit score below 640. **Opinion Dynamics** 

conducted source energy savings review. The team conducted 13 follow-up interviews with participants with unexplained savings patterns.

- Participant Surveys: The team fielded online surveys with GGH Program participants to support the team in understanding the participant experience, collect information about participants' households, and gather details on any nonroutine adjustments participants made to their homes or behaviors after completing a home upgrade/purchasing energy-efficient equipment. The team completed 144 online surveys with standard loan participants and 60 with micro-loan participants. The evaluation team developed the sample and survey targets to achieve 90% confidence with 10% precision.
- Program Influence Analysis: The team used self-reported data from the participant survey to qualitatively
  understand the overall influence of GGH financing on decision-making, the influence of GGH financing compared
  to other financing options available, and the influence of financing relative to that of rebates when customers take
  advantage of both.

#### 1.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 1.4.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE I: ASSESS WHETHER GGH IS SCALABLE

#### CONCLUSION I: THE GGH PROGRAM SCALED SINCE THE REEL PILOT.

Since the REEL Pilot evaluation, the GGH Program experienced significant growth in yearly number of loans (106 compared to 777) and yearly financing generated (\$1.8 million compared to \$12.3 million). Despite the growth in loan number, defaults for standard loans remained consistent to the pilot period as did the loan performance, with only 1% of standard loans defaulting during the GGH evaluation period.

CAEATFA successfully dispersed the GGH Program's reach to areas beyond Southern California (where participation was concentrated during the REEL Pilot). However, the GGH Program remains concentrated in three main areas of the state: Southern California, the Central Corridor, and the Bay Area.

 Recommendation 1: To scale to a truly statewide offering, target lenders and contractors serving the areas of the state not-yet-touched by the GGH Program, such as Northern California and the eastern inland areas of the state.
 Provide lenders and contractors in these areas with program marketing and education materials to ensure customers are aware of the GGH Program in these areas.

### 1.4.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 2: IDENTIFY WHETHER GGH IS LEVERAGED BY PRIVATE CAPITAL AND SUPPORT

#### CONCLUSION 2: AN INCREASE IN PARTICIPATING PRIVATE LENDERS INCREASED PROGRAM REACH.

CAETAFA recruited additional lenders to the program, successfully increasing the participant lender pool from four during the REEL Pilot (two statewide and two regional lenders) to 10 during the evaluation period (two statewide microloan lenders, two statewide and six regional standard loan lenders). Two of the legacy statewide lenders accounted for 62% of the private capital generated whereas two of the newly recruited regional standard loan lenders contributed a third of the private capital generated through the Program. The remaining four regional lenders (including the two legacy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> "ETRM Overview." California Technical Forum, <u>www.caltf.org/etrm-overview</u>. Accessed 01 March. 2024 Opinion Dynamics

regional lenders) accounted for less than 1% of GGH Program private capital each. Micro-loan lenders, classified as statewide lenders, were introduced through One Finance, but Lewis and Clark Bank is now the sole micro-loan lender. Given the relatively more recent introduction and smaller size of each micro-loan compared to standard loans, micro-loans make up only 1% of private capital generated for the GGH Program. While recruiting new lenders is one way of expanding the program, the previous speed of enlisting new recruitment points to encouragement of existing inactive lenders as a more immediate path towards greater encouragement of private lenders.

• Recommendation 2: Identify opportunities to increase program activity among less active lenders (those who have contributed no more than 1% of GGH Program private capital each). Host an event with participating lenders to encourage them to share best practices for successful GGH Program loan activity. During these events participant lenders may also share challenges and ways to mitigate these issues.

### CONCLUSION 3: CONTRACTORS DRIVE PROGRAM ACTIVITY BUT MANY ENROLLED CONTRACTORS ARE NOT ACTIVELY ENGAGED WITH THE PROGRAM.

Contractors are the primary source of GGH Program awareness for standard loan participants. Nearly two-thirds of standard loan participants (63%) heard about the GGH Program through their contractor. Most micro-loan participants do not need to engage with a contractor because most EEMs purchased from the California Enervee and SoCalGas Marketplaces are self-install eligible. By September 2023, CAEATFA had recruited nearly 1,000 contractors to enroll in the GGH Program (786 of which were still enrolled as of September 2023), a significant increase compared to the REEL Pilot period. However, contractor participation is very uneven. Ten contractors (about 1% of the total enrolled contractor base) contributed to more than one-third (36%) of all GGH Program projects (n=1,598) from April 2016 to September 2023. In the spring of 2023, CAEATFA instituted a delisting process for inactive contractors; however, many inactive contractors requested to remain enrolled. Despite most of the enrolled contractor network serving Southern California, most of the active contractors for the program (nine of the 10) are concentrated in the Bay Area and Central parts of the state. The recruitment of these active contractors is a driving factor for the GGH Program's reach expanding outside of Southern California during the evaluation period. According to CAEATFA, it has encouraged contractor participation by marketing the availability of other incentives/rebates that can be stacked on top of GGH financing, such as a \$50 TECH incentive to contractors who install and enroll a heat pump water heater into a demand response program.

- Recommendation 3: Weigh the costs and benefits of keeping contractors enrolled with the GGH Program who are not actively promoting the program and submitting projects.
- Recommendation 4: Identify opportunities to increase program activity among less active contractors. Since the contractor network is vast, the GGH Program may start by identifying markets for greater program activity and targeting the contractors in those areas with program education and training opportunities to increase their engagement (such as in Northern California and the eastern inland areas of the state). Contractor incentives can also be useful at increasing program engagement. Identify if any of these incentives already exist and make sure to inform contractors of the stacked benefits of submitting GGH Program projects. For example, BayREN offers a \$1,000 incentive for qualifying contractors that install heat pump water heaters.<sup>8</sup> Continue to help contractors connect the dots that they may benefit from multiple programs when completing a single project.

<sup>8</sup> https://www.bayren.org/partner-us/heat-pump-water-heater-hpwh-incentive-participating-contractors Opinion Dynamics

# I.4.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 3: GAUGE WHETHER GGH REACHES UNDERSERVED CALIFORNIANS WHO WOULD NOT OTHERWISE HAVE PARTICIPATED IN EE UPGRADES AND EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES, BENEFITS, AND DRAWBACKS OF MODIFYING HOW CAEATFA DEFINES "UNDERSERVED"

### CONCLUSION 4: THE INTRODUCTION OF MICRO-LOANS EXPANDED THE GGH PROGRAM TO A GREATER NUMBER OF UNDERSERVED BORROWERS.

Standard loans facilitated through the GGH Program reached borrowers in LMI areas. However, a large portion of these borrowers may not be credit challenged. In September 2021, CAEATFA introduced micro-loans as a GGH Program financing product. For most of the evaluation period, micro-loans were only available to SoCalGas customers via the SoCalGas Marketplace operated by Enervee. Shortly prior to the end of the evaluation period (March 2023), micro-loans were added to Enervee's California Marketplace, broadening the offering to those receiving electric service from SCE, PG&E, and SDG&E. The average standard loan size during the evaluation period was \$18,253 while the average micro-loan size was only \$1,498. Half of the micro-loan borrowers (50%) during the evaluation period had a FICO credit score below 640. Nearly three-quarters (71%) of micro-loan borrowers resided in census tracts with a tract median income below 120% of the area median income of the metropolitan area, country, or state (defined as an underserved area by the GGH Program). Nearly three-quarters (74%) of micro-loan borrowers also had an annual income below \$100,000. The opposite was true of standard loan borrowers: only 4% had FICO credit scores less than 640, 57% resided in census tracts where the tract median income was less than 120% the larger area median income, and only 16% had an income of less than \$100,000. Compared to standard loan participants, a statistically greater number of micro-loan borrowers also indicated they would be unlikely to qualify for other financing options outside of the GGH Program (4% compared to 30%, respectively).

However, micro-loans were riskier for lenders than standard loans during the evaluation period. In this period approximately 16% of micro-loans defaulted, whereas only 1% of standard loans defaulted. Additionally, a larger percentage of micro-loan payments were past-due relative to standard loan payments (14% compared to less than 1%, respectively). The higher default rate among micro-loans relative to standard loans is likely attributable to micro-loans having a greater reach to underserved borrowers, as detailed below in Conclusion 5. All the defaulted micro-loans were administered by the program's first micro-loan lender, One Finance, who is no longer active in the Program. Lewis and Clark Bank has served as the GGH Program micro-loan lender since June 2023.

 Recommendation 5: Monitor default rates for micro-loans to ensure that program components' performance stabilizes over time.

### CONCLUSION 5: THE GGH PROGRAM'S DEFINITION OF "UNDERSERVED" ADEQUATELY CAPTURES THE PORTION OF UNDERSERVED BORROWERS REACHED.

As previously mentioned, the GGH Program defines underserved borrowers as those with a credit score below 640, residing in a census tract where the tract AMI is less than 120% of the AMI of the metropolitan area, county or state, or with a household income at or below the current annual income limit as determined by the California Department of Housing and Community Development according to county and family size. More than half (59%) of the standard loans and 85% of the micro-loans were given to underserved borrowers as per the GGH Program definition. Breaking it down further, 59% of program loans were to borrowers residing in a census tract where the median tract income was less

than 120% the metropolitan area, country, or state median income, and 11% were to borrowers with a FICO credit score less than 640.

The CPUC has broader definitions of equity for many of its energy programs, including hard-to-reach, underserved customers, and disadvantaged communities. When comparing GGH program activity to the CPUC's Environmental and Social Justice Action Plan's definition of underserved Californians, 48% of standard loans and 77% of micro-loan went to an underserved population, and 23% of standard loans and 36% of micro-loans went to disadvantaged communities. CAEATFA does not track all the data necessary to calculate hard-to-reach customer penetration, such as borrower language, utility bill assistance program participation, and housing type.

#### 144 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 4: VERIEY GGH PRODUCES ENERGY SAVINGS

#### CONCLUSION 6: THE GGH PROGRAM ACHIEVES ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS BEYOND ENERGY SAVINGS.

Overall, the GGH Program achieved 555.58 MWH annual electric energy savings and 80,739.50 therms annual gas savings. This equates to approximately 3% electricity savings and 5.7% gas savings per participant. Electricity savings are lower for the GGH Program than the REEL Pilot, likely due to the fact that, during the evaluation period, the GGH Program made efforts (such as partnering with the TECH program) to emphasize financing for fuel substitution projects, not just energy-saving projects, to align with California's broader energy transition goals. The GGH Program's emphasis on fuel substitution and gas savings led to deeper emissions reductions. The GGH Program achieved 575.87 Metric Tons of CO2 emission reductions. Nearly all program savings and emission reduction impacts (97%) are driven by standard loan projects rather than micro-loan equipment purchases. The consumption analysis confirmed that Electrification of major energy using systems, such as HVAC and water heating, eliminates the need to use gas and these measure types typically provide the highest impact from a savings perspective (more so than window/door measures and appliances).

However, the evaluation team's review of measures adopted through the program and analysis of participant-specific pre-post models suggests that fuel substitution may not be fully documented or tracked as part of the program tracking data. The evaluation team found that among 581 participants for whom we had both gas and electricity savings estimates and without known fuel substitution measures in the tracking data, 131 participants increased electricity consumption and decreased gas consumption after participation in the GGH Program.

- Recommendation 6: Require contractors/customers to mark whether their financed project is for fuel substitution
  on their loan application. Train contractors to coach customers on the meaning of fuel substitution and how it
  impacts their project, so customers are familiar with the concept when applying for GGH Program financing.
- Recommendation 7: Align GGH Program performance metrics with program objectives. If fuel substitution is a viable
  program objective, add growth in fuel substitution projects and emission reductions over time as a program
  performance metric for future tracking. Verifying whether the GGH Program produces energy savings does not
  currently provide the full context of program impacts.

### CONCLUSION 7: CUSTOMERS INTERESTED IN FUEL SUBSTITUTION HAVE THE GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR PROGRAM IMPACT.

Not all GGH Program standard loan projects contributed equally to energy savings for participants. Among the 61% of standard loan participants that were "positive savers," those with known fuel substitution measures were more likely to deliver deeper positive savings. This is likely because "positive savers" with known fuel substitution measures undertook larger projects with multiple end-uses. Additionally, "positive savers" that installed HVAC, weatherization, and Opinion Dynamics

water heating measures achieved deeper savings compared to participants who installed cool roof and window/door measures.

Overall, "positive savers" were more likely to have higher average baseline usage. As baseline usage of a participant increases, so does the energy savings. In an exception to this rule, net metering customers experienced much higher annual per-participant energy savings than non-net metering customers (588 kWh compared to 111 kWh respectively) despite having a much lower baseline grid electricity usage. Customers who have already invested in solar have a vested interest in fuel substitution because their solar panel generation offsets their electricity usage, not their gas usage. A greater number of net metering customers had known fuel substitution measures included in their GGH Program projects than non-net metering customers (17% compared to 9%, respectively). Among "positive savers," net metering participants in climate zones 10-13 (primarily Central California) saw nearly double the savings from GGH Program projects than non-net metering participants in these same areas. This was highly correlated to net metering customers having a higher incidence of installing HVAC measures as part of their GGH Program projects compared to non-net metering customers.

- Recommendation 8: Emphasize GGH Program promotion among enrolled HVAC contractors. HVAC projects have the greatest opportunity for savings among standard loan participants.
- Recommendation 9: Develop marketing collateral that emphasizes the benefits of fuel substitution and the opportunities to offset upfront costs of fuel substitution with GGH Program financing (this could be developed in coordination with the TECH Program). Target solar customers with this GGH program literature to increase awareness among customers with the greatest opportunity for savings.

#### CONCLUSION 8: THE GGH PROGRAM INFLUENCES CUSTOMER DECISION-MAKING.

Overall, the GGH Program financing is influencing the majority of participants to make upgrades. More than half of standard loan survey respondents (54%) and nearly two-thirds of micro-loan respondents (61%) said they would have been unlikely to make their home upgrade at all in absence of the GGH Program financing. All the micro-loan respondents (n=60) and 90% of the standard loan respondents (n=144) indicated the GGH Program financing was influential on their decision to complete their home upgrade. Among those standard loan respondents who received a rebate for their home upgrade (in addition to the financing), more than half (16 of 29) said the financing was more important to their decision to complete the home upgrade than the rebate. Standard loan participants were most motivated to use the GGH Program financing because of the low interest rates, while micro-loan participants were most motivated by the easy process. Please see Section 7.4.1 for more information.

## I.4.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 5: GAUGE IF RESOLUTION E-4900 METRICS REMAIN VALID INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE FOR THE CURRENT/FUTURE GGH PROGRAM, IF THERE ARE NEW METRICS TO TRACK, AND/OR IF ORIGINAL METRICS SHOULD BE MODIFIED

### CONCLUSION 9: GGH PROGRAM PERFORMANCE METRICS DO NOT HAVE TARGETS TO ADEQUATELY MEASURE SUCCESS.

Without established targets, the Resolution E-4900 metrics are not sufficient to adequately measure program success. CAEATFA collects all the data necessary to track and monitor the metrics established by Resolution E-4900 but it is not possible for the evaluation team to determine if the program is successfully meeting these metrics without targets or benchmarked data. For the purposes of this evaluation, the team measured GGH Program success in comparison to

the REEL Pilot period. Moving forward, to adequately measure if the GGH Program is operating as intended, these metrics will need to be compared to established targets.

• Recommendation 10: The CPUC should coordinate an effort to establish targets for the Resolution E-4900 metrics based on baseline evaluation results (during the current evaluation period) or benchmarked data. Revisit these targets on a regular basis to determine whether they are viable targets for future stages of the program. For instance, as the program matures, monitoring default rates separately by micro- and standard loans will allow for identification of potential risks early on.

#### 2. PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND STUDY PURPOSE

This chapter provides an overview of the program design and introduces the study research objectives.

#### 2.1 PROGRAM HISTORY

Figure 2 presents a brief history of the GGH Program. In 2012, the CPUC allocated up to \$25 million in ratepayer funds to test the effectiveness of financing as a mechanism to make EE improvements more affordable to residential homeowners.<sup>9</sup> Through the REEL Pilot, the CPUC tested the ability to leverage ratepayer funds to stimulate deeper energy savings than the state has historically achieved through other market incentives, such as rebates. The goals of the Pilot were to attract private capital to increase the volume of EE financing available, increase the penetration of EE upgrades in California, and attempt to reach residents in LMI markets. CAEATFA administered the REEL Pilot, which issued its first loan in July 2016. The evaluation team completed the first evaluation of the REEL Pilot in 2019, covering the period of July 2016 to June 30, 2018.

The CPUC expanded the REEL Pilot into a full-scale program via Resolution E-5072 pursuant to Decision 17-03-026, issued on April 17, 2020. The Program was later renamed the GoGreen Home Financing Program (GGH Program) in August 2021 as part of a renewed marketing effort. The GGH Program received authorization for additional funding through June 30, 2027, via Decision 21-08-006 Rulemaking 20-08-022 released on August 5, 2021. CAEATFA remains the GGH Program administrator.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The CPUC provided guidance for, allocated budget to, and ordered the implementation of the energy efficiency financing pilots via Decisions 12-05-015, 12-11-015, and 13-09-044 (pg. 114).

Figure 2. GGH Program History

2012	CPUC allocates \$75.2 million in ratepayer funds to test financing as a mechanism to make energy efficiency improvements more affordable; \$25 million is reserved for residential LLR
July 2016	• REEL Pilot issues first loan
March 2017	CPUC D.17-03-026 gives CAEATFA flexibility to modify REEL Pilot
Decembe r 2017	CPUC specifies program performance metrics and EM&V process via R. E-4900
March 2018	First REEL Pilot modifications go into effect
January 2020	Opinion Dynamics completes evaluation of REEL Pilot period
April 2020	• R. E-5072 pursuant to D. 17-03-026 expands REEL Pilot into full-scale Program; calls for additional rulemaking process
August 2021	CPUC approves additional funding requested by CAEATFA and IOUs     Program is renamed to the GoGreen Home Financing Program (GGH Program)
September 2021	• CAEATFA introduces micro-loans, Enervee developes first formal micro-loan offering via Enervee operated, SoCalGas online marketplace
September 2022	GGH Program changes go into effect based on evaluation and stakeholder feedback
June 2023	<ul> <li>Micro-loans relaunched, available on SoCalGas and SCE online marketplace operated by Enervee. By March 2024, micro-loans are available on Envervee's own website, available to customers of California electricty IOUs.</li> </ul>

#### 2.2 PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

Like the REEL Pilot, the GGH Program aims to expand the adoption of EE improvements by reducing the hurdle of upfront cost for customers via financing. This evaluation focuses on GGH Program operations and performance from July 2018 to June 30, 2023 (referred hereafter as the "evaluation period"). During the evaluation period, the GGH Program operated by establishing an LLR as a risk mitigation strategy for lenders that enroll and offer GGH Program loans to customers. <sup>10</sup> The evaluation analyzed two types of GGH Program loans:

- Standard loans: Up to \$50,000 for major EE improvement projects typically implemented through GGH contractors. The loans are available to residential property owners and renters who receive gas or electricity from one of the four California IOUs. However, as most of the EE improvements stay with the building, renters are unlikely to take standard loans.
- Micro-loans: Up to \$5,000 for eligible EEEM purchases. EEEMs financed via micro-loans are typically appliances
  available to homeowners and renters and many are eligible for self-installation (i.e., do not require a contractor to
  install). Micro-loans were introduced as a component of the program in September 2021. During the evaluation

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> To incent lending to underserved borrowers, the GGH LLR contribution (i.e., the percentage of the original and eligible loan amount CAEATFA puts into the LLR) is set at 20% of the loan value for underserved borrowers and 11% for other borrowers, mitigating a greater portion of lender risk.

period, micro-loans were only available to SoCalGas customers and SCE customers via the SoCalGas and SCE Marketplace operated by Enervee.

For each project/EEEM financed via a GGH Program loan, CAEATFA puts money into the LLR equal to a percentage of the original loan amount. This percentage was  $11\%^{11}$  for loans distributed to market rate borrowers and 20% for loans distributed to borrowers identified as meeting at least one criteria under the GGH Program's definition of underserved: (1) credit score below 640, (2) property in an LMI census tract (i.e., census tract AMI does not exceed 120% the AMI of metropolitan area, county, or state), and (3) LMI household income (household income at or below current annual income limit determined by California Department of Housing and Community Development based on country and family size).

The LLR can cover up to 90% of potential losses experienced by lenders in cases of loan default. This mitigates a large portion of lender risk, enabling lenders to offer loans for EE projects and EEEMs with lower interest rates, longer payback periods, and broader eligibility criteria. The better loan terms and broadened eligibility criteria reduce monthly payments and aim to enhance market coverage in underserved market segments, such as LMI or credit-challenged borrowers.

In addition to the GGH Program loan, borrowers may qualify for utility rebates to further lower the upfront cost of eligible equipment. Utility rebates for EEMs purchased via the Enervee marketplace or IOU online Marketplaces operated by Enervee are applied at point-of-sale. Standard loan borrowers may also receive utility rebates; however, the business models/capabilities of standard loan lenders do not allow for the application of rebates at the point of sale.

#### 2.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The overarching purpose of this study was to reassess the performance of GGH since scaling beyond the initial pilot stage. Based on metrics adopted in Resolution E-4900,<sup>12</sup> included for reference in Appendix B, as well as additional performance metrics agreed upon by the CPUC and evaluation team, this study has the following specific research objectives:

- 1. Assess whether GGH is scalable, by analyzing the following:
  - a. Growth in the number of loans on a month-by-month basis over the evaluation period (July 2018 to June 30, 2023);
  - b. The number of loans made by the program, average loan size, and total amount of financing generated (since Resolution E-5072 was adopted);
  - c. The geographic distribution of loans, including the ability to reach new regions of the state, especially those with large, underserved populations;
  - d. Loan performance to date in terms of defaults, late payments, and use of LLR; and
  - e. Participant details, including credit scores, loan terms, percent underserved, and percent who may qualify for other private loan options (e.g., based on credit score and income).
- 2. Identify whether GGH is leveraged by private capital and support, by tracking the following:
  - a. The number and type of participating financial institutions and program-certified contractors (i.e., program "partners"), including an analysis of the distribution of participation across partners;
  - b. Any changes CAEATFA made from the REEL Pilot to attract additional funding for the GGH Program and the total amount of private capital attracted to date;

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c. Any program modifications CAEATFA implemented (or proposes to implement) to improve consumer protections and attract additional lenders;

 $<sup>^{11}</sup>$  Although 11% over the duration of the evaluation period, CAEATFA reduced this percentage to 5% in December 2023.

<sup>12</sup> D.21-08-006

- d. The incidence of early payoffs and the implications of this on savings and annual percentage rate (APR) benefits; and whether customer early repayments alter the attractiveness of participation for lenders; and
- e. Whether the incremental funds from additional ratepayer funding were needed to implement GGH, and if so, how much.
- 3. Gauge whether GGH reaches underserved Californians who would not otherwise have participated in EE upgrades and explore the possibilities,<sup>13</sup> benefits and drawbacks of modifying how CAEATFA defines "underserved," by reviewing the following:
  - a. Credit scores of loan participants reported on an aggregate basis;
  - b. Length of time allowed for applicants to pay back the loans;
  - c. Percentage of participants deemed "underserved" as measured through CalEnviroScreen data, AMI, or other poverty statistics (including a comparison across California's definitions for customers in vulnerable populations [e.g., underserved, hard-to-reach, disadvantaged communities, low income/moderate income/market rate]);
  - d. How other entities define "underserved" Californians in comparison to GGH; and
  - e. Whether participants would have qualified for existing private EE loan programs at interest rates and terms they could afford or would accept.
- 4. **Verify that GGH produces energy savings**, by assessing the following:
  - a. Customer meter data provided by the utilities to conduct a consumption analysis and understand how much energy savings GGH produced, including electric and gas savings, taking into account fuel shifting from gas to electric, per participant and overall;
  - b. Differences in energy savings achieved across subpopulations of interest, such as climate zone, loan size, loan recipient type (e.g., LMI), presence of solar generation, and presence of fuel substitution, provided participation levels and available data allow for such comparisons;
  - c. Energy savings from other loan programs and comparing the EM&V results to those of the GGH Program;
  - d. The influence of the program on customer decision-making and relative influence of financing and rebates, where applicable;
  - e. Source energy and CO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions from financed projects (including fuel substitution measures).
- 5. **Gauge if Resolution E-4900 metrics remain valid performance indicators** for the current/future GGH Program, if there are new metrics to track, and/or if original metrics should be modified.

#### 3. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

CPUC issued Resolution E-4900 to establish metrics for measuring financing pilot success and require regular EM&V of the financing pilots, including the GGH Program. When CPUC elevated the REEL Pilot to a full-scale program via Resolution E-5072, the CPUC required an evaluation of the REEL Pilot (now GGH Program) by April 30, 2024. Resolution E-5072 suggested that the evaluation cover additional metrics beyond Resolution E-4900. The evaluation team measured GGH Program performance against the Resolution E-4900 metrics as well as additional evaluation metrics discussed with the CPUC to fully address this study's research objectives and cover the Resolution E-5072 requirements. The full list of metrics the evaluation team used to measure GGH Program performance are listed in Table 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> GGH regulations define underserved borrowers as those have a credit score below 640, whose property is in a LMI) census tract ((i.e., census tract AMI does not success 120% of AMI of metropolitan area, county, or state)), whose household income is LMI (household income at or below current annual income limit determined by California Department of Housing and Community Development based on country and family size).

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Table 3. EE Financing Pilot Metrics

Research Objective	Resolution E-4900 Metrica	Additional GGH Program Evaluation Metrics
The financing tool is <b>scalable</b>	Number of loans made by the Pilot, with breakdown by:  Growth in the number of loans on a month-bymonth basis over the lifetime of the Pilot  Total amount of financing generated by the Pilot  Geographic distribution of loans, including the ability to reach new regions of the state, especially those with large, underserved populations	<ul> <li>The number of loans made by the program and average loan size (since Resolution E-5072 was adopted)</li> <li>Loan performance to date in terms of defaults, late payments, and use of loan loss reserve</li> <li>Participant details including credit scores, loan terms, percent underserved, and percent who may qualify for other private loan options (e.g., based on credit score and income)</li> </ul>
The financing tool is <b>leveraged</b> by private capital and support	Private capital participation in the Pilot, as measured by:  Number of financial institutions participating in the Pilot and types of financial institutions participating (such as credit unions)  Amount of private capital attracted	<ul> <li>The number and type of program-certified contractors</li> <li>Analysis of the distribution of participation across participating financial institutions and program-certified contractors</li> <li>Any changes CAEATFA made from the REEL pilot to attract additional funding for GGH;</li> <li>Any program modifications CAEATFA implemented (or proposes to implement) to improve consumer protections and attract additional lenders;</li> <li>The incidence of early payoffs and the implications of this on savings and annual percentage rate (APR) benefits; and whether customer early repayments alter the attractiveness of participation for lenders</li> <li>Whether the incremental funds from additional ratepayer funding were needed to implement GGH, and if so, how much</li> </ul>
The financing tool reaches underserved Californians who would not otherwise have participated in EE upgrades	<ul> <li>Analysis of participants in the Pilot, according to:         <ul> <li>Credit scores of loan participants reported on an aggregate basis</li> <li>Length of time allowed for applicants to pay back the loans</li> <li>Percentage of participants deemed "underserved" as measured through CalEnviroScreen data, AMI, or other poverty statistics</li> <li>Whether participants would have qualified for existing private energy efficiency loan programs at interest rates and terms that they can afford or would accept</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Comparison of participation across California's definitions for customers in vulnerable populations [e.g., underserved, hard-to-reach, disadvantaged communities, low income/moderate income/market rate])</li> <li>How other entities define "underserved" Californians in comparison to the Program</li> </ul>
The financing tool produces energy savings	<ul> <li>Energy savings that resulted, as measured:</li> <li>Through customer meter data provided by the utilities via Energy Division data request (customer privacy must be maintained)</li> <li>Through Normalized Metered Energy Consumption (NMEC) analysis, as an option</li> <li>Comparison of energy savings from other loan programs to that of the pilot, if possible, to assess through EM&amp;V studies</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Average energy savings per participant</li> <li>Differences in energy savings achieved across subpopulations of interest, such as climate zone, loan size, loan recipient type (LMI), presence of solar generation, and presence of fuel substitution</li> <li>The influence of the program on customer decision-making and relative influence of financing and rebates</li> <li>Source energy and CO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions from financed projects (including fuel substitution measures)</li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup>Source: CPUC Resolution E-4900. December 18, 2018.

Note: Blue text indicates the Resolution E-5072 requirements for evaluation beyond Resolution E-4900.

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This report includes results from a range of data collection and analytical methods to support evaluation of GGH Program performance based on the metrics discussed in Table 3. Table 4 summarizes the specific tasks undertaken to conduct this evaluation. Detailed descriptions of the methods are available in Appendix A.

Table 4. Summary of Program Evaluation Tasks

Evaluation Task	Summary of Research Activities Performed					
Data Review and Program Staff Interviews	The evaluation team reviewed existing program materials and data provided by CAEATFA and the IOUs. Additionally, the team conducted in-depth interviews with CAEATFA and Enervee (the current implementer of the GGH Program's Eco-Financing micro-loan component) to confirm program design and implementation details, inform subsequent evaluation tasks, and understand program participation.					
Participation Analysis	The evaluation team analyzed primary participation data to assess program accomplishments over time and characterize participants in terms of borrower characteristics (e.g., credit score, debt-to-income [DTI] ratio, geographic distribution, climate zone, home upgrade project/EEEM purchase characteristics, and loan size).					
Impact Analysis	<ul> <li>The evaluation team verified energy savings produced by measures financed through GGH using three methods:         <ul> <li>A consumption analysis for standard loan projects:</li> <li>The team estimated individual pre-post models to identify drivers of energy savings</li> <li>The team estimated annual per-household electricity and gas savings using linear fixed effects regression (LFER) models.</li> </ul> </li> <li>A deemed savings application for micro-loan measures:         <ul> <li>The team applied deemed savings from California's eTRM to estimate energy savings for EEEMs purchased through the California Enervee Marketplace and financed through the GGH Program<sup>a</sup></li> </ul> </li> <li>A source energy savings review to quantify environmental impacts from the GGH-financed projects:         <ul> <li>The team estimated emissions reduction using CPUC's Fuel Substitution Technical Guidance for Energy Efficiency. The accompanying emissions reduction calculator was used, and assumptions were updated to match this evaluation context.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>					
Participant Surveys and Interviews	<ul> <li>The evaluation team fielded two online surveys with GGH Program participants; 204 participants completed the surveys:</li> <li>144 standard loan participants (65 who installed a fuel substitution measure, 79 who did not install a fuel substitution measure), and</li> <li>60 micro-loan participants.</li> <li>The surveys supported the team by aiding in understanding the participant experience, collecting information about participants' households, and increasing understanding of any nonroutine adjustments participants made to their homes or behaviors after completing a home upgrade/purchasing EEEMs (to provide context for the consumption analysis).</li> <li>As a follow-up to the online surveys, the team interviewed 13 participants identified by the consumption analysis as having increased energy usage after program participation. The phone interviews aimed to further illuminate non-routine events associated with standard loan participants.</li> </ul>					
Program Influence Analysis	The team used self-reported data from the participant surveys to qualitatively understand the influence of GGH financing compared to other financing options available, understand the relative influence between financing and rebates when customers take advantage of both, and assess the influence of the GGH Program on customer decision-making when considering home energy improvements and purchase of EEEMs.					

a "ETRM Overview." California Technical Forum, www.caltf.org/etrm-overview. Accessed 01 March. 2024

#### 4. PROGRAM SCALABILITY

The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether the GGH Program is further scalable, by analyzing the following:

- Growth in the number of loans on a month-by-month basis over the evaluation period (July 1, 2018–June 30, 2023);
- The number of loans made by the program, average loan size, and total amount of financing generated (since the adoption of Resolution E-5072 in April 2020);
- The geographic distribution of loans, including the ability to reach new regions of the state, especially those with large, underserved populations;
- Loan performance to date in terms of defaults, late payments, and use of LLR; and
- Participant characteristics including credit scores, loan terms, the percent underserved, and the percent who may
  qualify for other private loan options (e.g., based on Fair, Isaac and Company [FICO] score and income).

The evaluation team reviewed program tracking data, conducted a participation analysis, and completed participant surveys with standard loan and micro-loan borrowers to assess program scalability.

#### 4.1 HISTORICAL GROWTH IN LOANS

During the evaluation period, the GGH Program facilitated 3,887 loans (3,320 standard loans and 567 micro-loans). Figure 3 shows the number of standard loans and micro-loans facilitated each month. The number of loans per month steadily increased while experiencing seasonal fluctuations, typically peaking in the summer months. As expected, the monetary volume of the loans distributed each month increased with the number of loans. There was an increase in standard loans per month from 22 to 73 loans on average after the GGH Program was elevated to full-scale program status by the passage of Resolution E-5072 in April 2020.

One Finance (the GGH Program's first micro-loan provider) issued its first micro-loan in September 2021. However, they did not continue with the GGH Program and issued their last micro-loan nine months later, in June 2022. Lewis and Clark Bank joined the GGH Program in June 2023 as a micro-loan provider. The GGH Program did not offer micro-loans to customers between July 2022 and May 2023.

300 \$4.000.000 \$3,500,000 250 \$3,000,000 Pilot Changes Rulemaking 200 \$2,500,000 (\$ Loans (#) 150 \$2,000,000 \$1,500,000 100 \$1,000,000 \$500,000 2019 2022 2021 Micro-loans Loan Volume Linear (# of Loans)

Figure 3. Quantity and Volume of GGH Loans Over Time

#### 4.2 PROGRAM LOAN GENERATION

Standard Loans

Table 5 presents the number of loans, average number of loans per month, average loan size, and total amount of financing generated in the pre-Resolution E-5072 (July 2018 – March 2020), post-Resolution E-5072 (April 2020 – June 2023), and full evaluation period (July 2018-June 2023). Of the 3,320 standard loans distributed over the course of the evaluation period, 15% (accounting for \$8,291,075 of financing) were distributed under the REEL Pilot, and the remaining 85% (accounting for \$52,308,912 of financing) were distributed under the GGH Program. Since micro-loans launched in September 2021, all 567 microloans (accounting for \$849,209 of financing) were administered post-Resolution E-5072. More than 99% of the loan principal amount was eligible for claims, implying that almost all of the finances generated went towards installing EEEMs.<sup>14</sup>

Across the entire evaluation period, standard loans distributed per month averaged 66, a notable increase from the average of 9 loans per month during the Pilot period (Pilot initiation-June 2018). Over the months that micro-loans were available, 57 micro-loans were distributed each month on average.

The average standard loan size was \$17,095 in the pre-resolution E-5072 period and \$18,451 in the post-resolution E-5072 period, representing a nominal increase in loan amount by 7%. However, construction costs increased in

<sup>14</sup> Borrowers must use at least 70% of their GGH loan to fund EEMs. The claim-eligible portion of the loan amount includes the cost of the EEMs and up to 30% of the cost of additional home improvements and any costs incurred as part of EEM installation (e.g., permits, electrical panel upgrades, etc.)..

California by 5% between July 2018 and March 2020 and 37% between April 2020 and June 2023. As such, standard loan projects likely did not actually increase in scope post-resolution E-5072.15

Table 5. Number of Loans, Total Amount of Financing Generated, and Average Loan Size

Evaluation Period	Pre-Resolution E-5072 (July 2018–March 2020)		Post-Resolu (April 2020-	tion E-5072 -June 2023)	Total Evaluation Period (July 2018-June 2023)	
Loan Category	Standard Loans	Micro-Loans <sup>a</sup>	Standard Loans	Micro-Loans	Standard Loans	Micro-Loans
Number of Loans	485	N/A	2,835	567	3,320	567
Average Number of Loans Per Month <sup>b</sup>	22	N/A	73	57	66	57
Total Amount of Financing	\$8,291,075	N/A	\$52,308,912	\$849,209	\$60,599,987	\$849,209
Average Loan Size	\$17,095	N/A	\$18,451	\$1,498	\$18,253	\$1,498

Source: CAEATFA tracking data.

#### 4.3 GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS

The previous evaluation found that most of the participation in the REEL Pilot was in Southern California. Since the previous evaluation, four regional lenders have joined the program, and existing lenders have expanded their loan distribution to larger parts of the state. Figure 4 shows the distribution of GGH loans throughout California in the current evaluation period before and after Resolution E-5072, distinguishing between loans provided by the two statewide standard loan lenders, regional standard loan lenders, and the micro-loans offered via the SCE or SoCalGas Marketplace operated by Enervee. 16 It should be noted that the lenders cannot legally consider the location of the borrower while approving loans. As such, the Program implementer or lenders do not directly control the geographic distribution of loans. Rather, the geographic distribution is determined by factors such as location of enrolled lenders, contractors, and IOU boundaries.

As in the Pilot period, a large proportion of the statewide standard loans were provided in Southern California. Despite operating statewide, the two statewide lenders' branch locations are limited to Southern California: however, customers may apply and qualify for loans virtually as well as in-person at branch locations. Unlike during the Pilot period, statewide lenders distributed a sizeable number of standard loans to customers in the Central (Central Corridor) and Northern (Bay Area) parts of the state. Additionally, there was a notable increase in loans provided by regional standard loan lenders that CAEATFA recruited to the program after the Pilot period. Regional standard loan lenders were primarily concentrated in the North Central Corridor and the Bay Area.

In alignment with micro-loans solely being available to SoCalGas and SCE customers via the SoCalGas Marketplace operated by Enervee during the evaluation period, micro-loans were concentrated in Southern California. By March of 2024, Enervee introduced micro-loans to the Enervee California Marketplace, broadening their availability to customers receiving electricity from SCE, PG&E and SDG&E.17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Micro-loans launched in September 2021 after the CPUC issued Resolution E-5072.

b The team calculated average micro-loans per month using periods during which micro-loans were offered (September 2021 to June 2022 and June 2023.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Construction cost inflation is estimated from DGS California Construction Cost Index CCCI:

https://www.dgs.ca.gov/RESD/Resources/Page-Content/Real-Estate-Services-Division-Resources-List-Folder/DGS-California-Construction-Cost-Index-CCCI

<sup>16</sup> Prior to TECH LLR funding in 2022, funding through the Program could only facilitate loans to customers in the IOU territories. Publicly Owned Utility (POU) territories are not shown to avoid complexity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> As per https://ca.enervee.com/ on March 11, 2024.

GGH Loans by Lender (pre-Resolution)

\* Statewide Standard Loan

\* Regional Standard Loan

\* Micro-loan

Figure 4. Geographic Distribution of Loans by Lender Type

Figure 5 shows the loan density by county (per 100,000 residents). The figure shows that loans were more concentrated in the North Central Corridor than in Southern California. This observation further reinforces the geographic shift of loan distribution from the Pilot period to the current evaluation period. As previously mentioned, this is due to the introduction of a new regional standard loan lender.



Figure 5. Loan Density by County

As previously mentioned, the GGH Program aims to provide underserved customers with financing for EE improvements with favorable terms. Figure 6 shows the distribution of loans by census tract, with census tracts identified as underserved highlighted in green. Despite the large percentage of California identified as underserved, only 50% of loans fell within an underserved census tract. The density of loans to underserved borrowers closely follows the population density.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> For the purpose of this map, underserved census tracts were identified as (1) disadvantaged communities, (2) low-income communities as defined by paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Section 39713 of Health and Safety Code, ( –census tracts with median household incomes at or below 80% of the statewide median income or with median household incomes at or below the threshold designated as low income by the Department of Housing and Community Development's list of state income limits adopted pursuant to Section 50093 (3) tracts meeting CALEPA disadvantaged community criteria, (4) tracts where 75%+ of public-school students receive free or reduced-price meals, and (5) federally recognized tribal lands.




Figure 6. Loan Density by Census Tract - Underserved Census Tracts

#### 4.4 LOAN PERFORMANCE

Although most standard loan and micro-loan borrowers were up to date or ahead on loan payments at the end of the evaluation period, loan performance was better among standard loan borrowers than micro-loan borrowers. Table 6 depicts the distribution of loans by payment status and loan type as of the end of the evaluation period (June 30, 2023). Of the loans distributed during the evaluation period, 80% of standard loans and 56% of micro-loans were current on payments. By the end of the evaluation period, a larger percentage of micro-loans than standard loans had been defaulted (16% vs. 1%). Additionally, a larger percentage of micro-loan payments were past-due relative to standard loan payments (14% vs. <1%). Notably, the higher rate of default among micro-loans relative to standard loans is reflective of micro-loans reaching a higher proportion of underserved borrowers than standard loans, a main objective of the Program overall. Detailed results on the reach of micro-loans and standard loans to underserved borrowers are discussed in Section 6.2. The incidence of pay-off was similar by loan type, with 18% of standard loans (up from 6% in the Pilot period) and 13% of micro-loans distributed during the evaluation period paid in full by the end of the period.

Table 6. Loan Performance as of June 30, 2023

Loan	Standard Loan				Micro-loan			
Payment Status	Loan Count	Original Loan Amount	Outstanding Loan Amount	Amount Defaulted	Loan Count	Original Loan amount	Outstanding Loan Amount	Amount Defaulted
Paid in Full	607	\$9,396,023	\$0	NA	75	\$96,925	\$0	NA
Current	2,660	\$50,453,000	\$42,312,398	NA	320	\$484,081	\$327,054	NA
30 Days Past Due	7	\$95,290	\$58,299	NA	32	\$56,637	\$39,288	NA
60 Days Past Due	6	\$103,144	\$68,729	NA	22	\$34,148	\$24,322	NA
90 Days Past Due	1	\$11,096	\$8,231	NA	21	\$29,423	\$19,300	NA
120 Days Past Due	NA	NA	NA	NA	7	\$14,337	\$11,652	NA
150 Days Past Due	NA	NA	NA	NA	0	\$0	\$0	NA
Defaulted	39	\$541,435	\$342,128	\$479,970	90	\$133,658	\$13,111	\$113,504
Total	3,320	\$60,599,987	\$42,789,784	\$479,970	567	\$849,209	\$434,727	\$113,504

As seen in Table 7, California Coast Credit Union and Matadors Community Credit Union accounted for 34 of the 39 defaulted standard loans distributed during the evaluation period (87% of claimed paid off by CAEATFA using the LLR). However, California Coast Credit Union and Matadors Community Credit Union, the two statewide standard loan providers, were among the top three standard loan providers in terms of number of standard loans distributed during the evaluation period (accounting for 60% of total standard loans distributed). Only 2% of the standard loans distributed by California Coast Credit Union and Matadors Community Credit Union had defaulted by the end of the evaluation period. CAEATFA distributed LLR funds to lenders equal to a percentage of the loan amount defaulted. In the case of standard loans, LLR funds covered 89% to 90% of defaulted standard loan financing. As of the end of evaluation period, LLR funds covered 35% of defaulted micro-loan financing.

Table 7. Defaults and Claims Paid as of June 30, 2023

Lender	Loan Count	Default Amount at Time of Default	CAEATFA Distributed LLR Funds	Recoveries Paid to Program
Standard Loan				
California Coast Credit Uniona	24	\$289,385	\$257,820	\$(16,018)
Matadors Community Credit Uniona	10	\$126,495	\$113,846	\$0
First US Community Credit Union	2	\$21,527	\$19,375	\$0
Valley Oak Credit Uniona	2	\$28,132	\$25,318	\$0
Travis Credit Union	1	\$14,432	\$12,988	\$0
Standard Loan Total	39	\$479,970	\$429,347	(16,018)
Standard Loan Net Credit Enhanceme	nt Funds Exper	nded – Standard Lo	an	\$413,329
Micro-loan				
One Finance	90	\$113,504	\$39,706	\$0
Micro-loan Total	90	\$113,504	\$39,706	\$0
Standard Loan Net Credit Enhanceme	\$39,706			
Total Loans	129	\$593,474	\$469,053	\$(16,018)
Standard Loan Net Credit Enhanceme	nt Funds Exper	nded – All Loans		\$453,035

Source: CAEATFA tracking data. a Indicates legacy lenders that enrolled and began loans in the pilot period prior to July 2018.

#### 4.5 PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS

Figure 7 summarizes the participation of this evaluation period across six key characteristics: FICO credit score, debt-to-income (DTI) ratio, CalEnviroScreen score, LMI census tract, loan term, and household income. Notably, whereas the first five characteristics are summarized for all participants, household income is only available for participants who completed the participant survey. See Section 6 for further details and a discussion of these characteristics.

Figure 7. Summary of Participant Characteristics



Range	Standard Loan	Micro-loan
580-640 (Fair)	4%	50%
641-700 (Fair/Good)	15%	29%
701-760 (Good/Very Good)	29%	17%
761-820 (Very Good/Exceptional)	40%	4%
821+ (Exceptional)	12%	0%
NO FICO	<1%	0%



Range	Standard Loan
Under 25% (Less risk)	25%
25-35% (Some risk)	34%
36-45% (More risk)	27%
46-55% (Most risk)	14%



Range	Standard Loan	Micro-loan
0 - 25 (Least vulnerable)	30%	9%
26 - 50	34%	25%
51 - 75	23%	36%
76 - 100 (Most vulnerable)	13%	30%



Range	Standard Loan	Micro-loan
120+ (Non-LMI)	43%	29%
80 - <120 (LMI)	37%	41%
60 - <80 (LMI)	14%	20%
<60 (LMI)	6%	11%



Metric	(Months)	(Months)
Average	106	60
Median	120	60
Minimum	12	60
Maximum	180	60



Range	Standard Loan	Micro-loan
Less than \$25,000	1%	12%
\$25,000 to less than \$50,000	3%	22%
\$50,000 to less than \$100,000	12%	40%
\$100,000 to less than \$200,000	38%	13%
\$200,000 or more	24%	3%
Don't know/prefer not to say	23%	10%

The team compared the distribution of household income from the 2022 American Community Survey five-year estimates to that of the participant survey respondents who provided a valid 2022 income response (Table 8). Participation in the program is concentrated among households with an annual income of more than \$50,000 and increases among households with an annual income of \$100,000. Though more top-heavy than the state, the income distribution of GGH Program participants is not concentrated enough to warrant a re-focus of marketing efforts for future growth. Given that census data estimates that in 2022, half of households in California (over seven million) had an income less than \$100,000, there is ample opportunity for increasing GGH Program participation in lower-income households, particularly through micro-loans (see Table 22).

Table 8. Statewide Distribution of Households by Annual Income (Compared to Survey Respondents)

Household Income	2022 5-Year Estim	ate Census Data	Participant Surveys: Standard and Micro- loans		
	Count (Household)	Percent	Count (Respondent)	Percent	
Less than \$25,000	1,757,689	13%	9	5%	
\$25,000 to less than \$35,000	798,949	6%	7	4%	
\$35,000 to less than \$50,000	1,158,477	9%	10	6%	
\$50,000 to less than \$75,000	1,824,268	14%	20	12%	
\$75,000 to less than \$100,000	1,597,899	12%	21	13%	
\$100,000 to less than \$150,000	2,370,216	18%	35	21%	
\$150,000 to less than \$200,000	1,424,793	11%	28	17%	
\$200,000 or more	2,383,532	18%	36	22%	
Total	13,315,822	100%	166	100%	

Sources: 2022 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates and Standard Ioan and Micro-Ioan participant surveys.

The team compared the statewide distribution of households in LMI census tracts (defined as census tracts where the tract AMI does not exceed 120% of the AMI of the metropolitan area, county, or state) to that of all borrowers during the evaluation period. As seen in Table 9, whereas 34% of households statewide are in a non-LMI census tract, 41% of borrowers in the evaluation period were in a non-LMI tract.

Table 9. Statewide Distribution of Households by LMI Census Tract Status (Compared to All Borrowers)

Census Tract Median	2023 FFIEC Ce	nsus Data	CAEATFA Tra	CAEATFA Tracking Data		
Income/Area Median Income (Percentile)	Count (Households)	Percent	Count (Borrowers)	Percent		
120+ (Non-LMI)	4,462,008	34%	1,578	41%		
80 - <120 (LMI)	4,737,214	36%	1,465	38%		
60 - <80 (LMI)	2,290,213	17%	579	15%		
<60 (LMI)	1,560,340	12%	265	7%		
Not Known	121,154	1%	0	0%		
Total	13,170,929	100%	3,887	100%		

Sources: 2023 FFIEC Census Data and CAEATFA tracking data.

#### PROGRAM FINANCING SUPPORT

The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether the GGH Program is leveraged by private capital and support, by tracking:

- The number and type of participating financial institutions and program-certified contractors (i.e., program "partners"), including an analysis of the distribution of participation across partners;
- Any changes CAEATFA made from the REEL Pilot to attract additional funding for the GGH Program and the total amount of private capital attracted to date;
- Any program modifications CAEATFA implemented (or proposes to implement) to improve consumer protections and attract additional lenders;
- The incidence of early payoffs and the implications of this on savings and annual percentage rate (APR) benefits and whether customer early repayments alter the attractiveness of participation for lenders; and

• Whether the incremental funds from additional ratepayer funding were needed to implement the GGH Program, and if so, how much.

To address this research objective, the evaluation team reviewed program changes, reviewed program tracking data, and conducted a participation analysis.

#### 5.1 PARTICIPATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRIVATE CAPITAL GENERATED

Over the evaluation period, ten participating lenders distributed 3,887 GGH Program loans (3,320 standard loans, 567 micro-loans) to borrowers across the state, amounting to \$61.4M (\$60.6M standard loans, \$0.8M micro-loans) in private capital lending. This is an increase from the 212 loans amounting to \$3.7M in capital provided during the REEL Pilot. Only four lenders participated in the REEL Pilot. Approximately 43% of GGH financing came from the GGH Program's largest private capital lender, California Coast Credit Union. California Coast Credit Union is a legacy lender, having enrolled during the REEL Pilot and accounting for 71% of private capital in the pilot period. Matadors Community Credit Union, the second largest lender, accounted for 19% of the GGH Program's private capital. Matadors Community Credit Union was the first financial institution to enroll in the REEL Pilot and accounted for 23% of the Pilot's private capital. Both California Coast Credit Union and Matadors Community Credit Union operate statewide. During this evaluation period, there were six regional standard loan lenders, four of which each accounted for one percent or less of the Program's private capital; however, First US Community Credit Union and Travis Credit Union accounted for 18% and 15%, respectively. The two micro-loan providers accounted for 1% of the Program's private capital. Table 10 shows the number of loans, the amount of private financing, the ratepayer LLR contribution for each lender, and the proportion of GGH program private capital from the ten lenders between July 2018 and June 2023.

Table 10. Lender Characteristics

Lender	Lender Type	Date of First Loan	# of Loans	Original Loan Amount (Private Capital)	LLR Contribution	Proportion of GGH Private Capital	
Standard Loan Lenders							
California Coast Credit Uniona	Statewide	1/13/2017	1,455	\$26,522,262	\$4,103,433	43%	
Matadors Community Credit Union <sup>a</sup>	Statewide	7/19/2016	563	\$11,974,685	\$1,868,869	19%	
First US Community Credit Union	Regional	9/28/2018	694	\$11,040,132	\$1,742,842	18%	
Travis Credit Union	Regional	5/13/2021	510	\$9,477,075	\$1,689,482	15%	
Desert Valleys Federal Credit Union <sup>a</sup>	Regional	9/11/2017	47	\$787,520	\$98,744	1%	
Valley Oak Credit Uniona	Regional	11/28/2016	36	\$532,140	\$95,672	1%	
Eagle Community Credit Union	Regional	8/10/2018	12	\$210,348	\$36,311	<1%	
Pasadena Service Federal Credit Union	Regional	9/20/2018	3	\$55,824	\$9,206	<1%	
Standard Loan Total			3,320	\$60,599,987	\$9,644,559	99%	
Micro-loan Lenders							
One Finance	Statewide	9/30/2021	496	\$725,579	\$135,667	1%	
Lewis And Clark Bank	Statewide	6/9/2023	71	\$123,630	\$23,232	<1%	
Micro-loan Total			567	\$849,209	\$158,899	1%	
Total All GGH Loans			3,887	\$61,449,196	\$9,803,459	100%	

Source: CAEATFA tracking data. a Indicates legacy lenders that enrolled and began loans in the pilot period prior to July 2018.

Of the ten lenders that participated in the GGH Program between July 2018 and June 2023, four were legacy lenders who began participating during the Pilot period, and six enrolled during the evaluation period. Figure 8 depicts the timeline of when lenders began their participation.


Figure 8. Lender Participation Timeline



Source: CAEATFA tracking data.

Figure 9 shows the quantity and amount of loans over time relative to when new lenders joined the GGH Program.

Figure 9. Quantity and Amount of GGH Loans Over Time Relative to Lender Enrollment



Source: CAEATFA tracking data.

#### 5.2 EARLY LOAN PAYOFFS

Of the 3,320 standard loans and 567 micro-loans distributed during the evaluation period, 607 standard loans (18%) and 75 micro-loans (13%) were paid in full by the end of the evaluation period. The evaluation team used the original LLR funding date and date paid in full to calculate how far borrowers were into their loan term when they paid their loan off. The median standard loan term was 120 months (ten years), and the static micro-loan term was 60 months (five years). As seen in Table 11, of those who paid off their standard loan by the end of the evaluation period, about 19% paid off the loan within 5% of the loan term (six months at median standard loan term). 74% paid it off in the first 30% of the loan payoff term (three years at median standard loan term). Likewise, 25% of the micro-loan borrowers paid off their loans within six months, and 96% paid off their loans by 30% of the loan payoff term (18 months for micro-loans).

Table 11. Percentage of Time Through Loan Payoff Term at the Time of Full Payoff

Percentage Through Loan Term	Standard Loan		Micro-loan	
at Time of Payoff	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Immediate (<5%)	118	19%	10	13%
5% - <10%	101	17%	9	12%
10% - <20%	128	21%	26	35%
20% - <30%	100	16%	27	36%
30% - <40%	46	8%	3	4%
40% - <60%	55	9%	0	0%
60% - <80%	27	4%	0	0%
80% - 100%	22	4%	0	0%
Past term	10	2%	0	0%
Total	607	100%	75	100%

Source: CAEATFA tracking data

All participating lenders allow for and do not have any penalties or fees associated with early payoff (i.e., paying off the loan before the original loan payment term is over). As such, early payoffs do not affect APR; however, early payoff results in lenders receiving less cumulative interest than forecasted based on the original loan payoff term. The team used the original loss reserve funding date and date paid in full to estimate the interest paid over the actual payment period accounting for amortization. The team compared these estimates to lenders' initial estimates of cumulative interest expected over the original loan payoff period to estimate how much interest customers saved (and therefore lenders did not receive) due to early payoff.

As seen in Table 12, standard loan borrowers who paid off their loan early paid approximately \$370,000 in interest but saved over \$2.5 million by avoiding further interest payments, according to this estimate. Over \$2.3 million of these interest savings were associated with standard loan borrowers who paid off their loans within 30% of the original loan payoff term. Micro-loan borrowers who paid their loan off early paid approximately \$3,500 in interest but saved over \$20,000 in interest payments. Lenders are missing out on a sizeable amount of interest payments due to early payoffs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> For context, the average loan term of standard loans is 106 months. Opinion Dynamics

Table 12. Borrower Interest Savings Associated with Early Payoff

Percentage Through	Standard Loan		Micro-loan			
Loan Term at Time of Payoff	Interest Paid	Interest Saved	Percentage of Expected Interest Saved	Interest Paid	Interest Saved	Percentage of Expected Interest Saved
Immediate - <5%	\$16,692	\$830,240	98%	\$92	\$5,225	98%
5% - <10%	\$39,280	\$569,352	94%	\$151	\$2,066	93%
10% - <20%	\$109,237	\$690,060	86%	\$1,172	\$6,675	85%
20% - <30%	\$81,200	\$293,362	78%	\$1,756	\$6,002	77%
30% - <40%	\$43,882	\$90,869	67%	\$323	\$780	71%
40% - <60%	\$39,127	\$45,232	54%	N/A	N/A	N/A
60% - <80%	\$21,435	\$10,856	34%	N/A	N/A	N/A
80% - 100%	\$13,399	\$2,171	14%	N/A	N/A	N/A
On time or late	\$7,164	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Total	\$371,417	\$2,532,141	87%	\$3,494	\$20,748	86%

Note: The estimate is based on interest compounded at the daily level.

The participant surveys asked respondents how they paid for their project or equipment other than GGH Program financing to assess the financial resources respondents had available to them. As seen in Table 13, 28% of standard loan and 25% of micro-loan respondents indicated they supplemented their GGH Program loan using cash or a debit card. Two of the five standard loan respondents who used a credit card to supplement their GGH loan amount indicated they intended to pay off the balance immediately.

Table 13. Payment Methods Other Than GGH Financing

Payment Methods Other Than GGH Loan	Standard Loan (n=144)	Micro-loan (n=60)
None	58%	65%
Cash or debit card	28%	25%
Utility rebates/incentives	15%	8%
Other rebates/incentives (not from utility)	8%	0%
Credit card	3%	0%
Financing OTHER THAN the GoGreen Home Loan	3%	0%
Other	0%	0%

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: In addition to [the GoGreen Home Loan/EcoFinancing], did you use any of the following ways to pay for your project?

Note: Responses will not sum to 100% as multiple responses were permitted.

#### 5.3 PARTICIPATING CONTRACTORS

The evaluation team reviewed program tracking data provided by CAEATFA to analyze contractor participation in the GGH Program. Notably, the timeframe of the available data differed from the evaluation period. Therefore, project

counts do not align with the number of loans distributed during the evaluation period.<sup>20</sup> The CAEATFA contractor tracking data covers when the first contractor was approved as a GGH Program contractor (i.e., April 2016) through to September 2023 and includes all contractors regardless of whether they were removed or suspended from the Program.

Figure 10 shows that contractor enrollment has grown consistently since 2016, aside from a dip in enrollment in 2021. Of the 959 contractors in the tracking data, 786 were still enrolled as of September 2023, 121 were removed, and 52 were suspended.




Figure 10. Contractor Enrollment Over Time (April 2016-September 2023)

Source: CAEATFA contractor tracking data.

As seen in Table 14, about 43% of contractors approved as GGH Program Contractors (regardless of their current enrollment status) had not yet completed a GGH-financed project, and 48% had only completed between one and ten projects through the Program. Notably, the 465 contractors who did one to ten projects accounted for approximately the same proportion of total projects as the five contractors who did more than 100 projects each (27%). In the spring of 2023, CAEATFA instituted a delisting process for inactive contractors; however, many inactive contractors requested to remain enrolled.

Table 14. Number of Projects by Contractors Who Enrolled Between April 2016 and September 2023

Number of Projects (Range)	Contractors		Projects	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
None	413	43%	0	0%
1-10	465	48%	1,210	27%
11-30	54	6%	925	21%
31-60	17	2%	728	16%
61-100	5	1%	390	9%
More than 100	5	1%	1,208	27%
Total	959	100%	4,461	100%

Source: CAEATFA tracking data

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> CAEATFA program tracking data contains contractor names and identifiers for projects implemented by a contractor but does not include enrollment dates, and status of contractors. Duplicate contractor names in the program tracking data often have slight spelling variations. As such, the evaluation team used a separate contractor tracking data file provided by CAEATFA for the contractor participation analysis. Opinion Dynamics

Figure 11 depicts the number of enrolled and listed contractors per county as of September 2023 and loan concentration per county over the evaluation period.<sup>21</sup> In line with the geographic distribution of standard loans (Section 4.3), the areas with the most contractors were Southern California (in particular the Southern Coast), the Northern Central Corridor, and the Bay Area.




Figure 11. Geographic Distribution of Enrolled and Listed Contractors

Source: CAEATFA tracking data

Of the ten contractors who completed more than 60 projects through the GGH Program, nine served territories in the Northern Central Corridor and/or Bay Area, and only one served Southern California, suggesting differences in contractor engagement by service territory. Contractor engagement is another contributing factor to the rise of standard loan participation outside of Southern California. Notably, according to CAEATFA, the two major regional standard loan lenders, First US Community Credit Union and Travis Credit Union, have well-developed relationships with the participating contractors in their regions.

#### 5.4 PROGRAM CHANGES SINCE REEL

The REEL Pilot issued its first loan in July 2016. In November 2016, the CPUC issued a ruling requesting comment from parties on the next steps regarding REEL. In early 2017, in response to these comments and perceived issues with the Pilot, the CPUC issued Decision 17-03-026, giving CAEATFA flexibility to modify the REEL Pilot through an emergency rulemaking process, resulting in a group of Pilot modifications in March 2018. The modifications enacted in this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> A small number of contractors were enrolled in the GGH Program but not listed on the GGH Program website as of September 2023. Opinion Dynamics

rulemaking sought to simplify the participation process for lenders, broaden program eligibility, and increase program benefits.

The rulemaking included the following modifications:

- Adding a statewide list of EEEMs (previously, each IOU had its own individual set of eligible measures);
- Giving lenders the option of using average census tract income to determine LMI status instead of verifying borrower household income;
- Combining IOU credit enhancement funds into a single account to allow for statewide, consolidated LLR accounts for lenders and to provide a more valuable credit enhancement at the same overall cost;
- Decoupling EE measure eligibility for financing from eligibility for IOU rebate and incentive programs to allow for broader measure eligibility and simplify eligibility for lenders;
- Adding the option to file UCC-1 fixture filings (financing statement filed in the local jurisdiction where the debtor's
  property is located and then filed in property records) in loan terms, allowing lenders to place a priority on the loan;
  and
- Removal of program paperwork and forms that were proven to be burdensome to lenders.

In April 2020, following the completion of the first EM&V process for the REEL Pilot, the CPUC issued Resolution E-5072, transitioning the REEL Pilot into a full-scale program. The REEL Pilot was rebranded to the GoGreen Home Program in August 2021.

CAEATFA completed another rulemaking process to modify the GGH Program between the summer of 2021 and September 2022 in response to Decision 21-08-006 of the CPUC Clean Energy Financing Proceeding. These modifications specifically aimed to attract new lenders, further streamline the lender participation process, and enhance borrower protections.

The rulemaking introduced the following changes aimed at attracting new lenders:

- Adding equipment leases and service agreements as eligible for financing for residential customers (already available for commercial properties through the GoGreen Business Financing program);
- Creating a Channel Partner role to attract lenders that leverage partners to fulfill parts of the lending process (e.g., lenders that leverage partners for marketing, data submission, and deal generation);
- Creating the micro-loan product offering for financing under \$5,000;
- Reducing the minimum net worth eligibility requirement for lenders interested in participating in the GGH Program from \$1M to \$500,000; and
- Adding the option to establish up to three LLR accounts upon request for lenders who participate in the secondary market and want to maintain separate pools of loans (e.g., lenders may want to have separate loan pools if they have several funding sources or loan portfolio management plans).

The rulemaking also aimed to further streamline and simplify the lender participation process through the following:

Allowing CAEATFA to utilize non-IOU EE ratepayer sources of funding for credit enhancements, allowing for more
uniform measure eligibility across IOU and publicly owned utility (POU) areas (lenders' ability to receive credit
enhancement was previously limited to measures corresponding to an IOU fuel source, limiting the eligibility of
POU electric customers interested in fuel substitution from gas to electric and resulting in complicated eligibility
requirements);

- Allowing CAEATFA to accept loan and project information digitally and in batches rather than individual physical documents/PDFs; and
- Updating the project permit verification process to be completed by a GGH Program vendor during quality assurance checks.

Lastly, the rulemaking sought to provide additional consumer protections by introducing the following:

- Updating the borrower privacy disclosure to clarify the types of information shared by the Program with audiences and better align with California's Information Practices Act;
- Adding a requirement for financial providers offering loans for lease/service agreements to disclose either the APR or total project cost for each agreement added;
- Adding a requirement for lease/service agreement providers to guarantee functionality of the equipment if the borrower is paying an added ongoing service and maintenance fee; and
- Providing alternative eligibility requirements for lease/service agreement lenders who are not legally required to get a California Finance Lender's License in order to ensure the lender brings sufficient capital and experience.

As of June 2023, CAEATFA was considering several improvements (for future implementation) aimed at attracting additional, including the following:

- Allowing the deployment of interest rate buy-down (IRBD) promotions funded by external parties in the form of payment provided by CAEATFA directly to the private capital provider to reduce the customer's interest rate;
- Implementing an online project portal for lenders and contractors to use to submit loan and project data; and
- Addition of energy generation and storage measures as eligible measures (as granted by Decision 23.08.026).

### 5.5 ADDITIONAL PROGRAM FUNDING

The D.13-09-044 directed the IOUs to allocate \$75.2 million to kick-start and test multiple innovative EE-financing programs over an initial period ending June 30, 2022. Towards that end, CAEATFA launched the California Hub for Energy Efficiency Financing (CHEEF) programs, including the GGH program. Initially, an allocation of \$28.9 million was recommended for the GGH Program. The CHEEF programs received authorization for additional funding through June 30, 2027, via Decision 21-08-006 Rulemaking 20-08-022 released on August 5, 2021. That decision added an incremental fund of \$51.1 million to the estimated carryover amount of \$24.0 million to bring the total CHEEF budget for FY 2022-2026 (July 01, 2022–June 30, 2027) to \$75.2 million (Table 15).

Table 15. Incremental Funding Request

ltem	Amount
Estimated Carryover Amount from Original Budget Authorized by D.13-09-044a	\$23,986,777
Incremental Funding Request	\$51,187,749
CHEEF FY 2022-2026 Budget	\$75,174,526

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Estimate provided by CAEATFA based on current spending and loan activity forecasts. The incremental funding will be adjusted based on actual carryover amount.

Source: Advice Letter 4506G/6355E of Decision 21-08-006.

Advice Letter 4506G/6355E, issued jointly by CAEATFA and the IOUs, breaks down the expected allocation of funds for different CHEEF programs and overall administrative costs. \$23.2 million (31%) of the total \$75.2 million for FY 2022-

2026 is allocated for overall CAEATFA administration. The GGH program is forecasted to utilize between \$19.7 million to \$39.4 million of the funds as new LLR funds between FY 2022-2026. The three scenarios presented in Table 3 of Attachment 2 posit a new LLR fund requirement of \$19.7 million under the low first-year volume scenario (S1), \$39.4 million under the mid-first-year volume scenario (S2), and \$68.7 million under the high first-year volume scenario (S3). In FY 2022-2023, the GGH program increased its total LLR contribution by \$4.5 million. This aligns closely with their mid-first-year volume requirement of \$4.1 million in new LLR funds. As such, the incremental funds are likely required.

The GGH Program allocation forecast were developed using assumptions of average standard and micro-loan sizes, growth in number of loans, average LLR contribution percentages, default rates, and percentages paid off annually. See Attachment 2 of Advice Letter 4506G/6355E for details. Table 16 presents some key assumptions about the LLR funds requirement and their realized values from July 01, 2022–June 30, 2023, the base year for fund requirement calculations. The total loan volume was \$27.7 million, in between the low- (S1) and mid- (S2) volume scenarios. The loan volume will likely grow faster since the micro-loan offering was only reintroduced in Q2 of the Fiscal Year 2022–23. Moreover, we also see that the average micro- and standard loan size is larger than assumed. This is unsurprising, given that the general price levels and cost of construction are increasing. In addition, the LLR contribution percentages were higher as well.

Table 16. Comparison of Assume	d and Realized Base Year (Jul	ly 01, 2022-June 30, 2023) Values
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Key Parameters	Realized Values Standard Loans	Realized Values Micro-loans	Assumed Values	
Total loan volume (\$ Millions)	27.6	0.1	S1: 18.8 S2: 37.6 S3: 67.0	
Num. of loans	1396	71	Standard Loans S1: 1000 S2: 2000 S3: 3000	Micro-loans S1: 2500 S2: 5000 S3: 20,000
Average LLR contributions (%)	0.17	0.19	0.16	
Average loan amount (\$)	19,748	1,741	Standard Loans Micro-loan 16,660 850	
Average Term Length (Month)	109	60	109	

Comparison of the assumed and realized *default rate* and *paid-off percentage* of the portfolio is difficult since these values are forward-looking assumptions, but enough time has not passed to derive reliable base year estimates. Nevertheless, historical standard loan default has been less than 1% so far. The micro-loan default rate was 16% during the initial roll-out of micro-loans, beset by implementation challenges that are likely to ameliorate with the introduction of a new partnering financial institution.<sup>22</sup> Thus, the assumed default rate of 2% may be an overestimation but it is well within justifiable range.

The realized base year values indicate that the new LLR fund requirement will likely be closer to \$19.7 million (low first-year volume scenario) than any other scenario. Data corresponding to the post-evaluation period in 2023 (July 2023–December 2023) from published GGH data summaries suggest that the growth assumptions may have differed from expectation than expected.<sup>23</sup> For instance, 1,410 new standard loans and 392 new micro-loans were issued in the second half of 2023. Moreover, the average size of standard loans was much larger. These factors helped increase loan volumes and LLR contributions by more than 40% in six months, as opposed to an assumed growth of 20% in loan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> As per CAEATFA staff interview on November 30, 2023.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> "Monthly Data Summaries, GoGreen Home Reports." CAEATFA, <a href="https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/caeatfa/cheef/cheef-reports-and-additional-materials.asp">https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/caeatfa/cheef/cheef-reports-and-additional-materials.asp</a>. Accessed 01 March. 2024

volume over July 01, 2023 – June 30, 2024. The realized base year values combined with the post-base year loan growth indicate that the likely scenario is a new LLR fund requirement of \$19.7 to \$39.4 million.

## 6. PROGRAM REACH

The purpose of this chapter is to provide insights into whether the GGH Program reaches underserved Californians who would not otherwise have completed EE upgrades and explores the possibilities, benefits, and drawbacks of modifying how CAEATFA defines "underserved," by reviewing the following:

- Length of time allowed for applicants to pay back the loans;
- Credit scores of loan participants reported on an aggregate basis;
- How other entities define "underserved" Californians in comparison to the GGH Program;
- Percentage of participants deemed "underserved" as measured through CalEnviroScreen data, AMI, or other
  poverty statistics (including a comparison across California's definitions for customers in vulnerable populations
  [e.g., underserved, hard-to-reach, disadvantaged communities, low-income/moderate-income/market rate]); and
- Whether participants would have qualified for existing private EE loan programs at interest rates and terms they
  could afford or would accept.

The evaluation team used data from the participation analysis and participant surveys to analyze the reach of the GGH Program.

## 6.1 LOAN TERMS

Table 17 shows that the average loan amount was \$18.2K for standard loans and \$1.5K for micro-loans.<sup>24</sup> The average loan term was just under nine years for standard loans (median was ten years). All micro-loans had a loan term of five years. The average interest rate for standard loans was 4.9%, down from 6.95% in the pilot period.

Table 17. GGH Loan Product Summary: July 2018–June 2023

Standard Loan (n=3,320)			Micro-loan (n=567)					
	Average	Median	Min	Max	Average	Median	Min	Max
Loan Amount	\$18,253	\$15,536	\$1,989	\$50,098	\$1,498	\$1,204	\$215	\$4,792
Interest Rate	4.9%	5.0%	3.0%	9.0%	9.2%	9.0%	9.0%	11.4%
Loan Term	106 months	120 months	12 months	180 months	60 months	60 months	60 months	60 months
Monthly Payment	\$251	\$205	\$31	\$2,006	\$31	\$25	\$4	\$100

Source: CAEATFA tracking data.

## 6.2 UNDERSERVED BORROWER REACH

One of the intentions of the GGH Program was to create a financing product for customers who otherwise may not be able to obtain loans for EE upgrades. GGH regulations define "underserved borrowers" as those whose,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Although the average standard loan amount is up from \$17K in the pilot period, this should not be considered as evidence of larger projects given differences in price levels.

- Credit score is below 640 (i.e., credit-challenged);
- Property is in an LMI census tract (Census tract AMI does not exceed 120% the AMI of the metropolitan area, country, or state); OR
- Household income is LMI (household income is at or below the current annual income limit determined by the California Department of Housing and Community and Development based on county and family size).

The CPUC's *Environmental & Social Justice Action Plan Version 2.0.* lists definitions for hard-to-reach, underserved, and disadvantaged communities, outlined in Table 18.

Table 18. CPUC Definitions for Environmental and Social Justice and Disadvantaged Communities

Equity Segment Category	Definition
	Customers who do not have easy access to program information or generally do not participate in energy efficiency programs due to a combination of language, geographic, income, and split incentive barriers.
Hard-to-Reach	<ul> <li>Two criteria are considered sufficient if one of the criteria met is geographic:         <ul> <li>Language – Primary language spoken is other than English</li> </ul> </li> <li>Geographic – Homes in disadvantaged communities (as designated by CalEPA) and/or areas other than the United States Office of Management and Budget Combined Statistical Areas of the San Francisco Bay Area, the Greater Los Angeles Area, and the Greater Sacramento Area or the Office of Management and Budget metropolitan statistical areas of San Diego County</li> <li>Income – Those customers who qualify for the California Alternative Rates for Energy (CARE) or the Family Electric Rate Assistance Program (FERA)</li> <li>Housing Type – Multifamily and mobile home tenants (rent and lease)</li> </ul>
	A community that meets one of the following criteria:
Underserved	<ul> <li>"Disadvantaged communities," or communities in the 25% highest scoring census tracts according to the California communities Environmental Health Screening Tool (CalEnviroScreen); as well as all California tribal lands, census tracts with median household incomes less than 60% of state median income; census tracts identified in the 2017 DAC designation as disadvantaged, regardless of their scores in CalEnviroScreen 4.0; and census tracts that score in the highest 5% of Pollution Burden within CalEnviroScreen, but do not receive an overall CalEnviroScreen score due to unreliable public health and socioeconomic data.</li> <li>"Low-income communities," or census tracts with median household incomes at or below 80% of the statewide median income or with median household incomes at or below the threshold designated as low income by the Department of Housing and Community Development's list of state income limits.</li> <li>Is within an area identified as among the most disadvantaged 25% in the state according to the California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA) and based on CalEnviroScreen.</li> <li>A community in which at least 75% of public-school students are eligible to receive free or reduced-price meals under the National School Lunch Program.</li> <li>A community located on lands belonging to a federally recognized California Indian tribe.</li> </ul>
Disadvantaged Communities	Communities in the 25% highest scoring census tracts according to CalEnviroScreen; as well as all California tribal lands, census tracts with median household incomes less than 60% of state median income; census tracts identified in the 2017 DAC designation as disadvantaged, regardless of their scores in CalEnviroScreen 4.0; and census tracts that score in the highest 5% of Pollution Burden within CalEnviroScreen, but do not receive an overall CalEnviroScreen score due to unreliable public health and socioeconomic data.

Source: CPUC. Environmental & Social Justice Action Plan Version 2.0. April 2022. <u>esj-action-plan-v2jw.pdf (ca.gov)</u>. The disadvantaged community status was modified slightly based on Senate Bill 535's Final Designation of Disadvantaged Communities, finalized in May 2022.

## 6.2.1 BORROWER CREDIT METRICS

### CREDIT SCORE

Borrowers with credit scores as low as 580 are considered for loans under GGH; however, for applicants with credit scores between 580 and 640 looking to take out a loan in excess of \$20,000, the lender must verify the borrower's income as part of the underwriting process. As previously mentioned, a May 2021 rulemaking removed FICO as the GGH Program's credit score source; however, all analyses of participant credit scores included in this report rely on FICO scores as they were the only indicator of credit score included in participant data. Very few standard loan borrowers in the evaluation period could be considered "underserved" as defined by their FICO score alone. Over the current evaluation period, only 4% of standard loan borrowers had a FICO score of 640 or less, down from 8% in the pilot period. Likewise, 52% of standard loan borrowers had a "very good" or "exceptional" FICO score, up from 34% in the pilot period. Unlike standard loan borrowers, 50% of micro-loan borrowers had FICO score of 640 or less. Table 19 depicts the distribution of FICO scores by loan type for the evaluation period and pilot period.

Table 19. FICO Scores Among Borrowers

	Evaluatio (July 2018		Pilot Period (July 2016–July 2018)
FICO Credit Score Range	Standard Loan (n=3,320)	Micro-loan (n=567)	Standard Loan (n=212)
580-640 (Fair)	4%	50%	8%
641-700 (Fair/Good)	15%	29%	16%
701-760 (Good/Very Good)	29%	17%	42%
761-820 (Very Good/Exceptional)	40%	4%	26%
821+ (Exceptional)	12%	0%	8%
NO FICO	<1%	0%	0%

Source: CAEATFA data.

### DEBT-TO-INCOME RATIO

Debt-to-income (DTI) ratios, although not an indicator of underserved status for the GGH Program, are often used by lenders to determine creditworthiness or ability to repay a loan. According to financial sources, borrowers with DTI ratios above 36% are often considered risky, and borrowers above 55% are commonly considered too risky for lending, even with an LLR. As shown in Table 20, during the evaluation period, less than 40% of standard loan borrowers had DTI ratios between 36% and 55% (loans with a greater risk for lending), down from 54% in the Pilot period. The GGH Program does not track DTI ratios for micro-loan borrowers.

Table 20. Debt-to-Income Ratios Among Borrowers

	Standard Loan				
DTI Ratio	Evaluation Period (July 2018–June 2023) (n=3,320)	Pilot Period (July 2016–July 2018) (n=212)			
Under 25% (Less risk)	25%	14%			
25%-35% (Some risk)	34%	32%			
36%-45% (More risk)	27%	33%			
46%-55% (Most risk)	14%	21%			

Source: CAEATFA data. Note: The GGH Program does not track DTI ratios for micro-loan borrowers.

### 6.2.2 BORROWER INCOME METRICS

### LOW-TO-MODERATE INCOME CENSUS TRACT

The GGH identifies LMI census tracts as those in which the tract AMI does not exceed 120% of the AMI of the metropolitan area, country or state. Under this criterion, 57% of standard loan borrowers resided in an LMI census tract, an increase from 49% in the Pilot period. Compared to standard loan borrowers, a larger percentage of micro-loan borrowers resided in an LMI census tract (71%).

Table 21. LMI Census Tract Status Among Borrowers

Census Tract Median Income/Area	Evaluatio (July 2018		Pilot Period (July 2016–July 2018)	
Median Income (Percentile)	Standard Loan (n=3,320)	Micro-loan (n=567)	Standard Loan (n=212)	
120+ (Non-LMI)	43%	29%	51%	
80-<120 (LMI)	37%	41%	33%	
60-<80 (LMI)	14%	20%	10%	
<60 (LMI)	6%	11%	7%	

Source: CAEATFA data.

### HOUSEHOLD INCOME

As the GGH Program does not track details on borrower household income, the evaluation team collected this information as part of the study's participant survey effort. As seen in Table 22, most standard loan respondents (62%) had an income of more than \$100,000. The team compared standard loan respondents who installed a fuel-substitution upgrade as part of their GGH-financed home upgrade project to those who did not install fuel substitution measures as part of their project. Those who installed a fuel substitution measure were more likely than those who did not install a fuel substitution measure to have made over \$100,000 (71% vs. 55%) and significantly more likely to have made over \$200,000 (31% vs. 18%). The percentage of standard loan respondents with an annual income of less than \$100,000 decreased relative to the pilot period (25% vs. 16%). Notably, respondent income varied significantly by loan type, with micro-loan respondents being significantly more likely than standard loan respondents to fall within the income thresholds between \$0 and \$100,000. Inversely, standard loan respondents were significantly more likely than micro-loan respondents to fall within the income thresholds above \$100,000.

Table 22. 2022 Annual Income Among Survey Respondents

		Standard Loan			
2022 Annual Household Income	Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=144) (c)	Micro-loan (n=60) (d)	
Less than \$25,000	0%	3%	1%	12% <sup>c</sup>	
\$25,000 to less than \$35,000	2%	0%	1%	10%c	
\$35,000 to less than \$50,000	3%	1%	2%	12% <sup>c</sup>	
\$50,000 to less than \$75,000	5%	5%	5%	22% <sup>c</sup>	
\$75,000 to less than \$100,000	9%	5%	7%	18% <sup>c</sup>	
\$100,000 to less than \$150,000	18%	23%	21% <sup>d</sup>	8%	
\$150,000 to less than \$200,000	22%	14%	17% <sup>d</sup>	5%	

\$200,000 or more	31%b	18%	24% <sup>d</sup>	3%
Don't know	0%	1%	1%	0%
Prefer not to say	11%	30%a	22% <sup>d</sup>	10%

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: What was your annual household income from all sources in 2022 before taxes?

 $Note: Results \ are \ based \ on \ two-sided \ tests. \ a/b/c/d \ indicates \ significant \ differences \ at \ a \ 90\% \ confidence \ level \ and \ 0.10 \ alpha$ 

between the following tests: ab, cd

The average number of household occupants at the time of the survey was significantly greater for micro-loan respondents than standard loan respondents, with standard loan respondents averaging almost three and micro-loan respondents averaging almost four. No significant difference in occupancy existed based on whether the standard loan respondent installed a fuel substitution measure.

The team also asked respondents whether they qualified for or received state or government assistance, such as MediCal, the CalFresh/SNAP/Food Stamp Program, CalWorks, CARE/FERA, or some other assistance program. As seen in Table 23, micro-loan respondents were significantly more likely than standard loan respondents to indicate they received or qualified for assistance (62% vs. 9%). Standard loan respondents who installed a fuel substitution measure were significantly less likely to indicate receiving or qualifying for assistance than those who did not install a fuel substitution measure (5% vs. 13%). The percentage of standard loan respondents who received/qualified for state/government assistance (9%) increased relative to the pilot period (6%).

Table 23. Receipt of or Qualification for State/Government Assistance Among Survey Respondents

Qualify for or Receive State		Micro-loan (n=60)		
or Government Assistance	Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=144) (c)	(d)
Yes	5%	13%ª	9%	62% <sup>c</sup>
No	95%b	84%	89% <sup>d</sup>	33%
Don't know	0%	4%	2%	3%
Prefer not to say	0%	0%	0%	2%

Source: Standard Ioan and Micro-Ioan participant surveys

Question: Does your household qualify for or receive any state or government assistance, such as MediCal, the CalFresh/SNAP/Food stamp program, CalWorks, CARE/FERA, or some other type of welfare program?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates are a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates are a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the 90% co

### HOME OWNERSHIP

As seen in Table 24, nearly all standard loan respondents owned the property upgraded using GGH financing at the time of the upgrade. Standard loan respondents were significantly more likely than micro-loan respondents to have owned and lived at the property (92% vs. 62%). Conversely, micro-loan respondents were significantly more likely than standard loan respondents to indicate they were a tenant at the time (38% vs. 1%).

Table 24. Home Ownership Status Among Survey Respondents

Home Ownership	Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=144) (c)	Micro-loan (n=60) (d)
Owned and lived there	97%b	89%	92% <sup>d</sup>	62%
Owned but rented to someone else	2%	4%	3%	0%
Owned but vacant	2%	4%	3%	0%
Owned but allowed someone else to live there	0%	3%	1%	0%
I was a tenant	0%	1%	1%	38% <sup>c</sup>

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: Which of the following best describes your relation to the property at the time [of your home upgrade/you purchased the energy savings products]?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab, cd

### CALENVIROSCREEN SCORE

The California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA) developed the CalEnviroScreen tool to identify communities disproportionately burdened by multiple sources of pollution and socioeconomic stressors. The tool considers various indicators and computes a composite score reflective of the cumulative impacts of pollution and socioeconomic factors at the census tract level. As shown in Table 25, 13% of standard loan borrowers from the evaluation period were in the most vulnerable census tracts according to their CalEnviroScreen Score (above the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile, those with the highest 25% of scores for pollution burden and socioeconomic vulnerability). A further 23% of standard loan borrowers were in the second most vulnerable census tracts. The distribution of standard loan borrowers by CalEnviroScreen Score was similar to that of the pilot period. Compared to standard loan borrowers, a larger percentage of micro-loan borrowers were in the most vulnerable census tracts (30%).

Table 25. CalEnviroScreen Scores Among Borrowers

	CalEnviroScreen	Evaluation Period (July 2018 – June 2023)  Standard Loan Micro-loan (n=3,320) (n=567)		Pilot Period (July 2016 – July 2018)		
Vulnerability	Score (Percentile)			State of the state		(Percentile) Standard Loan
Least Vulnerable	0 - 25	30%	9%	33%		
	26 - 50	34%	25%	33%		
	51 - 75	23%	36%	21%		
Most Vulnerable	76 - 100	13%	30%	13%		

Source: CAEATFA data

### 6.2.3 CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS FOR UNDERSERVED CUSTOMERS

The GGH Program LLR contribution (i.e., the percentage of the original and eligible loan amount CAEATFA puts into the LLR) is set at 20% of the loan value for underserved borrowers and 11% for other borrowers, mitigating a portion of lender risk to incent lending to underserved borrowers.<sup>25</sup> The higher contribution to the LLR, often referred to as credit enhancement in this report, is available to borrowers identified as meeting at least one of the GGH Program's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> California Code of Regulations Title 4 Business Regulations, Division 13. 2015. Opinion Dynamics

underserved criteria: borrower credit score is below 640 (i.e., credit-challenged); property is in an LMI census tract; or household income is LMI.

Between July 2018 and June 2023, CAEATFA provided the enhanced 20% LLR contribution for 1,966 of the 3,320 standard loan borrowers (59%) and 482 of the 567 microloan borrowers (85%). Table 26 shows that most standard loans provided with the enhanced 20% LLR contribution were in an LMI census tract. In contrast, most standard loans with an 11% LLR contribution were not in an LMI census tract. Although most micro-loan 20% credit enhancement recipients were located in an LMI census tract, 15% of micro-loan borrowers in non-LMI census tracts also received the enhanced 20% LLR contribution.

Table 26. GGH Program Loans by LMI Tract and Credit Enhancement Level

Credit Enhancement	Percentage of GGH	LMI Census Tract		
Credit Elliancement	Loans	Yes	No	
Standard Loan (n=3,320)				
Underserved – 20% LLR contribution	59%	56%	3%	
Not Underserved – 11% LLR contribution	41%	1%	40%	
Micro-loan (n=567)				
Underserved – 20% credit enhancement	85%	71%	14%	
Not Underserved – 11% LLR contribution	15%	<1%	15%	

Source: CAEATFA data.

Note: Orange areas denote areas of potential misalignment between credit enhancement level and borrower characteristics.

Table 27 shows that most standard loan recipients who received the 20% credit enhancement had a FICO score above 640, and many had a very good or exceptional FICO score. Only 26 standard loans (1%) were provided to recipients with a FICO score between 580 and 640, and they were provided with 11% LLR contribution. The majority of micro-loans that received an enhanced 20% LLR contribution were provided to individuals with a FICO score of 580 to 640. None of the micro-loans provided to individuals with a FICO score of 580 to 640 received an 11% LLR contribution.

Table 27. GGH Loans by FICO Score and Credit Enhancement Level

	Percentag	FICO Credit Score							
Credit Enhancement	e of GGH Loans	580-640 (Fair)	641-700 (Fair/Good)	701-760 (Good/Ver y Good)	761-820 (Very Good/ Exceptional)	821+ (Exceptional)	NO FICO		
Standard Loan (n=3,320)									
Underserved – 20% LLR contribution	59%	3%	10%	17%	23%	7%	<1%		
Not Underserved – 11% LLR contribution	41%	1%	5%	12%	17%	6%	0%		
Micro-loan (n=567)									
Underserved – 20% LLR contribution	85%	50%	21%	12%	2%	<1%	0%		
Not Underserved – 11% LLR contribution	15%	0%	8%	5%	2%	<1%	0%		

Source: CAEATFA data.

Note: Orange areas denote areas of potential misalignment between credit enhancement level and borrower characteristics.

As shown in Table 28, 14% of standard loan borrowers received a 11% credit enhancement but had a DTI ratio of less than 25% (i.e., they were considered less risky lenders). Additionally, 19% of standard loan borrowers received a 20% Opinion Dynamics

credit enhancement but had a DTI ratio of 25% to 35%. This range is considered to carry only "some" risk. Inversely, 6% of standard loan borrowers received an 11% enhancement despite carrying the "most" risk according to their DTI ratio.

Table 28. GGH Loans by DTI Ratio and Credit Enhancement Level

		DTI Ratio				
Credit Enhancement	Percentage of GGH Loans	Under 25% (Less Risk)	25-35% (Some Risk)	36-45% (More Risk)	46-55% (Most Risk)	
Standard Loan (n=3,320)						
Underserved – 20% LLR contribution	59%	14%	19%	17%	9%	
Not Underserved - 11% LLR contribution	41%	11%	14%	10%	6%	

Source: CAEATFA data.

Note: Orange areas denote areas of potential misalignment between credit enhancement level and borrower characteristics. DTI ratios were not tracked for micro-loan borrowers.

# 6.3 EXTERNAL FINANCING QUALIFICATIONS

## 6.3.1 COMPARISON WITH LENDERS' SIGNATURE LOANS

EE measures with deep savings potential often require high upfront costs, creating a barrier to adoption. The GGH Program aims to increase the adoption of EE measures by (1) ameliorating the credit constraints associated with high upfront costs of some EE upgrades, (2) reducing interest rates, and (3) reducing monthly payments. The LLR contribution decreases the risk associated with offering borrowers unsecured EE loans and, in doing so, allows lenders to increase their loan disbursements, extend loan terms, and decrease interest rates.

Each of the participating standard loan lenders had "signature" loan products for residential borrowers outside of the GGH Program that were unsecured (i.e., required no collateral from the borrower), but most were not specifically focused on energy efficiency. For each standard loan borrower, lenders provided CAEATFA with a comparative estimate of the terms of an alternative signature loan without the GGH Program. A comparison of features of the GGH Program loans with the signature loans is presented in Table 29.26 Lenders' average standard loan interest rates were up to 8.4 percentage points lower than their average signature loan interest rate, averaging 5.3 percentage points less across lenders. Lenders' average GGH payback periods were also longer than the average payback periods for their signature loans (apart from Travis Credit Union). Lenders' average standard loan payback periods were up to 100 months longer than their average signature loan payback period, averaging 33 months longer across lenders. Almost all standard loans had a lower calculated monthly payment than comparable signature loans. Lenders' average calculated monthly payments for GGH loans were up to \$220 less than their average signature loan monthly payment, averaging \$172 less across lenders.

 $<sup>^{26}</sup>$  These estimates are available for 3,178 of the 3,320 standard loans. Opinion Dynamics

Table 29. Comparison of Loans: GGH Standard Loan Versus Signature Loan

	# of		Interest Ra	ite	Loan Pa	ayback Terr	n (Months)	Monthly Payment		
Credit Union	Standa rd Loans	GGH	Signa- ture	Difference	GGH	Signa- ture	Difference	GGH	Signa- ture	Difference
California Coast Credit Union	1,455	4.9%	12.7%	-7.8%	100	56	44	\$270	\$445	-\$175
First US Community Credit Union	694	4.4%	9.6%	-5.2%	87	55	33	\$262	\$373	-\$110
Matadors Community Credit Union	563	5.5%	10.9%	-5.4%	122	60	63	\$247	\$467	-\$220
Travis Credit Union	510	5.0%	6.0%	-1.0%	134	136	-2	\$196	\$209	-\$14
Desert Valleys Federal Credit Union	47	5.5%	13.6%	-8.1%	107	59	48	\$205	\$390	-\$185
Valley Oak Credit Union	36	7.1%	11.1%	-4.0%	85	59	26	\$222	\$325	-\$102
Eagle Community Credit Union	12	6.1%	14.5%	-8.4%	120	60	60	\$210	\$418	-\$208
Pasadena Service Federal Credit Union	3	8.0%	11.7%	-3.7%	160	60	100	\$184	\$402	-\$218
Overall	3,320	5.6%	10.8%	-5.3%	100	67	33	\$219	\$391	-\$172

Source: CAEATFA tracking data.

Data on signature loans was not uniformly available for micro-loans. One Finance (the GGH program's initial micro-loan lender) did not provide estimates for signature loans. The Lewis and Clark Bank (the current micro-loan lender) standard loan term is five years (for both GGH program loans and signature loans). The interest rate for Lewis and Clark Bank's signature micro-loans in the tracking data was the lowest rate offered through the Eco Financing product of the channel partner and does not appear to vary by participant FICO score range. As such, the current signature micro-loans interest rates and monthly payments are equal to or lower than the GGH loans, but this is not indicative of the Program's efficacy in in lowering financing barriers or costs.

## 6.3.2 ALTERNATIVE FINANCING OPTIONS

The evaluation team reviewed available EE-specific financing in California, finding a notable lack of private, unsecured EE loans outside the GGH Program. Among the common mechanisms for financing EE improvements in existing residential properties are California's Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs; however, unlike GGH loans, PACE loans are secured and tied to the property where the improvement was completed. The PACE loans place a lien on the property, and borrowers are expected to repay their loan using their property tax bill. Borrowers also accept the full risk of repercussions if they are unable to do so, a risk that disproportionately affects underserved customers. Additionally, whereas GGH loans are available to homeowners and renters, only homeowners can participate in PACE Programs.

Figure 12 compares the GGH Program to three PACE Programs in California across five key loan term specifications: type (secured/unsecured), payback period, interest rate, DTI ratio eligibility, and credit score eligibility. Notably, unlike the GGH Program, which has a minimum credit score requirement of 580, the secured PACE loans do not have a minimum credit score requirement. The PACE Programs do not specify a maximum DTI ratio; however, a 2023 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau report suggested that PACE lenders nationwide were generally less willing to

offer a loan to those with DTI ratios of more than 40%.<sup>27</sup> In contrast, the GGH Program considers borrowers with DTI ratios up to 55%. Secure loans, such as PACE, place risk on the borrowers while unsecured loans place risk on the lender; as such, unsecured lenders rely upon borrower information like DTI ratio and credit score to determine creditworthiness. Although unsecured loans often have higher interest rates than secured loans, GGH standard loan interest rates are comparable to the interest rates the secured PACE Programs offer.

Figure 12. Loan Terms of GGH Compared to PACE Programs

#### **GGH Standard Loan**

- Type: Unsecured
- Payback Period:1 to 15 years
- Interest Rate: 3% to 9%
- DTI Ratio: 55% or less
- Credit Score: 580 or greater

#### Home Energy Renovation Opportunity (HERO) Loan

- Type: Secured
- Payback Period:5 to 25 years
- Interest Rate: 2.99% to 8.99%
- DTI Ratio: No maximum specified, lender typically hesitant if in excess of 40%
- Credit Score: Not an eligibility criterion

#### CaliforniaFIRST Loan

- Type: Secured
- Payback Period:5 to 30 years
- Interest Rate: 6.75% to 8.49%
- DTI Ratio: No maximum specified, lender typically hesitant if in excess of 40%
- Credit Score:
   Not an eligibility criterion

#### yGrene Loan

- Type: Secured
- Payback Period:
   Up to 30 years
- Interest Rate: As low as 3.99% (maximum not specified)
- DTI Ratio: No maximum specified, lender typically hesitant if in excess of 40%
- Credit Score: Not an eligibility criterion

The GGH Program's loan terms are more favorable than the typical, non-EE-specific unsecured loan. Whereas unsecured loans typically require borrowers to have a minimum credit score of 610 and a DTI ratio of 40% or less, the GGH Program broadens eligibility to those with a minimum credit score of 580 and a maximum DTI ratio of 55%. Unsecured loans typically have a two- to seven-year payback period; however, while the GGH Program allows up to 15 years. Additionally, the range of interest rates for GGH standard loans is lower than the average unsecured loan interest rate.

Alternative financing options for micro-loans include credit cards and personal (non-energy efficiency specific) loans. During the evaluation period, micro-loan interest rates ranged from 9.0% to 11.4%, averaging 9.2%, and had a set loan term of 5 years. Other personal loans can range from 7% to 36% APR, with variable loan terms ranging from one to seven years. Most personal loan lenders require a credit score of at least 670 to qualify, further, borrowers with lower credit scores often receive higher interest rates, with the average APR for personal loans to borrowers with a credit score less than 599 being 31.7%.<sup>28</sup> The average interest rate on credit cards has increased from 12.9% in late 2013 to 22.8% in 2023.<sup>29</sup>

# 6.3.3 ALTERNATIVE FINANCING TERMS AND ELIGIBILITY

As part of the participant surveys, the evaluation team asked respondents about the likelihood they would have qualified for any other type of financing based on their credit score and income. As shown in Table 30, micro-loan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> McAlister, Siobhan and Ryan Sandler. 2023. "Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Financing and Consumer Financial Outcomes."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> As per https://www.forbes.com/advisor/personal-loans/minimum-credit-score-for-a-personal-loan/ on December 1, 2023

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> As per <a href="https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/credit-card-interest-rate-margins-at-all-time-high/#:~:text=Over%20the%20last%2010%20years,collecting%20this%20data%20in%201994">https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/credit-card-interest-rate-margins-at-all-time-high/#:~:text=Over%20the%20last%2010%20years,collecting%20this%20data%20in%201994</a>. on February 22, 2024 Opinion Dynamics

respondents were significantly more likely than standard loan respondents to indicate they would have been "somewhat" or "very" unlikely to qualify for other financing (18% vs. 3% and 12% vs. 1%). Standard loan respondents were also more certain of their ability to qualify for other financing. They were significantly more likely to indicate they would have been "very" likely to qualify for other financing than micro-loan respondents (87% vs. 20%). Among standard loan respondents, those who installed a fuel substitution measure were more likely to indicate they were "very" likely to qualify for other financing compared to those who did not install a fuel substitution measure (94%; 81%).

Table 30. Likelihood of Qualifying for Other Financing Based on Credit Score and Income

Likelihood of Qualifying for				
Other Financing Based on Credit Score and Income	Fuel No Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a) (n=79) (b) Total (n=79) (c)		Total (n=144) (c)	Micro-loan (n=60) (d)
Very likely	94%b	81%	87% <sup>d</sup>	20%
Somewhat likely	5%	14%a	10%	50%⁰
Somewhat unlikely	0%	5%	3%	18% <sup>c</sup>
Very unlikely	2%	0%	1%	12% <sup>c</sup>

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: What do you think is the likelihood you would have qualified for any other type of financing based on your credit score and income?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab, cd

The team asked all respondents except those who indicated they were "very" unlikely to have qualified for other financing whether they thought other financing options would have offered an interest rate lower than, similar to, or higher than the interest rate of their GGH loan. As seen in Table 31, only 2% of standard loan respondents and 8% of micro-loan respondents thought another type of financing they may have qualified for would have a lower interest rate. The majority (73% of standard loan respondents and 60% of micro-loan respondents) thought the interest rate of other loan products would be higher. Interestingly, compared to standard loan respondents, micro-loan respondents were significantly less likely to think the interest rate of non-GGH financing would be higher (73% vs 60%) and significantly more likely to think it would be lower (8% vs. 2%).

Table 31. Interest Rate of Hypothetical Other Financing Compared to GGH/Eco Financing

Interest Rate of Hypothetical				
Other Financing Compared to GGH/Eco Financing	Fuel Substitution (n=64) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=143) (c)	Micro-loan (n=53) (d)
Lower interest rate	3%	1%	2%	8% <sup>c</sup>
Similar interest rate	19%	29%	24%	32%
Higher interest rate	78%	70%	73% <sup>d</sup>	60%

Source: Standard Ioan and Micro-Ioan participant surveys

Question: If you had been able to qualify for another type of financing, do you think the interest rate would have been lower than, similar to, or higher than the interest rate for your [GoGreen Home/Eco Financing] Loan?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab, cd

Approximately 26% of standard loan respondents (n=144) indicated they sought other financing options before using a GGH loan. Of micro-loan respondents (n=60), 61% indicated they explored other purchasing options prior to purchasing equipment from the Enervee/SoCalGas Marketplace. Of the micro-loan respondents who explored other purchasing options, 65% explored purchasing options that offered financing.

The team asked respondents who explored other financing options if they found any they would have qualified for but did not use. As shown in Table 32, a large percentage of standard loan and micro-loan respondents indicated they found other financing option(s) that they could qualify for but did not use (64% and 77%, respectively).

Table 32. Found Other Financing Options They Qualified For But Did Not Use

Found Other Financing				
They Would Have Qualified For But Did Not Use	Fuel Substitution(n=22)	No Fuel Substitution(n=34) Total (n=5		Micro-loan (n=26)
Yes	68%	62%	64%	77%
No	14%	24%	20%	12%
Don't know	18%	15%	16%	12%

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: Did you find any other financing options you would have qualified for [but did not use]?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. Tests revealed no significant differences.

Of the 36 standard loan and 20 micro-loan respondents who indicated finding another financing option they would have qualified for but did not use, no standard loan respondents and only one micro-loan respondent indicated the other financing option had a lower interest rate than their GGH loan. One-third of the standard loan respondents (12 of 36) and two micro-loan respondents indicated that the other financing they qualified for had a longer loan payback term than their GGH loan.

The evaluation team asked respondents what they would have done if all other financing options they found required a higher monthly payment. As seen in Table 33, 39% of standard loan respondents and 57% of micro-loan respondents would have done or purchased a "much" or "somewhat" smaller project or cheaper equipment. Standard loan respondents were significantly more likely than micro-loan respondents to indicate they would have done the same despite the higher payment (31% vs. 7%). Conversely, micro-loan respondents were more likely than standard loan respondents to indicate they would not have used financing at all (30% vs. 15%) or done something smaller/cheaper to reduce the monthly payment (35% vs. 19%).

Table 33. Action if All Other Financing Options Would Have Required a Higher Monthly Payment

		Standard Loan				
Action if All Other Financing Options Would Have Required a Higher Monthly Payment	Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=144) (c)	Micro-loan (n=60) (d)		
Not used financing at all	17%	13%	15%	30%⁰		
Done a much smaller project/purchased much cheaper equipment to significantly reduce the monthly payment	18%	19%	19%	35%⁰		
Done a somewhat smaller project/purchased somewhat cheaper equipment to slightly reduce the monthly payment	26%	15%	20%	22%		
Done the exact same project/purchased the exact same equipment with a higher monthly payment	26%	35%	31% <sup>d</sup>	7%		
Don't know	12%	18%	15% <sup>d</sup>	7%		

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: If all the other financing options you could find would have required a higher monthly payment, would you have...?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab, cd

## 7. PROGRAM ENERGY SAVINGS

The purpose of this chapter is to verify whether the GGH Program produces energy savings, by assessing the following:

- Customer meter data provided by the utilities to conduct a consumption analysis and understand how much energy savings the GGH Program produced, including electric and gas savings, taking into account fuel shifting from gas to electric, per participant and overall;
- Differences in energy savings achieved across subpopulations of interest, such as climate zone, loan size, loan
  recipient type (LMI), presence of solar generation, and presence of fuel substitution, provided participation levels
  and available data allow for such comparisons;
- Energy savings from other loan programs and comparing the EM&V results to that of the GGH Program;
- The influence of the GGH Program on customer decision-making and relative influence of financing and rebates, where applicable;
- Source energy and CO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions from financed projects (including fuel substitution measures).

The evaluation team conducted a consumption analysis of standard loans and a deemed savings review for micro-loans to verify program energy savings. The evaluation team used self-report survey data to conduct a program influence analysis and estimated emissions reduction using CPUC's Fuel Substitution Technical Guidance for Energy Efficiency.

## 7.1 EVALUATED SAVINGS SUMMARY

The estimated first-year gross energy savings and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions from EE projects and measures financed through the GGH Program from July 2018 to June 2023 are presented in Table 34. The total estimated electricity savings was 555.58 MWh, and the total gas savings was 80,739.50 therms. These energy savings were associated with GHG emission reductions of 575.87 Metric Tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>. Standard loan projects drove 97% of the GGH Program's savings and emission reduction impacts.

Table 34. Energy Savings and GHG Reductions from the GGH Program, 2018–2023
---

Metric	EEEMs through Standard Loans	EEEMs through Micro-loans	Total
Total annual electric energy savings (MWh)	538.18	17.40	555.58
Total annual gas savings (therms)	78,424.50	2,315.00	80,739.50
GHG emission reductions (Metric Tonnes of CO <sub>2</sub> )	559.12	16.75	575.87

# 7.1.1 ENERGY SAVINGS FROM STANDARD LOANS

The evaluation team used linear fixed effects (LFE) models with pooled participants to estimate energy savings from standard loans. The pooled model with LFE methods controls for exogenous factors that impact energy consumption over time.<sup>30</sup> Total electric and gas savings reflect the population of participants with electric and gas service from an IOU. Both electric and gas savings are inclusive of all participants, regardless of whether or not the installed measures impact the fuel source. Unless specifically indicated, all impacts reflect weather-normalized savings.<sup>31</sup> The evaluation team developed electric savings separately for net-metered (those with solar panels on their home) and non-net-

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<sup>30</sup> Details of the consumption analysis methods are included in Appendix A.

<sup>31</sup> Savings were normalized using CALEE2010 weather normal.

metered participants. Table 35 summarizes the gas and electric energy savings achieved from projects financed through standard loans of the GGH Program during the evaluation period.

Table 35. Summary of Standard Loan Electric and Gas Savings

Statistic	Result
Electric Savings	
Participant count	2,353
Average per participant annual energy savings (kWh)	228.72
Total energy savings (MWH)	538.18
Gas Savings	
Participant count	3,076
Average per participant annual energy savings (therms)	25.50
Total energy savings (therms)	78,424.50

Table 36 presents per-participant annual baseline energy consumption, energy savings, and percent of energy savings compared to baseline consumption. Participants with net metering from solar panels delivered considerably deeper electric energy savings than participants without net metering (588.11 kWh vs. 111.42 kWh). The baseline energy usage of participants with net metering is considerably lower than that of participants without.<sup>32</sup> Overall, electric participants saved 3% of the baseline consumption. Gas energy savings represented 5.7% of the baseline usage.

Table 36. Per Participant Baseline Consumption, Energy Savings, and Savings as a Percent of Baseline Consumption

		Per			90% Confidence		
Savings Type	Participant Count	Participant Annual Baseline Energy Consumption	Per Participant Annual Energy Savings	Lower	Upper	Energy Savings as a Percent of Baseline Consumption	
Electric (kWh)	2,353	7,502.99	228.72	74.90	403.54	3.0%	
Net metering	579	4,486.20	588.11	246.61	929.62	13.1%	
No net metering	1,774	8,487.62	111.42	18.86	231.84	1.3%	
Gas (therms)	3,076	448.04	25.50	19.02	31.97	5.7%	

In addition to developing total energy savings, the evaluation team also developed estimates of gas and electric energy savings by IOU, participant LMI status as per tracking data, DAC status, and known fuel substitution status, data permitting. For electric participants, these additional analyses were performed for non-net-metered participants only. Net-metered participant subpopulations were too small to allow for additional subgroup analysis. Not all models resulted in statistically significant estimates of energy savings. Table 37 presents the modeled electric savings estimates by subgroups of interest, whereas gas savings estimates are in Table 38.

Compared to overall program savings per participant, PG&E and non-LMI participants achieved higher electric savings (111.42 kWh for non-net-metered participants overall vs. 194 kWh for PG&E and 179.29 kWh for non-LMI). The models for other utilities and the LMI segment did not render statistically significant results; however, it is reasonable to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Baseline usage of participants with and without net metering should not be compared directly, as the baseline usage of participants with net metering does not includer solar generation data used to meet the energy needs at the time of energy production.

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assume that the energy savings for those subgroups are lower than the program average. As expected, known fuel-substitution increased electric usage by 6.4% from baseline but reduced gas by about 44% from baseline.

Table 37. Per Participant Electric Baseline Consumption, Savings, and Savings as a Percent of Baseline Consumption by IOU, LMI, and DAC Status (Non-Net-Metered Participants Only)

Segment	Participan	Per Participant Annual Baseline Energy	Per Participant Annual Energy	90% Cont	Electricity Savings as a Percent of	
Segment	t Count	Consumption (kWh)	Savings (kWh)	Lower	Upper	Baseline Consumption
IOU						
PG&E	1,112	8,644	194.60	53.30	335.90	2.3%
SCE	554	**	**	**	**	**
SDG&E	108	**	**	**	**	**
LMI						
LMI	944	**	**	**	**	**
Non-LMI	830	9,224.14	179.29	22.77	335.81	1.9%
Known Fuel Subs	stitution					
Fuel Substitution	244	8,576.61	-550.26	-1,050.96	-49.55	-6.4%
No Known Fuel Substitution	1,531	8,469.14	179.24	76.67	281.81	2.1%

<sup>\*\*</sup>Energy savings estimates are not statistically significant.

PG&E participants, non-LMI participants, and participants outside DACs achieved deeper gas savings (Table 38). Known fuel substitution also resulted in considerably deeper savings, which is not surprising, given that electrification of major energy-using systems, such as HVAC and water heating, eliminates the need to use gas for heating and water heating needs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> LMI status as recorded in the program tracking data.

Table 38. Per Participant Gas Baseline Consumption, Savings, and Savings as a Percent of Baseline Consumption by IOU, LMI, and DAC Status

	Per Participar Annual		Per Participant Annual	90% Confidence		Gas Savings as a Percent		
Segment	Count	Baseline Energy Consumption (Therms)	Energy Savings (Therms)	Lower	Upper	of Baseline Consumption		
IOU								
PG&E	2,121	450.82	31.88	23.89	39.87	7.1%		
SoCalGas	842	451.72	13.38	2.67	25.66	3.0%		
SDG&E	113	**	**	**	**	**		
LMI								
LMI	1,786	428.59	24.40	16.16	32.65	5.7%		
Non-LMI	1,290	473.78	26.82	16.46	37.18	5.7%		
DAC*								
DAC	560	**	**	**	**	**		
Non-DAC	2,058	449.37	30.55	21.83	39.28	6.8%		
Known Fuel Substitution	Known Fuel Substitution							
Fuel Substitution	270	436.35	191.01	166.49	215.54	43.8%		
No Known Fuel Substitution	2,706	449.45	7.26	0.99	13.54	1.6%		


<sup>\*\*</sup>Energy savings estimates are not statistically significant.


### 7.I.I.I COMPARISON OF ENERGY SAVINGS ACROSS STANDARD LOAN PARTICIPANTS

In this section, we present the analysis of the results of participant-specific pre-post energy models. Analysis of individual participant energy savings and baseline consumption patterns provides insights into the variation in energy savings across participants. The savings values presented in this section should be considered only to compare the magnitude of differences between subgroups.

Figure 13 presents the distribution of participants across three saver categories: positive, neutral, and negative (i.e., participants whose energy usage increased in the year following the program participation). More than half (61%) of participants with electric service and the same share of participants with gas service achieved reductions in energy usage following the installation of financed projects with standard loans. For over a third of participants, however, energy consumption increased following the installation of the measure.

Figure 13. Gas and Electric Saver Segment Distribution





Individual pre-post models do not fully account for or control for the presence of exogenous and non-routine events. To ascertain the presence of these, the evaluation team conducted follow-up interviews with negative savers (n=13). Some of these participants reported non-routine changes to their energy consumption, including being able to use a heating or cooling system when there was none before, an increase in number of people living under the same roof, or purchasing an electric vehicle. While these exogenous changes do not explain all of the negative savings observed through the individual pre-post models, they likely account for some.


### KNOWN FUEL SUBSTITUTION STATUS AND ENERGY SAVINGS

Figure 14 and Figure 15 provides the breakdown of the electric and gas saving categories based on their known fuel substitution status. As expected, the individual model results show that known fuel substitution participants were more likely than their respective counterparts to report an increase in electricity usage and a decrease in gas usage. Some projects with known fuel switching also reduced electricity usage. This reflects consumption reduction from other EEEMs installed through the project, such as installation of heat pumps with cooling capabilities that replace relatively inefficient cooling systems. A review of measures adopted through the program and analysis of savings estimates suggests that adoption of fuel substitution behaviors may not be fully documented or tracked as part of the program tracking data, and as a result, it is difficult to isolate all participants who electrified their energy-using systems. For instance, the evaluation team found that among 581 participants with both gas and electricity savings estimates and without known fuel substitution, 131 participants increased electricity consumption and decreased gas consumption after participation in the GGH Program.

Figure 14. Electric Saver Segment Distribution by Known Fuel Substitution Status



Figure 15. Gas Saver Segment Distribution by Known Fuel Substitution Status



### PRESENCE OF NET METERING AND ENERGY SAVINGS

Participants with net metering status on electric AMI data, identifying the presence of solar, are much more likely to be positive electric savers and deliver larger energy savings per participant (Table 39). Notably, negative savers with net metering are more likely to deliver deeper negative savings than participants without net metering; however, the magnitude of the difference is not as pronounced as that among positive savers.

Table 39. Comparison of Electric Saver Distribution and Savings by Presence of Solar

		nts Without Net etering	Participants with Net Metering		
Saver Type	% of Participant Dail Participants Energy Savings (kWh)		% of Participants	Average Per- Participant Daily Energy Savings (kWh)	
Positive	60%	4.12	64%	8.30	
Neutral	3%	-0.01	1%	-0.07	
Negative	37%	-3.71	35%	-5.44	

Note: Energy savings are reflective of the post-period weather profile. Savings should not be compared to the ones from the pooled models presented in the section above. They are used to explore the magnitude of differences across the various segments.

The estimated baseline energy usage of participants with solar is much lower than participants without solar. Most of the gap is likely due to solar generation. Since we do not observe solar generation, we present results separated by participants with and without solar. This helps us further understand the drivers of higher rate of savers as well as deeper savings among net metered participants, we explored the following:

- Measure adoption among participants with and without net metering and project sizes
- Location of participants with and without net metering in terms of climate zones
- Composition of participants with and without net metering on a variety of known data, such as credit score and incidence of participants being in DAC tracts

Figure 16 describes each key electric saver segment: positive savers with and without net metering and negative savers with and without net metering. Neutral savers are not included in the analysis due to the small size of the segment.

As can be seen in the graphic, a variety of characteristics differentiate the various saver segments:

- Baseline usage. Positive savers are more likely to have higher average baseline usage than negative savers. This is true for positive saver segments with and without net metering. Notably, the baseline usage of participants with and without net metering should not be compared directly, as the baseline usage of participants with net metering does not include solar generation data used to meet the energy needs at the time of production. It is possible and, in fact, likely that participants with net metering have higher baseline usage than participants without net metering. Across all segments, as the baseline usage increases, so do the positive savings.
- Measures adopted. Energy savings vary depending on the measures adopted. Notably, positive savers with HVAC, weatherization, and water heating measures achieve deeper savings than participants with cool roof and fenestration measures. Negative savers with no net metering are achieving deeper negative savings upon installing HVAC and water heating measures, which could be tied to fuel substitution. Due to small population sizes, energy savings by end use are uncertain for the participants with net metering. They, therefore, could not be explored in greater detail.
- Loan amount. Participants with net metering, positive or negative savers, averaged higher loan amounts than participants without net metering. This signals larger project sizes among participants with net metering.
- FICO score. Negative savers, with or without net metering, are more likely to have slightly lower FICO scores; however, energy savings achieved by negative savers do not vary meaningfully according to the FICO score category. Positive savers with net metering are more likely to have higher FICO scores, and participants with higher FICO scores are more likely to achieve deeper positive savings. Interestingly, the energy savings of participants without net metering decreased as their FICO scores increased.
- DAC status. Positive savers with net metering have the least incidence of participants in DACs. Additionally, the
  energy savings of DAC and non-DAC participants are relatively similar. Among positive savers without net metering,
  DAC participant savings are lower than non-DAC participant savings.
- Fuel substitution. Negative saver segments are more likely to have known fuel substitution measures than positive saver segments. Among negative saver segments, participants with known fuel substitution achieve deeper negative savings than those without known fuel substitution. Interestingly, positive savers with and without net metering with known fuel substitution are more likely to deliver deeper positive savings. This is likely because positive savers with known fuel substitution undertake larger projects with multiple end uses.

Figure 16. Electric Saver Characterization



<sup>\*\*</sup> Results not shown due to small sample sizes

Note: Energy savings are reflective of the post-period weather profile. Savings should not be compared to those from the pooled models presented in the section above. They are used to explore the magnitude of differences across the various segments.

Given large differences in energy savings between positive savers with and without net metering, we explored those saver segment distributions and end use installation by climate zone. The results, presented in Table 40 below, suggest that the difference in HVAC measure installation by climate zone is one of the drivers of differences in energy savings.

More specifically, positive savers with net metering are more likely than positive savers without net metering to be located in climate zones with greater need for heating and cooling, as evidenced in higher average heating degree days (HDD) and cooling degree days (CDD). Further, positive savers with net metering located in climate zones with greater need for heating and cooling are also more likely to update their HVAC systems as part of the GGH Program, thus tapping into deeper energy savings. This interaction of participant location in terms of climate zones and differences in HVAC system replacement is a likely driver of the higher savings among participants with net metering.

Table 40. Relationship of Electric Energy Savings with Climate Zones and HVAC Measure Incidence

Average Weather		% Distribution of Participants		Incidence of HVAC Measures		Average Per-Participant Daily Savings (kWh)		
Climate Zone	CDD	HDD	Positive Savers - No NEM	Positive Savers - NEM	Positive Savers - No NEM	Positive Savers - NEM	Positive Savers - No NEM	Positive Savers - NEM
Climate zone 2	0.85	10.10	1%	4%	100%	75%	9.75	6.58
Climate zone 3	0.14	7.66	1%	0%	80%		4.72	
Climate zone 4	0.60	8.30	1%	1%	43%	100%	1.47	4.47
Climate zone 6	0.65	3.85	1%	0%	33%		4.32	
Climate zone 7	0.47	5.21	1%	2%	67%	0%	4.50	8.30
Climate zone 8	0.67	4.03	6%	0%	48%		3.49	
Climate zone 9	1.35	4.99	8%	0%	43%		3.41	
Climate zone 10	2.33	6.36	12%	2%	50%	100%	4.44	9.32
Climate zone 11	2.56	8.11	13%	32%	69%	94%	4.34	6.44
Climate zone 12	1.76	8.05	29%	36%	82%	86%	4.24	9.29
Climate zone 13	3.79	6.26	23%	23%	43%	61%	4.22	9.67
Climate zone 14	4.09	7.60	3%	0%	54%		2.26	
Climate zone 15	7.27	3.02	1%	0%	50%		6.25	
Climate zone 16	2.21	10.90	1%	0%	14%		2.94	

Note: Light grey italicized cells contain very small population counts, and, as such, the results should be treated with caution.

Energy savings values are reflective of the post-period weather profile. The savings values should not be compared to the ones from pooled models presented in the prior section and are used to explore the differences across the various segments.

Table 41 summarizes gas saver segments and their associated savings. As can be seen in the table, nearly two-thirds of participants with gas accounts deliver positive savings, while just over one-third deliver negative savings. Nearly two-thirds of gas participants deliver positive savings, while over a third deliver negative savings. Aside from baseline usage, negative savings do not appear to be driven by any of the key observable characteristics.

Table 41. Gas Saver Distribution

Saver Type	% of Participants	Average Per- Participant Daily Energy Savings (Therms)
Positive	61%	0.44
Neutral	3%	-0.001
Negative	36%	-0.24

Note: Energy savings are reflective of the post-period weather profile. Savings should not be compared to the ones from the pooled models presented in the section above and are used to explore the magnitude of differences across the various segments.

Figure 17 characterizes positive and negative gas savers. Neutral savers are not included in the analysis due to the small size of the segment. As can be seen in the graphic, the two segments have similarities and differences:

- Baseline usage. The average baseline usage of the positive gas savers is 15% higher than that of the negative gas savers. As the positive saver baseline usage increases, so do gas savings. Similarly, the negative savings decrease as the negative saver baseline usage increases.
- Loan amount. Loan amounts of negative gas savers are considerably lower than those of the positive savers, signaling more measures installed and a broader amount of energy-saving updates.
- Measures adopted. While negative savers are more likely to have installed HVAC measures as part of the financed projects and are less likely to have installed other measures, the magnitude of negative savings does not vary by installed measure. Among positive savers, HVAC, weatherization, and water heating measures achieve the highest savings.
- FICO score. Among the saver segment, participants with higher FICO scores achieve higher savings. Higher incidence of HVAC and insulation measures likely contribute to the savings differences.
- Fuel substitution. Positive savings are driven in part by fuel substitution. Gas savings from known fuel switchers are nearly three times higher than those from their counterparts. Negative savers are almost never fuel switchers.
- DAC status. Negative and positive savers are similar in terms of their DAC status. However, gas savings vary
  depending on whether or not participants are in DACs. More specifically, among positive savers, participants in
  DACs deliver lower savings than those who are not in DACs. Among negative savers, however, the differences in
  savings by DAC status are negligible.

**Negative Savers** 61% 36% Positive Savers Percent of Participants Percent of Participants with Gas Accounts with Gas Accounts Percentile Percentile Average  $10^{Th}$  $25^{th}$ 90<sup>th</sup> Average 75<sup>™</sup> 25<sup>th</sup> Median 75<sup>™</sup> 90<sup>th</sup> Avg Baseline (therm) 0.99 1 24 2.19 1.37 1.10 1.43 1.86 Avg Daily Savings 0.44 -0.30 -0.04-0.24 0.11 1 11 (therm) 10% **16%** 30% 46% 28% % Savings -31% -17% Incidence of Financed Measures Avg Daily **Avg Daily** FICO Score FICO Score Incidence of Financed Measures Avg Daily **Avg Daily** Therm Saving Therm Savings 580-640 4% 0.31 0.51 -0.28 -0.23580-640 3% HVAC 70% 641-700 15% 0.31 0.28 Cool Roof -0.25 11% -0.24 641-700 16% 0.33 0.37 701-760 31% Windows/doors 14% -0.24-0.23 701-760 0.56 -0.25 0.50 Weatherization 12% 761-820 38% -0.24761-820 0.90 -0.28Water Heating | 3% 821+ 13% 0.60 -0.20 821+ 0.87 Appliances -0.20 Fuel Fuel **DAC Status DAC Status** Substitution Substitution Average Loan Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Percent of Percent of 21% 79% 14% 86% 23% 77% 2% 98% \$15,149 **Participants Participants** Average Daily Average Daily 0.35 0.49 0.96 0.35 -0.23 -0.24 -0.24-0.20

Therm Savings

Figure 17. Gas Saver Segment Characterization

10<sup>Th</sup>

0.86

6%

65%

Therm Savings

Avg Baseline (therm)

Avg DailySavings

(therm) % Savings

Cool Roof 13%

Windows/doors 21%

Weatherization 21%

Average Loan

\$17.856

Water Heating | 4%

Appliances

Note: Energy savings are reflective of the post-period weather profile. Savings should not be compared to those from the pooled models presented in the section above and are used to explore the magnitude of differences across the various segments.

Table 42 presents the electric saver distribution and average daily electric savings per participant by IOU. In addition, the table summarizes the incidence of adoption for the various end uses by each IOU. As can be seen in the table, PG&E has the highest share of positive savers, while SDG&E has the lowest. Resultantly, average per-participant savings are highest for PG&E and lowest for SDG&E. Differences in HVAC measure adoption likely contribute to the differences in savings by the IOU.

Table 42. Electric Saver Segment Distribution and Average Per Participant Daily Energy Savings by IOU

Column	PG&E	SCE	SDG&E
Electric Saver Segment Co	mposition		
Positive	63%	59%	36%
Neutral	3%	2%	4%
Negative	35%	39%	61%
Average Per Participant Da	ily Electric Saving	gs (kWh)	
All	1.85	0.71	0.11
Positive	5.14	3.88	5.90
Neutral	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03
Negative	-4.01	-3.97	-3.29
Average Per Participant Loan Amount	\$16,838	\$18,755	\$18,345
Incidence of End Uses			
HVAC	66%	49%	36%
Cool roof	18%	25%	36%
Windows/doors	13%	26%	25%
Weatherization	14%	24%	11%
Water heating	3%	3%	7%
Appliances	1%	2%	4%

Note: Energy savings are reflective of the post-period weather profile. Savings should not be compared to those from the pooled models presented in the section above and are used to explore the magnitude of differences across the various segments.

Table 43 presents gas saver distribution and average per participant daily gas savings by IOU. In addition, the table summarizes the incidence of the adoption of various end uses by each IOU. As with the electric savings, PG&E has the highest share of positive gas savers, while SDG&E has the lowest. Because of that, average per-participant gas savings are highest for PG&E and lowest for SDG&E. Differences in HVAC measure adoption likely contribute to the differences in savings by the IOU.

Table 43. Gas Saver Segment Distribution and Average Per Participant Daily Energy Savings by IOU

	PG&E	SoCalGas	SDG&E
Gas Saver Segment			
Positive	61%	62%	62%
Negative	36%	35%	35%
Neutral	3%	3%	4%
Average Per Particip	oant Daily Gas S	avings (Therms)	
All	0.21	0.11	0.06
Positive	0.48	0.33	0.25
Neutral	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003
Negative	-0.23	-0.26	-0.28

	PG&E	SoCalGas	SDG&E
Average Per Participant Loan Amount	\$15,678	\$19,557	\$17,990
Incidence of End Us	ses		
HVAC	75%	48%	31%
Cool roof	7%	24%	35%
Windows/doors	15%	26%	27%
Weatherization	15%	26%	19%
Water heating	3%	5%	8%
Appliances	1%	3%	0%

Note: Energy savings are reflective of the post-period weather profile.

Savings should not be compared to those from the pooled models presented in the section above and are used to explore the magnitude of differences across the various segments.

### 7.1.2 ENERGY SAVINGS FROM MICRO-LOAN

Enervee provides micro-loans facilitated by the GGH Program for household appliances, including clothes washers, clothes dryers, dishwashers, ovens, ranges, refrigerators, and smart thermostats. Table 44 summarizes the total energy savings by measure, showing the program saved 17,402 kWh, 2.70 kW, and 2,315 therms for the 755 appliances purchased through the California Enervee Marketplace. The Appendix A includes more details regarding the deemed savings application methodology.

Table 44. Micro-Loan Total Energy Savings

Measure	Measure Quantity	Program Gross Savings			
Measure	Measure Qualitity	kWh	kW	Therms	
Clothes Dryer (Electric)	12	693	0.17	-6	
Clothes Dryer (Gas)	220	-209	N/A	731	
Clothes Washer	229	14,351	2.30	907	
Convection Gas Oven	178	N/A	N/A	450	
Dishwasher	66	881	0.22	174	
Induction Range or Cooktop	5	-1,095	N/A	72	
Refrigerator	39	1,867	0.00	-34	
Smart Thermostat	6	915	N/A	21	
Total	755	17,402	2.70	2,315	

Source: The deemed savings are multiplied by the total measure quantity from the program tracking data. The deemed savings reference the California Electronic Technical Reference Manual (eTRM).

## 7.2 EMISSIONS REDUCTION

The evaluation team emulated procedure 2.2 of the CPUC Fuel Substitution Calculator v2 to calculate the emission reductions achieved from electricity and gas savings during program years 2018–2023. We estimated the emissions reductions from electricity savings by applying the annual conversion factors (tCO<sub>2</sub>/MWh) to each year of energy

savings. These annual conversion factors are developed from long-run emissions inputs from the 2022 ACC Electrical Model v1b - IRP 2021 Reference System Plan.

For emissions reductions from gas savings, a single conversion factor, the carbon content of a single unit of natural gas (tCO<sub>2</sub>/therms), is applied to the total gas savings. Before adding the two to arrive at the total emissions reductions, two methane leakage percentages are applied to each emissions reduction quantity: one for upstream methane leakage from power plants (adds about 5% to emissions reductions) and one for residential behind-the-meter leakage (adds about 4% to emissions reductions). The sum of the resulting emissions reductions after the methane leakage percentages are applied is the total emissions reductions in metric tons of CO<sub>2</sub>. Further detailed emission reduction calculation methodology and assumptions are in Appendix A.

 $CO_2$  emission reductions associated with first-year annual energy savings are presented in Table 45. Unsurprisingly, EEEMs installed using standard loans accounted for most of the emissions reductions. Gas savings associated with the program achieved much deeper emissions reductions. Gas savings associated with EEEMs installed using standard loans accounted for 79% of the emission reductions achieved through the GGH Program.

EEEMs Installed Using:	tCO <sub>2</sub> Reductions from Gas Savings	tCO <sub>2</sub> Reductions from Electricity Savings	Total
Micro-loans	13.43	3.31	16.75
Standard loans	455.12	104.00	559.12
Total	468.55	107.32	575.87

Table 45. Emission Reduction from Energy Savings

## 7.3 BENCHMARKED PROGRAM SAVINGS

The GGH Program is one of the few programs that deploy LLR to encourage residential EE projects. However, a sizeable number of programs around the United States have promoted residential EE projects through financing to ameliorate high up-front costs of EE projects with deeper savings. In addition, the GGH Program has started facilitating micro-loans for smaller EE projects, typically appliance purchases. As such, benchmarking program savings from the GGH Program against other financing programs is challenging, and results should be interpreted with caution. Among many other factors, differences in measure mix, program delivery and implementation, evaluation methodology, participant period under evaluation, and differences in climate could result in differences in estimated savings.

Table 46 compares the evaluated energy savings from EEEMs installed using standard loans from the GGH Program to financing programs with a similar list of EEEMs. Savings from micro-loans are not compared since they make up a much smaller share of the evaluated savings (<3%). Moreover, the TRM-driven estimation of smaller appliances is not comparable to savings estimation for EEEMs, which are expected to lead to much deeper energy savings.

The GGH Program saved 3% of electricity and 5.7% of gas relative to per-participant pre-installation baseline usage. This represents much deeper gas savings and fewer electricity savings than the Pilot evaluation. The differences are likely due to two reasons. First, the pooled model-based consumption analysis of this evaluation uses future GGH Program participants as the comparison group. The REEL evaluation used matched participants who were not part of the GGH Program as the comparison group. Thus, the methodology of the REEL evaluation estimates gross savings (i.e., the sum of savings due to EEEMs) and the effect of selection into the program of participants who are eager to save energy. In contrast, by conducting a within-program comparison, this evaluation controls for the selection effect and brings estimates close to net savings. Second, more fuel-substituting EEEMs were installed during this evaluation period. Thus, the electricity savings are expected to be lower, and gas savings are expected to be higher.

The NYSERDA OBR project encouraged measures similar to the EEEMs in the GGH Program. The NYSERDA OBR project led to an estimated net electricity savings of 3%. The estimated gas savings are 13%. However, the comparability NYSERDA OBR estimated savings with the GGH program savings is somewhat limited since the NYSERDA OBR impact evaluation methodology drops some participating houses with weak relationship between weather and energy use, and unusually high consumption. Both these methodological choices is likely to increase the estimated savings. In addition, the NYSERDA OBR evaluation period was much earlier, thus reductions in savings from natural increase in energy efficiency is expected. With similar measures, the Michigan saves program estimated combined energy bills (electricity and gas) savings of 4%. However, their evaluation methodology is unknown.

The Missouri Pay As You Save (PAYS) program is another OBR program with comparable measure mix. However, they do not specifically encourage fuel substitution or fuel substitution. Their per participant ex post electricity saving, estimated using a TRM based engineering approach, is 31% of pre-installation electricity usage. This number is substantially higher than estimates obtained from approaches that utilize a consumption analysis with comparison groups. As per the NYSERDA OBR evaluation estimates, the net electric savings per participant when using an approach similar to the approach used for this evaluation is 17% of the program reported ex ante usage.<sup>33,34</sup>

Table 46. GGH Program Savings (Standard Loans) Compared to Similar Programs

	The GGH Program	REEL	NYSERDA OBR	Missouri PAYS	Michigan Saves
Participation period under evaluation (inclusive of endpoints)	July 2018- June 2023	June 2016- June 2018	January 2014– September 2016	January 2021- December 2022	January 2022- December 2022
Electricity Savings Per Participant	3%	12.8%	3%	31% <sup>b</sup>	4% <sup>c</sup>
Gas Savings Per Participant	5.7%	2.6%	13%ª	Not evaluated	4%c
Impact estimation method	Consumption Analysis with Pooled Model (own-comparison group)	Consumption Analysis with Pooled Model (matched comparison group with non- participants)	Consumption Analysis with Pooled Model	Engineering Analysis using Missouri and other TRMs	Unknown
Likely interpretation	Between net and gross impact	Gross impact	Between net and gross impact	Savings not verified through a consumption analysis	Unknown
Source	This Report	REEL Impact Evaluation, 2020 <sup>35</sup>	HPwES On Bill Recovery Impact Evaluation, 2019 <sup>36</sup>	Impact Evaluation Report, 2022 <sup>37</sup>	Michigan Saves Website <sup>38</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Not net gas savings.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>b</sup> Pre-install usage data estimated using billing data for a random subset of 20 participants.

c 4% saving in gas and electricity bills.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> In Opinion Dynamics experience, ex ante values are often developed using an approach similar to Engineering analysis approach.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Reported ex ante saving is 1,786 kWh, whereas net saving is 295 kWh. (Table 6 of "HPwES On Bill Recovery Impact Evaluation." West Hill Energy & Computing. 2019).

<sup>35 &</sup>quot;Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot: Final Impact Evaluation Report." Opinion Dynamics. 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> "HPwES On Bill Recovery Impact Evaluation." West Hill Energy & Computing. 2019.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> "Ameren Missouri Program Year 2022 Annual EM&V Report Volume 2: Residential Portfolio Report." Opinion Dynamics. 2023.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> "By the numbers." Michigan Saves, <a href="https://annualreport.michigansaves.org">https://annualreport.michigansaves.org</a>, Accessed March 15. 2024. Opinion Dynamics

## 7.4 PROGRAM INFLUENCE

The participant surveys explored how the availability of financing influenced respondents' decisions to complete a home upgrade project or purchase energy-efficient equipment. Because the GGH Program does not claim energy savings, the evaluation team did not calculate a net-to-gross ratio to discount energy savings. Rather, the evaluation team qualitatively assessed the Program influence on customer decision-making.

### 7.4.1 PROGRAM INFLUENCE ON DECISION-MAKING

The evaluation team asked participant survey respondents if they decided to do a home upgrade/purchase EE products before or after they knew about financing options. As shown in Table 47 micro-loan respondents were statistically more likely than standard loan respondents to have decided after learning about financing (63% vs. 31%). Inversely, standard loan respondents were statistically more likely than micro-loan respondents to have decided before learning about financing (68% vs. 32%).

Table 47. Timing of Learning About Financing Relative to Decision to Do Project/Purchase Equipment

Decided to Do Home				
Upgrade/Purchase Equipment Before or After Learning About Financing	Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=144) (c)	Micro-loan (n=60) (d)
Before	62%	73%	68% <sup>d</sup>	32%
After	37%	27%	31%	63% <sup>c</sup>
Don't know	2%	0%	1%	5%⁰

Source: Standard Ioan and Micro-Ioan participant surveys

Question: Did you decide to [do a home upgrade/purchase the energy saving products from the Enervee or SoCalGas Marketplace] before you knew about financing options or afterward?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: a/b/c/d indicates at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha be

The participant surveys included questions that explored what respondents would have done without financing. The team asked respondents how likely they would have been to undertake their home upgrade project/purchase EE products if financing were not available. As shown in Table 48, 54% of standard loan respondents and 61% of microloan respondents said they would have been unlikely to do their project/purchase EE products without financing.

Table 48. Likelihood of Undertaking Project/Purchasing Products Without Financing

Likelihood of Undertaking				
Project/Purchasing EE Equipment Without Financing	Fuel Substitution (n=65)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79)	Total (n=144)	Micro-Ioan (n=60)
Very likely	14%	24%	19%	15%
Somewhat likely	29%	22%	25%	22%
Somewhat unlikely	18%	20%	19%	18%
Very unlikely	37%	34%	35%	43%
Don't know	2%	0%	1%	2%

Source: Standard Ioan and Micro-Ioan participant surveys

Question: Without financing, how likely would you have been to [undertake this project/purchase energy savings products]? Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. Tests revealed no significant differences.

The team asked all respondents when they would have undertaken their home upgrade project/purchased EE products if financing had not been available. As seen in Table 49 approximately 64% of standard loan and 62% of micro-loan respondents would have done their project/purchased the equipment later than they did if the financing was not available. A further 6% and 7% of standard loan and micro-loan respondents, respectively, never would have done the project/or purchased the equipment.

Table 49. Timing of Undertaking Project/Purchasing Products Without Financing

When Respondents Would		Standard Loan		
Have Undertaken Project/Purchased EE Equipment Without Financing	Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=144) (c)	Micro-loan (n=60)
At the same time or sooner	20%	22%	21%	17%
Within six months	17%	9%	13%	17%
Within a year	9%	13%	11%	20%⁰
Within a year and a half	3%	5%	4%	5%
Within two years	15%	13%	14% <sup>d</sup>	5%
Two years or longer	20%	23%	22%	15%
Never	5%	6%	6%	7%
Don't know	11%	10%	10%	15%

Source: Standard Ioan and Micro-Ioan participant surveys

Question: Without any financing, WHEN would you have [undertaken this project/purchased the energy savings products] (compared to when you actually [undertook this project/purchased the equipment] with financing)?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab, cd

The team asked respondents to consider the likelihood they would have done a project/purchased equipment that cost less than they did absent financing. As seen in Table 50, 53% of standard loan respondents and 66% of micro-loan respondents indicated they would have been likely to do something cheaper absent financing. Micro-loan respondents were significantly more likely than standard loan respondents to indicate they would have been "very" likely to do something that cost less absent financing (43% vs. 30%).

Table 50. Likelihood of Undertaking a Project/Purchasing Equipment that Cost Less Without Financing

Likelihood of Doing a		Standard Loan			
Project/Purchasing Equipment That Cost Less Without Financing	Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=144) (c)	Micro-loan (n=60) (d)	
Very likely	34%	27%	30%	43% <sup>c</sup>	
Somewhat likely	22%	24%	23%	23%	
Somewhat unlikely	2%	13%ª	8%	13%	
Very unlikely, I would have done the same project	35%	24%	29%	18%	
Don't know	8%	13%	10% <sup>d</sup>	2%	

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: Without any financing, what is the likelihood that you would have [done a project that would have cost less than the project you did/purchased a less expensive equipment]?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab, cd

The team asked respondents, who indicated that absent financing, they would have been likely to have done a project/purchased equipment that cost less than what they did with financing, to consider the efficiency level of the cheaper equipment they would have installed. As shown in Table 51, 14% of standard loan respondents and 25% of micro-loan respondents were unsure what they would have done. Approximately 52% of standard loan respondents and 43% of micro-loan respondents indicated they would have purchased equipment that only met minimum efficiency standards or purchased no equipment at all.

Table 51. Efficiency of Equipment Purchased in Hypothetical Where Financing Was Unavailable

Efficiency of Cheaper Equipment Participants Would Have Purchased	Fuel Substitution (n=36)	No Fuel Substitution (n=40)	Total (n=76)	Micro-Ioan (n=40)
The minimum efficiency standards or building code	28%	35%	32%	20%
Would not have installed any equipment	17%	23%	20%	23%
The same or higher efficiency equipment but less in quantity	22%	13%	17%	20%
Above the minimum efficiency standards or building code but lower efficiency than what you installed	22%	13%	17%	13%
Don't know	11%	18%	14%	25%

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: For this question, please think of a hypothetical scenario where financing was not available for your [home upgrade project/equipment purchase]. Without any financing, would you have installed equipment that was...?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. Tests revealed no significant differences.

### REASONS FOR SELECTING GGH/ECO FINANCING

In addition to exploring the overall influence of financing, the participant surveys explored why participants chose to use GGH/Eco Financing specifically.

The team asked respondents to recall how they first learned about the GGH Program. As seen in Table 52, most standard loan respondents first learned about GGH from their contractor (63%) and most micro-loan respondent first learned about GGH from the Enervee or SoCalGas Marketplace website (72%). Among standard loan respondents, those who installed a fuel substitution measure were significantly more likely than those who did not install a fuel substitution measure to have first learned about GGH from a contractor (72% vs. 54%). In February 2022, CAEATFA signed a Memorandum of Agreement with Energy Solutions, the implementer of the TECH Clean California Initiative (TECH), a market transformation program designed to accelerate adoption of commercially available, low-emissions space- and water-heating equipment (i.e., fuel substation equipment).

Table 52. How Participants First Learned About GGH/Eco Financing

First Learned About GGH Via	Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=144) (c)	Micro-loan (n=60) (d)
The Enervee or SoCalGas Marketplace website	N/A	N/A	N/A	72%
Digital marketing: emails or search engine ads	N/A	N/A	N/A	15%
Contractor	72% <sup>b</sup>	54%	63%	0%
Did my own research	18%	22%	20% <sup>d</sup>	5%

Bank or Lender	5%	9%	7%	5%
A website (Other than Enervee or SoCalGas Marketplace)	3%	8%	6%	3%
Friend, family member, or acquaintance	0%	6%	3%	0%
Other advertisement	2%	1%	1%	0%

Source: Standard Ioan and Micro-Ioan participant surveys

Question: How did you FIRST learn about the [GoGreen Home/Eco Financing] Loan?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the

following tests: ab, cd

The team asked standard loan respondents who first heard about the GGH Program from a source other than their contractor (n=54) if their contractor told them about any financing options other than the GGH Program. Of these standard loan respondents, 7% did not use a contractor for their home upgrade project, and 6% did not know. Approximately 43% indicated that their contractor informed them of other financing options, and the remaining 44% did not hear about other financing from their contractor.

The team asked all shoppers (defined as respondents who first learned about GGH/Eco Financing from independent research or indicated they sought other financing options) why they chose to use GGH/Eco Financing. As seen in Table 53, the two reasons most often cited by shoppers were the low interest rate and the easy process. Responses varied somewhat by loan type; whereas the low interest rate was the most common response for standard loan respondents, the most common response among micro-loan respondents was the easy process. Standard loan respondents were significantly more likely than micro-loan respondents to indicate they used GGH because of the low interest rate (69% vs. 58%).

Table 53. Reasons for Using GGH/Eco Financing Over Other Financing Options

		Standard Loan			
Reason for Using GGH/Eco Financing	Fuel Substitution (n=22) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=34) (b)	Total (n=56) (c)	Micro-loan (n=26) (d)	
Low interest rate	51%	73%	69% <sup>d</sup>	58%	
Easy process	33%	51%	48%	77%	
No lien/upfront collateral	18%	23%	24%	31%	
Long loan term	14%	21%	21%	38%	
Do not like large credit card debts	N/A	N/A	N/A	23%	
No penalty for paying off early	5%	23%ª	18%	N/A	
Loan size	3%	3%	4%	N/A	
Did not qualify for other financing	0%	2%	1%	N/A	
Other reason	8%	2%	5%	8%	

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: In general, why did you choose to use a [GoGreen Home/Eco Financing] Loan instead of other financing options? Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab, cd

The team asked respondents how they paid for the home upgrade project/EE equipment other than the GGH/Eco Financing loan. Only 4 of the 144 standard loan respondents indicated they used another type of financing besides their GGH loan. No micro-loan participants used another type of financing, as this was not possible given the loan design.

Of the four standard loan respondents who used another type of financing, one indicated using a home equity loan/HELOC, one did mortgage refinancing, one used financing from a contractor/manufacturer, and one leveraged on-

bill financing. Two of the four indicated they used another type of financing on top of the GGH Program loan because the GGH Program did not cover the entire project costs.

The team asked standard loan respondents who indicated they used another type of financing in addition to the GGH Program Loan, in the absence of the GGH Program, how likely they would have been to increase the loan amount of the other type of financing they used to pay for their project. Of the four, one indicated they would have been "very" likely, one indicated "somewhat" likely, and the remaining two indicated "very" unlikely.

The team asked (1) non-shoppers (defined as respondents who did not first learn about the GGH Program from independent research and indicated they did not seek out other financing options) and (2) standard loan participants who used another type of financing and indicated they would have been likely to increase the amount of their non-GGH financing if the GGH Program were not available, whether they would have taken the time to research other options. As seen in Table 54, micro-loan non-shoppers were significantly more likely than standard loan non-shoppers to indicate they would not have researched other options (29% vs. 7%), suggesting micro-loan respondents would have been less likely than standard loan respondents to have found other financing absent the GGH Program. Among standard loan non-shoppers, those who installed a fuel substitution measure were significantly more likely than those who did not install a fuel substitution measure not to research other options absent the GGH Program (23% vs. 2%).

Table 54. Would Non-Shoppers Have Researched Other Financing Options in the Absence of GGH/Eco Financing

Would Non-Shoppers		Standard Loan	andard Loan			
Have Researched Other Financing Options	Fuel Substitution (n=44) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=45) (b)	Total (n=89) (c)	Micro-loan (n=34) (d)		
Yes	66%	76%	71% <sup>d</sup>	41%		
Maybe	11%	22%	22%	29%		
No	23%b	2%	7%	29%⁰		

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: If the [GoGreen Home/Eco Financing] Loan was not available, would you have taken the time to research other options?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab, cd

The team asked standard loan respondents who indicated their contractor told them about financing options other than the GGH Program: if the GGH loan were unavailable, would they have considered something other than what the contractor offered? Of 23 standard loan respondents, 9 indicated they would have considered something else, 12 indicated they might have, and 2 indicated they would not have.

The team asked respondents how influential the GGH/Eco Financing loan was on their decision to complete a home upgrade project/purchase EE equipment overall. As seen in Table 55, all micro-loan respondents said Eco Financing was at least "somewhat" influential on their decision to purchase EE equipment from the Enervee/SoCalGas marketplace, with 88% indicating it was "very" influential. Micro-loan respondents were significantly more likely than standard loan respondents to indicate the GGH was "very" influential; however, only 9% of standard loan respondents felt it was "not too" or "not at all" influential.

Table 55. Influence of GGH/Eco Financing on Decision to Do Home Upgrade Project/Purchase EE Equipment

Influence of GGH/Eco Financing				
on Decision to Do Project/Purchase EE Equipment	Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=144) (c)	Micro-Ioan (n=60) (d)
Very influential	58%	65%	62%	88% <sup>c</sup>
Somewhat influential	34%	24%	28% <sup>d</sup>	12%
Not too influential	6%	6%	6%	0%
Not at all influential	2%	5%	3%	0%

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: Overall, how influential was the [GoGreen Home/Eco Financing] Loan you received on your decision to [complete a home upgrade project/purchase the energy saving products]?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab, cd

### RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF REBATES AND FINANCING

The participant surveys explored how influential the GGH Program was on respondents' decision to do a home upgrade project/purchase EE equipment relative to any rebates they may have used to pay for the project/equipment.

The team asked respondents how they paid for their project/EE equipment other than their GGH loan: 29 standard loan respondents and five micro-loan respondents indicated using a rebate.<sup>39</sup> Micro-loan respondents (all SCE customers) can only receive rebates from Southern California Gas. Standard loan respondents reported their rebates were from BayREN, the federal government, Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), Sonoma Clean Power, PG&E, and the local government.

The teams asked these respondents if their GGH loan was more, less, or equally important to their decision to complete a project/purchase EE equipment than the rebate/incentive they received. Of the 29 standard loan respondents, compared to the rebate, 48% (14 of 29) felt the loan was "significantly" more important, 7% (2 of 29) felt it was "somewhat" more important, 38% (11 of 29) felt it was "equally" important, and 7% (2 of 29) felt it was "less" important. Of the five micro-loan respondents, compared to the rebate, one respondent felt the loan was "somewhat" more important, and the remaining four felt it was "equally" important.

The team asked those who used a rebate in addition to their GGH/Eco Financing loan if they needed both, either, or neither of the funding sources, to be able to do their home upgrade project/purchase EE equipment. Of the 29 standard loan respondents, 72% (21 of 29) indicated they needed both the loan and the rebate to do their project, 21% (6 of 29) indicated they needed the loan but not the rebate, and 7% (2 of 29) indicated they did not need either. Of the five micro-loan respondents, four indicated they needed both the loan and rebate and the remaining respondent needed the loan but not the rebate.

## 7.4.2 PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF UPGRADE PROJECT/EE EQUIPMENT ON ENERGY SAVINGS

The participant survey asked respondents how their utility bill changed, if at all, after completing their GGH-financed project or installing their GGH-financed equipment. As seen in Table 56, standard loan respondents were significantly more likely than micro-loan respondents to indicate that their utility bill decreased since their GGH Program

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Whereas standard loan participants can identify and use utility/non-utility rebates to apply to their home upgrade project, micro-loan participants can only use rebates that are identified and applied at the point-of-sale on the Enervee/SoCalGas marketplace.

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participation (58% vs. 32%). Likewise, micro-loan respondents were significantly more likely than standard loan respondents to indicate that their utility bill had not changed (38% vs. 12%).

Table 56. Self-Reported Change in Utility Bill Since GGH Participation

Change In Utility Bill		Standard Loan			
Since GGH-Financed Project/Equipment	Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=144) (c)	Micro-loan (n=60) (d)	
Decrease	63%	59%	58% <sup>d</sup>	32%	
No change	9%	15%	12%	38%⁰	
Increase	14%	12%	13%	7%	
Don't know	11%	22%	16%	23%	
Prefer not to say	3%	0%	1%	0%	

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: Have you noticed an increase or decrease in your utility bill since [completing the home upgrade/the purchase of your equipment]?

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab, cd

The team asked those who indicated any change in their utility bill (regardless of its direction) what they felt caused the change. As seen in Table 57, standard loan respondents were more significantly likely than micro-loan respondents to attribute the change in their bill to the work they completed with GGH financing (79% vs. 52%). Micro-loan respondents were significantly more likely than standard loan respondents to reference a change in utility rates (35% vs. 17%).

Table 57. Participant-Reported Reason for Change in Utility Bill Since GGH Participation

Reasons for Change in Utility Bill	Fuel Substitution (n=54) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=54) (b)	Total (n=108) (c)	Micro-loan (n=23) (d)
The GGH-financed home upgrade project	83%	74%	79% <sup>d</sup>	52%
Other changes made to the property	15%	20%	18%	9%
A change in utility rates	13%	20%	17%	35%°
The weather	4%	6%	5%	13%
A change in occupancy	4%	2%	3%	9%
Other	4%	6%	5%	0%

Source: Standard Ioan and Micro-Ioan participant surveys

Question: Please describe what you think caused this change.

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab, cd

# 8. PROGRAM PERFORMANCE METRICS REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to gauge if Resolution E-4900 metrics remain valid indicators of performance for the GGH Program, if there are new metrics to track, and/or if original metrics should be modified. We first present an assessment of the GGH Program and the REEL Pilot based on a set of metrics that closely aligns with metrics in Res E-4900 (Section 8.1). In Section 8.2, we present further metrics that will be useful in tracking progress of the GGH Program.

## 8.1 PROGRAM PERFORMANCE METRICS SUMMARY

Table 58 provides a brief assessment of how the GGH Program performed during the evaluation period of July 2018 to June 2023 relative to its performance in the Pilot period (July 2016 – June 2018) across the key metrics outlined by the study's research objectives (see Purpose of the Study).

Table 58. Key Program Performance Metrics Summary<sup>a</sup>

Metric	REEL Pilot Activity (July 2016 – June 2018)	GGH Program Activity (July 2018 – June 2023)	GGH Program Evaluation Assessment
Program Scalability			
Growth in the number of loans on a month- by-month basis over the evaluation period	Average number of loans per month: 9	<ul> <li>Average number of loans per month: 64</li> </ul>	A fix-fold increase number of loans per month
The number of loans made by the program, average loan size, and total amount of financing generated	<ul> <li>Total program loans: 212</li> <li>Average loan size: \$17,246</li> <li>Total financing generated: \$3,656,135</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Total program loans: 3,887 (3,320 standard loans, 567 micro-loans)</li> <li>Average loan size: \$18,253 (standard loan) \$1,498 (micro-loan)</li> <li>Total financing generated: \$61,449,196 (\$60,599,987 standard loans, \$849,209 micro-loans)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Significant participation and financing growth</li> <li>Consistent standard loan size, given increased construction costs over time</li> </ul>
The geographic distribution of loans, including ability to reach new regions of the state especially those with large, underserved populations	Loan distribution concentrated in Southern California.	<ul> <li>Loan distribution expanded to the North Central Corridor and Bay Area due to increased loans from statewide lenders and the introduction of medium-volume regional lenders in those areas.</li> <li>About half of loans were distributed to a customer in an underserved census tract.40</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The program expanded its reach beyond Southern California but has limited reach outside of Southern California, the North Central Corridor, and the Bay Area.</li> <li>A large proportion of GGH borrowers resided outside of undeserved areas.</li> </ul>
Loan performance to date in terms of defaults, late payments, and use of loan loss reserve	<ul> <li>It was too early to thoroughly evaluate loan performance at the time of the pilot evaluation.</li> <li>Only one borrower defaulted in the first two years.</li> <li>A few customers started to make late payments.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Standard loan:     Paid in full – 18%     Current – 80%     Past-Due - &lt;1%     Defaulted – 1%</li> <li>Micro-loan:     Paid in full – 13%     Current – 56%     Past-Due – 14%     Defaulted – 16%</li> <li>\$453K net payments to lenders to cover defaults.</li> </ul>	The incidence of past-due payments and defaults was low among standard loans but more prevalent among micro-loans.
Participant details including credit scores, loan terms, percent underserved, and	<ul><li>Standard loan:</li><li>FICO Score (580-700) - 24%</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Standard loan:</li> <li>FICO score (580-700) – 16%</li> <li>Average loan term – 106 months</li> <li>Percent underserved – 59%</li> </ul>	There is opportunity for increasing standard loan participation among lower-income households and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Underserved census tracts are designated based on the definition of "underserved community" presented in the CPUC ESJ plan. An underserved community must meet at least one of the following sub-criteria: a "disadvantaged community" as defined by subdivision (g) of Section 75005 of the Public Resource Code; a "low-income community" as defined by paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Section 397813 of the Health and Safety code; among the most disadvantaged 25 percent in the state according to CalEnviroScreen; a community in which at least 75 percent of public school students in the area are eligible to receive free or reduced-price meals under the National School Lunch Program; and a community located on lands belonging to a federally recognized California Indian tribe.

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Metric	REEL Pilot Activity (July 2016 – June 2018)	GGH Program Activity (July 2018 – June 2023)	GGH Program Evaluation Assessment
percent who may qualify for other private loan options	<ul> <li>Average Loan term – 117 months</li> <li>Percent underserved – 30%</li> <li>Percent credit challenged – 4%</li> <li>Percent who may qualify for other private loans (self-reported): 10%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Percent who may qualify for other private loans (self-reported) – 4%</li> <li>Micro-loan:</li> <li>FICO Score (580-700) – 79%</li> <li>Average Loan term – 60 months</li> <li>Percent underserved – 85%</li> <li>Percent who may qualify for other private loans (self-reported) - 30%</li> </ul>	households within LMI census tracts.
Program Leveraged by I	Private Capital and Support		
The number and type of participating financial institutions and program-certified contractors, including an analysis of the distribution of participation across partners	<ul> <li>Total participating lenders: 4</li> <li>The program enrolled two statewide and two regional lenders.</li> <li>Participant contractor network: 282 contractors who served most counties in the state.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Total participating lenders: 10</li> <li>The program enrolled four new regional standard loan lenders (two small volume, two medium volume) and two micro-loan lenders (only one micro-loan lender remains part of the program).</li> <li>Participant contractor network: 959 contractors 786 enrolled as of September 30, 2023</li> <li>Concentrated in Southern California, the Northern Central Corridor, and the Bay Area.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Increased lender participation supported loan growth and wider distribution of loan participation</li> <li>Contractor enrollment increased steadily; however, 43% of contractors have yet to complete a GGH-financed project.</li> </ul>
Any changes CAEATFA made from the REEL pilot to attract additional funding for GGH and the total amount of private capital attracted to date	CAEATFA enacted changes to increase loan volume: created consolidated Loss Reserve Accounts, broadened measure eligibility, added option to file UCC-1 fixture filings	CAEATFA enacted further changes to increase loan volume: streamlined approval process, added leases and service agreements as eligible products, introduced micro-loans, created a Channel Partner role, reduced the minimum net worth eligibility requirement, and added the option to establish up to multiple Loss Reserve Accounts.	<ul> <li>CAEATFA's efforts generated \$61 million in private lending.</li> </ul>
Any program modifications CAEATFA implemented to improve consumer protections and attract additional lenders	CAEATFA enacted changes to simplify the participation process for lenders: removing burdensome paperwork, adding statewide EEEMs list, allowing lenders to use census tract to determine LMI status, and decoupling financing eligibility from rebate eligibility.	<ul> <li>CAEATFA enacted further changes to simplify participation for lenders: defining more uniform measure eligibility across IOUs and POUs, allowing CAEATFA to accept loan and project information digitally and in batches, and moving project permit verification responsibilities to contractors.</li> <li>CAEATFA enacted changes to provide additional consumer protections: updating borrower privacy disclosure, adding requirement for lease/service agreement providers to disclose APR or total project cost, requiring lease/service agreement providers to guarantee functionality of equipment if borrower pays ongoing service fee, and providing</li> </ul>	Six new lenders were added to the program. Two of them were micro-loan lenders, a new type of offering for the program.

Metric	REEL Pilot Activity (July 2016 – June 2018)	GGH Program Activity (July 2018 – June 2023)	GGH Program Evaluation Assessment
Any program modifications CAEATFA proposes to implement to improve consumer protections and attract additional lenders	■ N/A	alternative eligibility requirement for lease/service lenders.  Addition of solar and battery storage to EEEMs Implementation of web-based loan and project management system CAEATFA has implemented regulatory modifications required to run interest rate buy-down (IRBD) campaigns, contingent on external funding.	<ul> <li>Addition of solar and battery storage to EEEMs likely to serve a market need</li> <li>Streamlined process to aid PFIs will help as the program is scaling up</li> </ul>
The incidence of early payoffs and the implications of this on savings and annual percentage rate (APR) benefits; and whether customer early repayments alter the attractiveness of participation for lenders	<ul> <li>Not evaluated</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Percentage of loans paid off before end of evaluation period: Standard loan – 18% Micro-loan – 13%</li> <li>Percentage of loan paid off that were paid in the first 30% of the original loan payoff term: Standard loan – 74% Micro-loan – 96%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The incidence of early payoff is not moderate, it is more common among micro-loans.</li> <li>Participating lenders do not have early payoff penalties indicating incidence of early payoff does not impact lender willingness to participate in the program</li> </ul>
Whether the incremental funds from additional ratepayer funding were needed to implement GGH, and if so, how much	■ N/A	<ul> <li>\$51 million incremental funding requested for CHEEF programs.</li> <li>\$19.7 million - \$68.7 million forecasted new LLR needed between FY 22-23 to FY 26-27.</li> </ul>	Based on the forecasted growth by CAEATFA, the incremental funds are likely required.
Program Reach to Unde	rserved Customers		
Length of time allowed for applicants to pay back the loans	<ul> <li>Average loan payback term: 117 months</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Average loan payback term:</li> <li>Standard loan – 106 months</li> <li>Micro-loan – 60 months</li> </ul>	The average loan payback term for standard loans decreased by almost a year from the pilot period to the current evaluation period.
Credit scores of loan participants reported on an aggregate basis	FICO score of 580 - 640, i.e., credit- challenged: 8%	<ul> <li>FICO score of 580 -640, i.e., credit- challenged: Standard loan – 4% Micro-loan – 50%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Standard loans to credit-challenged borrowers decreased from the pilot period.</li> <li>Micro-loans had better reach to credit-challenged borrowers than standard loans.</li> </ul>
Percentage of participants deemed "underserved" as measured through CalEnviroScreen data, area median income, or other poverty statistics	<ul> <li>DTI ratio of 36% to 55%: 54%</li> <li>LMI Census Tract, i.e., percentage with tract median income/larger area median income less than 120%: 49%</li> <li>Most vulnerable census tract according to CalEnviroScreen score: 13%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>DTI ratio of 36% to 55%: 40%</li> <li>LMI Census Tract, i.e., percentage with tract median income/larger area median income less than 120%:         Standard loan – 57%         Micro-loan – 71%</li> <li>Most vulnerable census tract according to CalEnviroScreen score:         Standard loan – 13%         Micro-loan – 30%</li> <li>2022 annual income less than \$100,000:</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Standard loan reach to riskier borrowers (according to DTI ratio) decreased from the pilot period.</li> <li>Standard loan reach to LMI tracts increased from the pilot period.</li> <li>Micro-loans had better reach to LMI tracts than standard loans.</li> <li>Standard loan reach to the most vulnerable census tracts was similar to that of the pilot period.</li> </ul>

Metric	ric REEL Pilot Activity GGH Program Ac (July 2016 – June 2018) (July 2018 – June		GGH Program Evaluation Assessment
	<ul> <li>2022 annual income less than \$100,000: 25%</li> <li>Received/qualified for state/government assistance: 6%</li> <li>Tenant at property at time of home upgrade: 0%</li> </ul>	Standard loan – 16% Micro-loan – 74%  Received/qualified for state/government assistance: Standard loan – 9% Micro-loan – 62%  Tenant at property at time of home upgrade/EE equipment purchase: Standard loan – 1% Micro-loan – 38%	<ul> <li>Micro-loans had better reach to the most vulnerable census tracts than standard loans.</li> <li>Standard loans reach to lower-income borrowers decreased from the pilot period.</li> <li>Micro-loans had better reach to lower-income borrowers than standard loans.</li> <li>Standard loan reach to borrowers receiving/qualifying for state/government assistance increased from the pilot period.</li> <li>Micro-loans had better reach to borrowers receiving/qualifying for state/government assistance than standard loans.</li> <li>Introduction of micro-loans expanded program reach to tenants.</li> </ul>
How other entities define "underserved" Californians in comparison to GGH	<ul> <li>Not evaluated</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Underserved:         Standard loan – 48%         Micro-loan – 77%</li> <li>Disadvantaged communities:         Standard loan – 23%         Micro-loan – 36%</li> </ul>	The current definition of underserved used in the GGH program overstates the reach of standard loans to underserved borrowers compared to other CPUC definitions.
Whether participants would have qualified for existing private energy efficiency loan programs at interest rates and terms that they can afford or would accept	<ul> <li>All lenders increased their maximum allowable loan payment term up to 15 years for REEL and reduced their interest rate by 4.6% on average.</li> <li>Percentage of respondents who felt they would have been likely to qualify for other financing: 94%</li> <li>Percentage of respondents who felt alternative financing they qualified for would have a higher monthly payment: 75%</li> <li>Percentage of respondents who would have done the same project if the monthly payment were higher: 29%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Nearly 100% of lender's GGH loans had a lower interest rate and lower estimated monthly payment than their signature loan, 48% had a longer payback term</li> <li>There is a lack of other private, unsecured EE loans other than GGH loans</li> <li>Percentage of respondents who felt they would have been likely to qualify for other financing:         Standard loan – 97%         Micro-loan – 70%</li> <li>Percentage of respondents who thought other financing they would qualify for would have a higher interest rate:         Standard loan – 73%         Micro-loan – 60%</li> <li>Among respondents who found another financing option they qualified for but did not use, almost none indicated the alternative option had a lower interest rate and few indicated it had a longer payback term.</li> <li>Percentage of respondents who would have done the same project if the monthly payment were higher:</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Most standard loan respondents felt they could qualify for other financing; however, they felt that the terms of other financing they qualified for would be less favorable.</li> <li>Micro-loan respondents were less likely to feel they could qualify for other financing (but still prominent).</li> <li>Standard loan respondents were more likely than micro-loan respondents to say they would have done the same exact project even if the monthly payments were higher.</li> </ul>

Metric REEL Pilot Activity (July 2016 – June 2018)		GGH Program Activity (July 2018 – June 2023)	GGH Program Evaluation Assessment		
		Standard Ioan – 31% Micro-Ioan – 7%			
Program Energy Savings		Wildre Idali 1770			
Customer meter data provided by the utilities to conduct a consumption analysis and understand how much energy savings GGH produced, including electric and gas savings, taking account fuel shifting from gas to electric, per participant and overall	<ul> <li>Total Electricity savings: 63.7 MWh</li> <li>Total Gas savings: 1,262 therms</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Per participant electricity savings: 228 kWh</li> <li>Per participant gas savings: 25.5 therms</li> <li>Total Electricity savings: 556 MWh</li> <li>Total Gas Savings: 80,740 therms</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Program savings are mostly driven by standard loans</li> <li>Per participant standard loan electricity savings reduced from 5.4% to 3.0%</li> <li>Per participant standard loan gas savings increased from 1.5% to 5.7%</li> </ul>		
Differences in energy savings achieved across subpopulations of interest, such as climate zone, loan size, loan recipient type (LMI), presence of solar generation, and presence of fuel substitution, provided participation levels and available data allow for such comparisons	Not evaluated during REEL evaluation period	<ul> <li>LMI participants do not have differential savings.</li> <li>Loan size is positively associated with savings.</li> <li>Fuel substitution projects achieved deep gas savings and emission reduction</li> <li>The presence of solar generation is associated with greater savings</li> <li>HVAC measures led to higher energy savings than other measures</li> <li>Participants in climate zones with greater need for heating and cooling achieved higher savings and installed more HVAC measures.</li> </ul>	Fuel substitution, net metering, and project with HVAC measures produced the highest savings.		
Energy savings from other loan programs and comparing the Evaluation, Measurement, & Verification (EM&V) results to that of GGH	<ul> <li>Electricity savings per participant: 5.7%</li> <li>Gas savings per participant: 2.6%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Electricity savings per participant: 3%</li> <li>Gas savings per participant: 12.8%</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Energy savings are in line with other evaluations of loan programs once differences in methodologies and measures are considered.</li> </ul>		
The influence of the program on customer decision-making and relative influence of financing and rebates, where applicable	<ul> <li>Percentage of respondents unlikely to do home upgrade project products without financing: 38%</li> <li>Percentage of respondents who would have undertaken their project later or not at all without financing: 78%</li> <li>Percentage of respondents who were likely to have</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Percentage of respondents unlikely to do home upgrade project/purchase EE products without financing:         Standard loan – 54%         Micro-loan – 62%</li> <li>Percentage of respondents who would have undertaken their project later or not at all without financing:         Standard loan – 70%         Micro-loan – 69%</li> <li>Percentage of respondents who were likely to have done something that cost less if financing were not available:</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Financing is influential in customer decision-making</li> <li>The availability of financing was vital in the decision-making of a large proportion of respondents, more so than during the pilot period.</li> <li>The availability of financing played a major role in the timing of doing a home upgrade or purchasing EE equipment for a large proportion of respondents.</li> <li>Respondents who used a rebate in addition to financing felt financing was more or equally important to the rebate.</li> </ul>		

Metric	REEL Pilot Activity (July 2016 – June 2018)	GGH Program Activity (July 2018 – June 2023)	GGH Program Evaluation Assessment
	done something that cost the same if financing were not available: 50%  4 of 6 respondents who also used a rebate felt the loan was more important than the rebate.  5 of 6 respondents who also used a rebate felt they needed both the loan and rebate or just the loan to be able to do their project	Standard loan – 53% Micro-loan – 66%  Percentage of respondents who found GGH influential on their decision-making: Standard loan - 90% Micro-loan – 100%  27 of 29 standard loan respondents and 5 of 5 micro-loan respondents who also used a rebate felt financing was more or equally important than the rebate  27 of 29 standard loan respondents and 5 of 5 micro-loan respondents and 5 of 5 micro-loan respondents who also used a rebate felt they needed both the loan and rebate or just the loan to be able to do their project.	Respondents who used a rebate in addition to financing needed the financing to complete their project/purchase equipment.
Source energy and CO <sub>2</sub> emission reductions from financed projects (including fuel substitution measures)	<ul> <li>Not evaluated</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Emissions reduction of 576 Metric Tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub></li> </ul>	<ul> <li>The program succeeded in achieving deep gas savings, which typically reduces more emissions than electricity savings.</li> </ul>

Note: Metrics outlined in Resolution E-4900 are delineated with emphasized text.

## 8.2 PROGRAM PERFORMANCE METRIC CONSIDERATIONS

The metrics outlined in Resolution E-4900 cover a robust group of research objectives that directly align with the GGH Program's goals of growing in size, leveraging private capital/support, reaching underserved customers, and producing energy savings. The evaluation team assessed whether the metrics in Resolution E-4900 remain valid indicators for assessing the progress towards achieving the Program goals in light of the research activities undertaken in this evaluation.

First, we note that the Resolution does not include metrics to measure the customer experience, which is vital to continually increasing participation. To gather data for new metrics to track, the evaluation team added participant experience questions to the participant survey. Section 8.2.1 documents and discusses customer experience with the GGH program. Second, we offer considerations for modifying existing Resolution E-4900 performance metrics to better track progress towards Program goals given the evolving program context in Table 59.

Table 59. Considerations for Modification of Resolution E-4900 Performance Metrics

Goal	Metric	CPUC Stated Metric Purpose	Evaluator Considerations
The financing tool is scalable	<ul> <li>Number of loans made by the Pilot, with breakdown by:</li> <li>Growth in the number of loans on a month-by-month basis over the lifetime of the Pilot</li> <li>Total amount of financing generated by the Pilot</li> <li>Geographic distribution of loans, including ability to reach new regions of the state especially those with large underserved populations</li> </ul>	Assessment of whether the GGH program can reach a significant and growing number of Californians	<ul> <li>The Program is operating at a larger scale since the passage of Resolution E-5072. As such, June 2020-June 2021 can serve as a better baseline.</li> <li>Separate tracking for micro- and standard loan activity.</li> </ul>
The financing tool is leveraged by private capital and support	Private capital participation in the Pilot, as measured by:  Number of financial institutions participating in the pilot, and types of financial institutions participating (such as credit unions)  Amount of private capital attracted	Assessment of whether these financing tools can become partially or entirely self-supporting, that can reach a point where they depend less or do not depend on the use of ratepayer funds.	<ul> <li>Tracking the amount of private capital leveraged per ratepayer-funded i) credit enhancement dollar, ii) credit enhancement dollar expensed, and iii) total ratepayer expenses will help assess self-financing capability of the Program.</li> <li>Tracking the share of inactive contractors and/or concentration ratio of contractor activity will CPUC and CAEATFA keep pulse of key source of program success: contractor engagement.</li> </ul>
The financing tool reaches underserved Californians who would not otherwise have participated in EE upgrades	<ul> <li>Analysis of participants in the Pilot, according to:</li> <li>Credit scores of loan participants reported on an aggregate basis</li> <li>Length of time allowed for applicants to pay back the loans</li> <li>Percentage of participants deemed "underserved" as measured through CalEnviroScreen data, area median income, or other poverty statistics</li> <li>Whether participants would have qualified for existing private energy efficiency loan programs at interest rates and terms that they can afford or would accept</li> </ul>	Assess whether i) participants would have taken loans from elsewhere for the same upgrades, ii) hard-to-reach communities were reached.	Separate tracking for micro- and standard loan activity.
The financing tool produces energy savings	<ul> <li>Energy savings that resulted, as measured:</li> <li>Through customer meter data provided by the utilities via Energy Division data request (customer privacy must be maintained)</li> <li>Through Normalized Metered Energy Consumption (NMEC) analysis, as an option</li> <li>Comparison of energy savings from other loan programs to that of the pilot, if possible to assess through Evaluation, Measurement, &amp; Verification studies (EM&amp;V)</li> </ul>	Assess whether the Program saves energy.	<ul> <li>Incorporate GHG savings as a de-jure program goal.</li> <li>Improve tracking of fuel substituting and fuel switching measures.</li> <li>Significant differences between NMEC based results and methods using a control group. In line with previous findings, NMEC likely overestimates savings.<sup>41</sup></li> </ul>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> "CPUC EM&V Group NMEC Accuracy Assessment Results Presentation." Demand Side Analytics. 2021. Opinion Dynamics

## 8.2.1 PARTICIPANT EXPERIENCE METRICS

The participant survey explored overall satisfaction with the GGH Program and individual program components. As seen in Figure 18, most respondents were highly satisfied with the overall program and individual program components. Notably, 99% of standard loan respondents and 98% of micro-loan respondents were at least "somewhat" satisfied with the Program overall. The only Program feature where standard loan and micro-loan respondents differed significantly was the interest rate. Standard loan respondents were significantly more likely than micro-loan respondents to indicate they were "very" satisfied with the interest rate (78% vs. 65%).




Figure 18. Participant Satisfaction with GGH Program Experience

Source: Standard loan and Micro-loan participant surveys

Question: Thinking about your [GoGreen Home/Eco Financing] Loan experience, how satisfied are you with the following? Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab

The team asked respondents how likely they are to recommend the GGH Program to others. As seen in Table 60, most respondents indicated they were "very" likely to recommend the program to others. There were no significant differences by loan type; however, among standard loan respondents, those who installed a fuel substitution measure were more likely than those who did not to indicate they were "very" likely to recommend the GGH Program in the future.

Table 60. Likelihood of Recommending GGH to Others

Likelihood of Recommending GGH/Eco Financing	Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=144) (c)	Micro-loan (n=60) (d)
Very likely	94%b	81%	87%	80%
Somewhat likely	6%	18%ª	13%	17%
Somewhat unlikely	0%	0%	0%	2%
Very unlikely	0%	1%	1%	2%

Source: Standard Ioan and Micro-Ioan participant surveys

Question: How likely are you to recommend [GoGreen Home/Eco] Financing to others in the future?

 $Note: Results \ are \ based \ on \ two-sided \ tests. \ a/b/c/d \ indicates \ significant \ differences \ at \ a \ 90\% \ confidence \ level \ and \ 0.10 \ alpha$ 

between the following tests: ab, cd

The team asked respondents who were less than "very" satisfied with the GGH Program overall or were less than "very" likely to recommend the GGH Program in the future what recommendations they had to improve the program moving forward. The team batched respondents' text responses into categories. Of 26 standard loan respondents, 10 indicated they had no recommendations. Common recommendations included decreasing the interest rate (six respondents), making the application process easier (five respondents), and adding eligible measures (three respondents). Of the 14 micro-loan respondents, three had no recommendations. Common recommendations included improving the billing/payment process (six respondents) and lowering the interest rate (four respondents).

In the participant surveys, the team asked respondents what their largest motivation was for completing a home upgrade project or purchasing energy-efficient equipment. As seen in Table 61, the most common responses for both standard loan and micro-loan respondents were the need to fix/replace broken equipment and the desire to reduce energy bills. Notably, whereas standard loan respondents' responses were divided more evenly between response options, 50% of micro-loan respondents indicated the need to replace/fix broken equipment. Additionally, micro-loan respondents were significantly more likely to indicate they had broken equipment in their homes than standard loan respondents (50% vs. 33%). Among standard loan respondents, those who installed a fuel substitution measure were significantly more likely to select reducing their energy bill than those who did not install a fuel substitution measure. Those who did not install a fuel substitution measure were significantly more likely than those who did install a fuel substitution measure to indicate their property was uncomfortable (22% vs. 11%) or they needed to make repairs to their home's structure (9% vs. 2%).

Table 61. Biggest Motivator for Completing a Home Upgrade or Purchasing Energy-Efficient Equipment

Primary Motivation	Fuel Substitution (n=65) (a)	No Fuel Substitution (n=79) (b)	Total (n=144) (c)	Micro-loan (n=60) (d)
I had broken equipment in my home that needed to be fixed/replaced	29%	37%	33%	50% <sup>c</sup>
I wanted to reduce my energy bills	31%b	16%	23%	32%
My property was uncomfortable, too cold, or too hot	11%	22%ª	17%	0%
I wanted the property to be more environmentally friendly	23%	13%	17%	12%
I needed to make repairs to my home's structure, such as the roof, flooring, or foundation	2%	9%ª	6%	0%
I wanted the latest technology for my home	5%	1%	3%	2%
I wanted to improve the property in preparation for selling it	0%	0%	0%	0%
I wanted to improve the property in preparation for renting it	0%	0%	0%	0%
None of these/other reason	0%	1%	1%	5%°
Don't know	0%	1%	1%	0%

Source: Standard Ioan and Micro-Ioan participant surveys

Question: Of the listed reasons about why you may have chosen to purchase energy savings products, which reason was the MOST IMPORTANT.

Note: Results are based on two-sided tests. a/b/c/d indicates significant differences at a 90% confidence level and 0.10 alpha between the following tests: ab, cd

# APPENDIX A. DETAILED IMPACT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

The GGH Program provided two types of loans: standard loans and micro-loans. The average standard loan amount was \$18,253, typically installing EEEMs expected to induce deep savings. On the other hand, micro-loans averaged \$1,498 and were used to install appliances. For standard loans, the evaluation team used a consumption analysis approach to estimate annual first-year energy savings, following the methodology detailed below. Measures provided through micro-loans are expected to lead to a much smaller reduction in energy usage. Under these scenarios, consumption analysis will likely fail to detect savings. As such, we estimated the energy impact of micro-loans through a deemed savings approach detailed in Deemed Savings Analysis (for Micro-Loans).

# CONSUMPTION ANALYSIS (FOR STANDARD LOANS)

Opinion Dynamics conducted a consumption analysis using AMI data to determine the overall weather-normalized electric and gas energy savings for participants who installed EEEMs using standard loans. Consumption analysis is a statistical analysis of energy consumption recorded in utility interval data. Because interval data reflects whole-building energy use, the method is well suited for studying the combined impact of a mix of energy efficiency measures, as well as behavioral changes, at the household level. The evaluation team estimated total program savings by examining variations among participants' daily electricity consumption in the pre- and post-program periods while controlling for weather, seasonal, and other factors. As part of the consumption analysis, the evaluation team pursued two distinct pathways:

- Pooled modeling pathway. This pathway aimed at developing robust estimates of gas and electric energy savings and involved statistical modeling of the time series consumption data across a panel of program participants. The modeling efforts included linear fixed effects regression modeling of consumption data pre- and post-participation, controlling for weather, seasonal, and other factors. We used a rolling comparison group to control for exogenous and non-routine changes in energy consumption unrelated to the financed measures.
- Individual modeling pathway. This pathway aimed to understand and explore energy savings patterns and drivers of energy savings. This analysis leveraged widely accepted CalTRACK methodologies and code base. It included statistical modeling of each participant's pre- and post-period electric and gas consumption data, thus developing energy savings estimates for each participant.

To support the two modeling efforts, the evaluation team performed the following steps:

- Participant data cleaning and preparation
- Consumption data cleaning and preparation
- Weather data preparation
- Model specification and validation
- Weather normalization of energy savings

We describe each of these steps in the sections below.

## PARTICIPANT DATA CLEANING AND PREPARATION

We leveraged participant data from 2018 to 2023 across the four IOUs (PG&E, SCE, SoCalGas, and SDG&E). The participant population consisted of 2,353 electric accounts and 3,072 gas accounts. The participant data underwent thorough cleaning and organization, including classification of the various measures into end uses, exploration of Opinion Dynamics

missing and incomplete records, and validation of participant eligibility. We checked for participants without participation dates and those with participation dates outside of the program period under evaluation and carefully explored available participation dates to identify those that best reflect the program treatment start. This step is particularly important to categorize consumption data into pre- or post-intervention periods accurately. To that end, we used POO2-SCOPE OF WORK CERTIFICATION DATE (CD) date field as the field of record best reflective of the financed measure installation. To further avoid the treatment effect appearing in the pre-period or not appearing right away in the post-period, and therefore threatening to bias the savings estimates, the team applied a deadband period of 60 days before and after the POO2-SCOPE OF WORK CERTIFICATION DATE (CD) date.

Finally, we identified and removed 113 electric and 111 gas participants whose account numbers did not merge with the consumption data.

## CONSUMPTION DATA CLEANING AND PREPARATION

We obtained hourly electric and a mix of hourly and daily gas consumption data. Each dataset underwent distinct data cleaning steps.

#### ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION DATA CLEANING

For the electric consumption data, the team performed the following steps using hourly data:

- Explored and removed duplicate records: We explored and removed exact duplicates. We also explored duplicate intervals with differing usage values and combined them through averaging usage.
- Explored missing data: We explored missing usage values and timestamps and flagged days with an incomplete set of hourly data.
- Explored outliers: We explored outlier usage at the account as well as interval level and flagged outlier observations and participants for exploration and potential removal from the modeling dataset.
- Explored and removed zero usage values: Zero usage values for electricity consumption are unlikely. As such, the team identified and removed intervals with zero usage.
- Identified and removed participants with changes in solar (net metering) status. Participants starting or stopping solar generation during pre- or post-period present a large non-routine behavior that may be challenging to control for as part of the analysis. As part of the data cleaning process, the team identified, flagged and dropped participants whose solar generation status had changed in either the pre- or post-participation period.

Following these cleaning steps, we aggregated the hourly data to the daily level by summing usage across all the hours of the day. In cases where 12 or more hours were missing from any given day, we dropped that day from the analysis. In cases where at least 12 but less than 24 hours were present, we imputed average consumption from the existing hours for the missing hours and retained that day in the analysis.

Following data aggregation to the daily level, we checked the data for pre- and post-period sufficiency as well as the presence of adequate weather data coverage. More specifically, we dropped participants without at least 70% of the year of pre- and post-period consumption data coverage. We also dropped participants for whom we have been unable to obtain weather data. Table 62 summarizes the drops made as part of each cleaning step.

Table 62. Summary of Electric Consumption Data Cleaning Results

Drop Reason	Accounts Remaining	Percent of Accounts Remaining
Initial count	2,240	100%
Duplicate records	2,240	100%
Missing data	2,240	100%
Outlier values	2,240	100%
Zero usage values	2,240	100%
Participants with changes in solar status	1,792	80%
Pre- and post-period data sufficiency	1,578	70%
Missing weather data	1,470	66%

### GAS CONSUMPTION DATA CLEANING

For the gas consumption data, we performed the following steps using daily data:42

- Explored and removed duplicate records: We explored and removed exact duplicates. We also explored duplicate intervals with differing usage values and combined them through averaging usage.
- Explored missing data: We explored missing usage values and timestamps and flagged days with an incomplete set of hourly data.
- Explored negative usage values. We explored the presence of negative usage values. No negative usage values were present in the data.
- **Explored outliers:** We explored outlier usage at the account as well as interval level and flagged outlier observations and participants for exploration and potential removal from the modeling dataset.
- Explored and removed participants with zero total gas usage: While zero usage values can occur for gas consumption, especially in the summer months, overall usage of zero for the entire consumption period is unreasonable. As such, we identified and removed participants with overall zero gas usage.
- Explored pre- and post-period data sufficiency. We checked the data for pre- and post-period sufficiency. More specifically, we dropped participants without at least 70% of the year of pre- and post-period consumption data coverage.
- Explored pre- and post-period heating period data sufficiency. In addition to ensuring sufficient data for the pre- and post-period, we checked the data for the winter season data sufficiency in the pre- and post-period. Given that most consumption occurs in the winter months, it is important to ensure data sufficiency during that period. As such, we dropped participants who did not have at least 75% of the winter season (months of December, January, and February) in the pre- and post-period.
- Explored missing weather data. We identified and dropped participants for whom we could not obtain weather data.
- Following consumption data cleaning, we retained 66% of electric participants and 70% of gas participants.

Table 63 summarizes the drops made as part of each cleaning step.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> The hourly data for SoCalGas was aggregated to the daily level prior to performing the cleaning steps. The hourly data was mostly complete and required limited imputations of the missing intervals prior to rolling the data up to the daily level.

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Table 63. Summary of Gas Consumption Data Cleaning Results

Drop Reason	Accounts Remaining	Percent of Accounts Remaining
Initial count	2,961	100%
Duplicate records	2,961	100%
Missing data	2,961	100%
Negative usage values	2,961	100%
Outlier values	2,959	99%
Zero total usage	2,950	99%
Pre- and post-period data sufficiency	2,243	76%
Missing weather data	2,086	70%

## WEATHER DATA PREPARATION

To include weather patterns in our modeling efforts, we used daily weather data from numerous weather stations across the state, utilizing the site closest to each participant's geographic location. By using multiple sites, we increased the accuracy of the weather data associated with each account. We obtained these data from the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC).

The daily data are based on hourly average temperature readings from each day. For the pooled modeling efforts, we calculated CDD and HDD for each day (in the analysis based on average daily temperatures, using the same formula used in weather forecasting).<sup>43</sup> We merged daily weather data into the consumption dataset.

We relied on CZ2010 weather normal data when developing weather-normalized estimates of energy savings.44

# MODEL SPECIFICATION AND VALIDATION

#### INDIVIDUAL MODEL SPECIFICATION AND VALIDATION

We leveraged daily CalTRACK methods and associated code base to develop individual participant energy savings. CalTRACK methods are a set of methods for estimating avoided energy use related to the implementation of one or more energy efficiency measures. CalTRACK methods yield whole-building site-level savings outputs. CalTRACK models are founded in literature and draw upon best practices developed as part of the PRISM, Uniform Methods Project for Whole Home Building Analysis and California Evaluation Project. The modeling process includes modeling sites as base load, heating load, and cooling load, with heating and cooling load assumed to have a linear relationship with heating

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> A "degree-day" is a unit of measure for recording how hot or how cold it has been over a 24-hour period. The number of degree-days applied to any particular day of the week is determined by calculating the mean temperature for the day and then comparing the mean temperature to a base value of 65°F (HDD) and 75°F (CDD). (The "mean" temperature is calculated by adding together the high for the day and the low for the day, and then dividing the result by two.) If the mean temperature for the day is five degrees higher than 75°F, then there have been five cooling degree-days. On the other hand, if the weather has been cool, and the mean temperature is, say, 55°F, then there have been 10 heating degree-days (65 minus 55). "Degree Days," National Weather Service, https://www.weather.gov/ffc/degdays.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> CZ2010 typical year files cover the period from 1998 to 2009, constituting a 12-year record. These files served as the standard weather data for Title 24 compliance calculations in California from 2010 to 2022. The collection includes 86 CZ2010 files, each representing a distinct weather station in California. These files are structured to incorporate statewide "typical months" as mandated by the California Energy Commission. Weather User Guide.pdf (calmac.org)

and cooling demand, as approximated by heating and cooling degree days, beyond particular heating and cooling (for electric consumption data only) balance points. Models for each participant are fit to baseline data in the 365 days immediately prior to the intervention start date. The modeling process involves the following steps:

- Select and qualify balance poring for candidate models for each period and meter. As part of this step, we
  deployed and developed the optimal balance point for each degree day covariate using CalTRACK grid search
  methodology.
- Compute design matrices. Using average usage per day as the dependent variable and CDDs and HDDs as independent variables, we computed the design matrix for each model.
- Fit and qualify all candidate models. We fit daily consumption data using ordinary least squares using models with HDD and CDD, HDD only, CDD only and intercept only.
- Select the best candidate model. Models with positive parameter estimates and the highest adjusted R-squared were selected as the final model for each participant.

Following the modeling process, we further scrutinized the selected models across multiple model fit statistics, including CVRMSE and R-squared of the best-fitting models. We dropped participants from further analysis in cases where the final models had R-squared values of less than 35% and a CVRMSE of less than 40%.

#### POOLED MODEL SPECIFICATION AND VALIDATION

We performed pooled modeling using daily consumption data. We specified an LFER model in a pre-/post-design that incorporates weather and interaction terms that show the effect of weather in the post-installation period. The fixed effect for the model is set at the account level, which allows us to control for all household factors that do not vary over time. In the process of determining the appropriate model for the analysis, we specified a range of models, from simple pre-post to more complex models incorporating a variety of terms and controls.

We judged our final models on several criteria. Primarily, we aimed to use a model that explained as much about changes in the dependent variable as possible. The most direct measure of this is the adjusted R-squared, which gives an estimate of how much the model explains the difference between post-period usage and the baseline. We also compared the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values of each model specification within the same sample. The AIC provides a measure of relative quality between models; a lower value indicates a relatively more efficient model. This method inherently incorporates explained variation as well as how many variables we use to achieve that level.

We specified electric models separately for participants with and without solar. In addition, we specified distinct models by DAC, LMI, and fuel substitution status. Finally, we developed separate models by IOU. On the gas side, in addition to the overall program-level model, we specified distinct models by DAC, LMI, and fuel substitution status, as well as by IOU. Equation 1 and Equation 2 contain the final model specifications.

Equation 1. Final Electric Model Specification

$$kWh_{it} = \alpha_{i} + \sum_{t=1}^{12} \beta_{month} month_{t} + \beta_{CDD} CDD_{it} + \beta_{HDD} HDD_{it} + \beta_{Post} Post_{it} + \beta_{Post} HVAC Post_{it} * HVAC_{i} \\ + \beta_{Post} CDD HVAC Post_{it} * CDD_{it} * HVAC_{i} + \beta_{Post} HDD HVAC Post_{it} * HDD_{it} \\ * HVAC_{i} + \beta_{Post} BE Post_{it} * BE_{i} + \beta_{Post} CDD BE Post_{it} * CDD_{it} * BE_{i} + \beta_{Post} HDD BE Post_{it} * HDD_{it} \\ * BE_{i} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where:

•  $kWh_{it}$  = Consumption (kWh) for account i at time t (all 24 hours)

- $\alpha_i$  = Account-specific intercept for account i
- $month_t$  = Set of 12 indicator variables for the month of the year; January is the reference month
- CDD<sub>it</sub> = Daily cooling degree days for account i at time t
- HDD<sub>it</sub> = Daily heating degree days for account i at time t
- $post_{it}$  = Indicator variable for the post-participation period (coded "0" in the pre-participation period, coded "1" in the post-participation period)
- HVAC<sub>i</sub> = Indicator variable for HVAC measures received after participating in the program (coded "0" if not received, coded "1" if received)
- Post HVAC<sub>i</sub> = HVAC measure indicator interacted with the post-participation period
- Post CDD<sub>it</sub> HVAC<sub>i</sub> = HVAC measure indicator interacted with the post-participation period and daily cooling degree days
- Post HDD<sub>it</sub> HVAC<sub>i</sub> = HVAC measure indicator interacted with the post-participation period and daily heating degree days
- $BE_i$  = Indicator variable for Building Envelope measures received after participating in the program (coded "0" if not received, coded "1" if received)
- $Post BE_i$  = BE measure indicator interacted with the post-participation period
- $Post\ CDD_{it}\ BE_i$  = BE measure indicator interacted with the post-participation period and daily cooling degree days
- $Post\ HDD_{it}\ BE_i$  = BE measure indicator interacted with the post-participation period and daily heating degree days
- $\beta_x$  = Model coefficients
- $\varepsilon_{it}$  = Error term

#### Equation 2. Final Gas Model Specification

$$therms_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{t=1}^{12} \beta_{month} month_t + \beta_{HDD} HDD_{it} + \beta_{Post} Post_{it} + \beta_{Post} HDD Post_{it} * HDD_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

#### Where:

- $therms_{it}$  = Consumption (Therms) for household i at time t (all 24 hours)
- $\alpha_i$  = Account--specific intercept for account i
- $month_t$  = Set of 12 indicator variables for the month of the year; January is the reference month
- HDD<sub>it</sub> = Daily heating degree days for account i at time t
- $post_{it}$  = Indicator variable for the post-participation period (coded "0" in the pre-participation period, coded "1" in the post-participation period)
- $Post\ HDD_{it}$  = Daily heating degree days interacted with the post-participation period
- $\beta_x$  = Model coefficients
- $\varepsilon_{it}$  = Error term

The final model summaries are presented in Table 64 and Table 65

Table 64. Final Electric Model Summaries

Model Type	Modeled Participants	Modeled Baseline	Modeled Savings	Standard Error	Statistically Significant Savings	Adjusted R- Squared
Participants with net metering	266	12.28	1.61	0.57	Yes	0.52
Participants without net metering	1204	23.24	0.31	0.18	Yes	0.67
PG&E	775	23.68	0.53	0.24	Yes	0.67
SCE	393	22.90	-0.11	0.26	No	0.66
SDG&E	36	17.79	-0.14	0.70	No	0.88
LMI	692	21.74	0.17	0.24	No	0.65
Non-LMI	512	25.27	0.49	0.26	Yes	0.69
DAC	233	22.58	0.28	0.35	No	0.64
Non-DAC	737	22.74	0.19	0.24	No	0.67
Known fuel substitution	122	23.50	-1.51	0.83	Yes	0.58
No known fuel substitution	1082	23.20	0.49	0.17	Yes	0.68

Table 65. Final Gas Model Summaries

Model Type	Modeled Participants	Modeled Baseline	Modeled Savings	Standard Error	Statistically Significant Savings	Adjusted R- Squared
All	2086	1.23	0.07	0.01	Yes	0.51
PG&E	1410	1.24	0.09	0.01	Yes	0.53
SoCalGas	634	1.24	0.04	0.02	Yes	0.48
SDG&E	42	0.85	-0.05	0.04	No	0.42
LMI	1189	1.17	0.07	0.02	Yes	0.51
Non-LMI	897	1.30	0.08	0.02	Yes	0.51
DAC	368	1.21	0.03	0.03	No	0.53
Non-DAC	1321	1.23	0.09	0.02	Yes	0.50
Known fuel substitution	202	1.25	0.57	0.04	Yes	0.47
No Known fuel substitution	1884	1.23	0.02	0.01	No	0.52

# DEEMED SAVINGS ANALYSIS (FOR MICRO-LOANS)

The evaluation team applied the following method(s) to arrive at the deemed savings for EEEMs installed using microloans, as presented in Table 66.

• Identify deemed savings source. The evaluation team referenced the California Technical Forum (Cal TF) electronic technical reference manual (eTRM). The eTRM is an online repository for all statewide prescriptive measures and provides deemed energy savings for variations of project and measure specifics, including but not limited to location, baseline, building type, building age, equipment size, and program type. The evaluation team established the appropriate version of the eTRM based on the project date identified in the program tracking data.

- Review program materials. The evaluation team reviewed program materials, such as the Enervee storefront and
  program tracking data, to identify measure-specific characteristics and project details to inform the application of
  deemed savings from the eTRM.
- Established average deemed savings. The eTRM provides measure-level deemed savings for several different scenarios. The evaluation team established an average deemed savings for each measure, incorporating factors from the scenarios most applicable to the measures offered through the program. Though many differ by measure, those common across all evaluated measures include the following:
  - Building Vintage: Existing (not new construction)
  - Building Type: Weighted for all home types (e.g., single family, multifamily)
  - Delivery Type: Downstream (non-Direct Install)
  - Location: Deemed savings applied specific to project climate zone (based on zip code lookup)
  - Measure-specific factors that informed the average deemed savings, included the following:
    - Clothes Dryer: Size (standard and compact); ENERGY STAR® model.
    - Clothes Washer: Configuration (top loading and front loading); Offering (not common area); ENERGY STAR model.
    - Refrigerator: Size (standard); Configuration (bottom freezer, top freezer, side-by-side); ENERGY STAR model.

Table 66. Micro-Loan Deemed Savings

Measure	Units	Per Measure Savings			
Measure	Ullits	kWh	kW	Therms	
Smart Thermostat	Thermostats	152.43	N/A	3.58	
Clothes Washer	Washers	62.67	0.010	3.96	
Clothes Dryer (Electric)	Dryers	57.73	0.014	(0.49)	
Refrigerator	Refrigerators	47.87	N/A	(0.87)	
Dishwasher	Dishwashers	13.35	0.003	2.63	
Induction Range or Cooktop	Ranges	(219.00)	N/A	14.30	
Clothes Dryer (Gas)	Dryers	(0.95)	N/A	3.32	
Convection Gas Oven	Ovens	N/A	N/A	2.53	

Note: Total program savings applied climate-specific deemed savings; however, the deemed savings presented above are weighted by the number of measures purchased within each climate zone. Source: California Technical Forum (Cal TF) Electronic Technical Reference Manual (eTRM).

# EMISSIONS REDUCTION METHODOLOGY

Reductions in emissions were calculated by the following procedure 2.2 of the CPUC Fuel Substitution Calculator v2. We estimated the emissions reductions from electricity savings by applying the annual conversion factors (tCO<sub>2</sub>/MWh) presented in

Table 67 to each year of energy savings. These annual conversion factors are developed from long-run emissions inputs from the 2022 ACC Electrical Model v1b - IRP 2021 Reference System Plan.

In addition to annual conversion factors, we estimated the share of total electricity savings in a year by estimating the share of "post-period" number of days each year relative to all "post-period" number of days in the Program.

Table 67. Annual Factors and Share of Total Electricity Savings, 2018-2024

Year	Annual Factor	Share of Electricity Savings in Year (EEEMs Installed Using Standard Loans) <sup>a</sup>	Share of Electricity Savings in Year (EEEMs Installed Using Micro-loans) b
2018	0.202	2%	0%
2019	0.198	8%	0%
2020	0.193	11%	0%
2021	0.189	18%	5%
2022	0.184	26%	76%
2023	0.171	31%	15%
2024	0.178	4%	3%

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Called Share of Savings in t (Standard) in equations

Other key parameters are presented in Table 68.

Table 68. Key Parameters Used in GHG Emission Reduction Calculation

Name	Value	Units/Description
Ton to Tonne	1.10231	short tons/metric tonne
MMBtu to Therms	0.1	MMBtu/therm
Btu to Therm	100000	Btu/therm
Btu to kWh	3413	Btu/kWh
Natural Gas Carbon Content	0.0585	short tons/MMBtu
Natural Gas Carbon Content	0.005307037	metric tons/therm
Upstream in-state methane leakage	0.0557	Methane leakage upstream of natural gas power plants. Methane leakage avoided cost is this percentage times the value of GHG emissions
Residential behind-the-meter methane leakage (Gas only)	0.0378	Applies to the elimination of natural gas appliances from a residential building.

The emissions reduction in year t, from electricity savings resulting from EEEMs installed using standard loans, *Emissions Reductions (Standard)*<sub>t</sub>, is given by:

Equation 3. Year-Wise Emission Reduction from EEEMs Installed Using Standard Loans

Annual Factor<sub>t</sub> \* Share of Savings in t (Standard) \* Total Savings (Standard) \* (1 + Upstream methane leakage)

The emissions reduction in year t, from electricity savings resulting from EEEMs installed using micro-loans, *Emissions Reductions (Micro)*<sub>t</sub>, is given by:

Equation 4. Year-wise emission reduction from EEEMs Installed using Standard Loans

Annual Factor<sub>t</sub> \* Share of Savings in t (Micro) \* Total Savings (Micro) \* (1 + Upstream methane leakage)

Thus, the GHG reductions from electricity savings is given by:

b Called Share of Savings in t (Micro) in equations

#### Equation 5. GHG Reductions from Electricity Savings of the Program

$$\sum\nolimits_{t=2018}^{2024} \textit{Emissions Reductions (Standard)}_t + \textit{Emissions Reductions (Micro)}_t$$

For emissions reductions that result from gas savings, a single conversion factor, the carbon content of a single unit of natural gas (tCO<sub>2</sub>/therms), is applied to the total gas savings. Thus, the Program GHG reductions from gas savings are given by:

Equation 6. GHG Reductions from Gas Savings of the Program

Natural Gas Carbon Content (metric tons CO2/therm) \* Gas Savings \* (1 + Upstream methane leakage + Residential methane leakage)

The total GHG reductions from energy savings is the sum of GHG reductions from electricity savings and gas savings.

## PARTICIPANT SURVEYS

#### SAMPLING AND COMPLETES

In January 2024, the evaluation team fielded two surveys with GGH Program participants, one targeted at standard loan borrowers and one targeted at micro-loan borrowers. The primary goals of the surveys were to understand the influence of the GGH/Eco Financing loan on participants' decisions to complete home upgrades/install EE equipment (as well the influence of GGH/Eco Financing relative to other sources of funding), collect information about their households, and understand any non-routine adjustments participants made to their homes or behaviors after the home upgrade/equipment installation.

Tracking data for the GGH Program included records for 3,320 standard loans and 567 micro-loans distributed during the evaluation period. There were no cases of a single address receiving both a standard loan and micro-loan in the sample frame; however, the team identified duplicate addresses that received multiple of the same type of loan at different times. The team removed 36 duplicate addresses from the sample frame, keeping the more recent record. Given that the outreach strategy was email only, the team removed 966 records without an email on file. The final sample frame included 2,325 standard loans and 560 micro-loans.

The evaluation team sent email outreach to a random sample of 1,198 standard loan borrowers, including 388 who installed a fuel substitution measure and 810 who did not install a fuel substitution measure. The standard loan survey achieved 144 completes and a response rate of 13%. The micro-loan survey was conducted as a census, with all 560 unique micro-loan participants receiving an invitation. The micro-loan survey achieved 60 completes and a response rate of 12%.45

Table 69 details the sample frame, sample contacted, and final completes for both the standard loan and micro-loan survey efforts.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> The evaluation team used the Response Rate 3 (RR3) method recommended by American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). RR3 excludes partially completed survey from the numerator and includes estimated number of eligible sample in the denominator. Opinion Dynamics

Table 69. GGH Participant Survey Sample Frame

	Standard Loan			Micro-loan		
	Sample Frame	Sample	Completes	Sample Frame	Sample	Completes
Fuel Substitution	388	388	65	NA	NA	NA
No Fuel Substitution	1,937	810	79	550	550	NA
Total	2,325	1,198	144	550	550	60

## DATA CLEANING AND ANALYSIS

The team cleaned the survey data outputs to facilitate analysis, standardizing variables and categorizing open-ended responses when appropriate. We then generated descriptive statistics for all questions. We completed two-sided statistical tests on key survey questions to compare (1) standard loan respondents to micro-loan respondents and (2) standard loan respondents who installed a fuel substitution measure as part of their GGH-financed project to standard loan respondents who did not install a fuel substitution measure. We completed statistical tests at a 90% confidence level with a 0.10 alpha. We note statistically significant relationships in tables/figures via superscripts and in supporting text.

# APPENDIX B. RESOLUTION E-4900 METRICS

In 2017, the CPUC established specific metrics for evaluating the success of the EE Financing Pilots, as shown in Table 70.

Table 70. EE Financing Pilot Metrics

Goal	Metric	CPUC Comments
The financing tool is scalable	<ul> <li>Number of loans made by the Pilot, with breakdown by:</li> <li>Growth in the number of loans on a month-by-month basis over the lifetime of the Pilot</li> <li>Total amount of financing generated by the Pilot</li> <li>Geographic distribution of loans, including the ability to reach new regions of the state, especially those with large underserved populations</li> </ul>	Data should be presented to show whether these financing tools can reach a significant and growing number of Californians
The financing tool is leveraged by private capital and support	Private capital participation in the Pilot, as measured by:  Number of financial institutions participating in the Pilot and types of financial institutions participating (such as credit unions)  Amount of private capital attracted	Data should be presented to indicate whether these financing tools can become partially or entirely self-supporting (i.e., can reach a point where they depend less or do not depend on the use of ratepayer funds)
The financing tool reaches underserved Californians who would not otherwise have participated in EE upgrades	<ul> <li>Analysis of participants in the Pilot, according to:         <ul> <li>Credit scores of loan participants reported on an aggregate basis</li> <li>Length of time allowed for applicants to pay back the loans</li> </ul> </li> <li>Percentage of participants deemed "underserved" as measured through CalEnviroScreen data, AMI, or other poverty statistics</li> <li>Whether participants would have qualified for existing private energy efficiency loan programs at interest rates and terms that they can afford or would accept</li> </ul>	The "counterfactual" of whether participants would have taken loans from elsewhere for the same upgrades is difficult to demonstrate, but best efforts should be made to provide data showing that hard-to-reach communities were reached. Analysis done by EM&V contractors can also be consulted. Lower-income participants may prefer longer loan payback periods, so the length of time allowed for repayment may offer a proxy for the ability to reach low-income communities
The financing tool produces <b>energy savings</b>	<ul> <li>Energy savings that resulted, as measured:</li> <li>Through customer meter data provided by the utilities via Energy Division data request (customer privacy must be maintained)</li> <li>Through Normalized Metered Energy Consumption (NMEC) analysis, as an option</li> <li>Comparison of energy savings from other loan programs to that of the pilot, if possible, to assess through EM&amp;V studies</li> </ul>	NMEC analysis has not previously been applied to the analysis of financing pilots, and is considered an option here to be used if it can add to the understanding of the results of the pilots

Source: CPUC Resolution E-4900. December 18, 2018.

# APPENDIX C. ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND FINANCE TERMS

Table 71. Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Financing Terms

Bridge funding When a borrower uses financing with the intention of paying the loan back very qi CalEPA California Environmental Protection Agency EE Energy efficiency EM&V Evaluation, measurement, and verification Evaluation period The period covered by the new research detailed in this report: July 2018–June 2 CAEATFA California Alternative Energy and Advanced Transportation Financing Authority CalEnviroScreen Tool that identifies communities disproportionately burdened by multiple sources pollution and socioeconomic stressors CPUC California Public Utilities Commission Credit-challenged Borrowers with a credit score of 580 to 640 Credit-enhancement Percentage of original loan amount placed into LLR, 20% for underserved borrow 11% for market rate borrowers DTI ratio Debt-to-income ratio: - monthly debt payments divided by your gross monthly inco Default Borrower fails to make required interest or principal repayments on a debt EEEM Eligible energy efficiency measure FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council FICO score Fair, Isacc and Company score, i.e., credit score GGH Program GoGreen Home Financing Program IOU Investor-owned utility LLR Loan loss reserve: ratepayer funds set aside as an allowance for potential uncolle loans and loan payments  LMI census tract Which the tract median family income does not exceed 120% of the metropolitan county, or state area median family income Low-to-Moderate-Income census tract: defined by the GGH Program as census tract which the tract median family income Low-to-Moderate-Income household: defined by the GGH Program as census tract which the tract median family income Low-to-Moderate-Income household: defined by the GGH Program as households combined income at or below the current annual income limits as determined by California Department of Housing and Community Development according to cour family size and adopted in Section 6932 of Division 1 of Title 25 of the California of Regulations.  Pilot period The period covered by the previous evaluation of t	Abbreviation/Acronym/Term	Definition
Bridge funding When a borrower uses financing with the intention of paying the loan back very qi CalEPA California Environmental Protection Agency EE Energy efficiency EM&V Evaluation, measurement, and verification Evaluation period The period covered by the new research detailed in this report: July 2018–June 2 CAEATFA California Alternative Energy and Advanced Transportation Financing Authority CalEnviroScreen Tool that identifies communities disproportionately burdened by multiple sources pollution and socioeconomic stressors CPUC California Public Utilities Commission Credit-challenged Borrowers with a credit score of 580 to 640 Credit-enhancement Percentage of original loan amount placed into LLR, 20% for underserved borrow 11% for market rate borrowers DTI ratio Debt-to-income ratio: - monthly debt payments divided by your gross monthly inco Default Borrower fails to make required interest or principal repayments on a debt EEEM Eligible energy efficiency measure FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council FICO score Fair, Isacc and Company score, i.e., credit score GGH Program Gogreen Home Financing Program IOU Investor-owned utility LLR Loan loss reserve: ratepayer funds set aside as an allowance for potential uncolle loans and loan payments  LMI census tract Uov-to-Moderate-Income census tract: defined by the GGH Program as census tract which the tract median family income does not exceed 120% of the metropolitan county, or state area median family income does not exceed 120% of the metropolitan county, or state area median family and community Development according to county, or state area and adopted in Section 6932 of Division 1 of Title 25 of the California of Regulations.  Pilot period The period covered by the previous evaluation of the REEL Pilot. July 2016–June Private capital Investment in assets not available on public markets POU Publicly owned utility Rebate/incentive A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds REEL Pilot Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Ass	AMI	Average median income: the midpoint of an area's income distribution
California Environmental Protection Agency  EE Energy efficiency  EM&V Evaluation, measurement, and verification  Evaluation period The period covered by the new research detailed in this report: July 2018–June 2  CAEATFA California Alternative Energy and Advanced Transportation Financing Authority  CalEnviroScreen Tool that identifies communities disproportionately burdened by multiple sources pollution and socioeconomic stressors  CPUC California Public Utilities Commission  Credit-challenged Borrowers with a credit score of 580 to 640  Credit-enhancement Percentage of original loan amount placed into LLR, 20% for underserved borrow 11% for market rate borrowers  DTI ratio Debt-to-income ratio: -monthly debt payments divided by your gross monthly inco Default Borrower fails to make required interest or principal repayments on a debt  EEEM Eligible energy efficiency measure  FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council  FICO score Fair, Isacc and Company score, i.e., credit score  GGH Program GoGreen Home Financing Program  IOU Investor-owned utility  Loan loss reserve: ratepayer funds set aside as an allowance for potential uncolle loans and loan payments  Low-to-Moderate-Income census tract: defined by the GGH Program as census treed which the tract median family income  Low-to-Moderate-Income household: defined by the GGH Program as households combined income at or below the current annual income limits as determined by California Department of Housing and Community Development according to count for Regulations.  Pilot period The period covered by the previous evaluation of the REEL Pilot: July 2016–June Private capital Investment in assets not available on public markets  POU Publicly owned utility  Rebate/incentive A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds  REEL Pilot Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot	APR	Annual percentage rate: a measure of interest rate plus additional fees charged with the loan
EE Energy efficiency EM&V Evaluation, measurement, and verification Evaluation period The period covered by the new research detailed in this report: July 2018–June 2 CAEATFA California Alternative Energy and Advanced Transportation Financing Authority Tool that identifies communities disproportionately burdened by multiple sources pollution and socioeconomic stressors CPUC California Public Utilities Commission Credit-challenged Borrowers with a credit score of 580 to 640 Credit-enhancement Percentage of original loan amount placed into LLR, 20% for underserved borrow 11% for market rate borrowers DTI ratio Debt-to-income ratio: - monthly debt payments divided by your gross monthly inco Default Borrower falls to make required interest or principal repayments on a debt EEEM Eligible energy efficiency measure FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council FICO score Fair, Isacc and Company score, i.e., credit score GGH Program GoGreen Home Financing Program IOU Investor-owned utility LLR Loan loss reserve: ratepayer funds set aside as an allowance for potential uncolle loans and loan payments LOw-to-Moderate-Income census tract: defined by the GGH Program as census tr which the tract median family income does not exceed 120% of the metropolitan county, or state area median family income Low-to-Moderate-Income household: defined by the GGH Program as households combined income at or below the current annual income limits as determined by California Department of Housing and Community Development according to cour family size and adopted in Section 6932 of Division 1 of Title 25 of the California of Regulations.  Pilot period The period covered by the previous evaluation of the REEL Pilot: July 2016–June Private capital Investment in assets not available on public markets  POU Publicly owned utility Rebate/incentive A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds REEL Pilot Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot	Bridge funding	When a borrower uses financing with the intention of paying the loan back very quickly
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DTI ratio  Debt-to-income ratio: - monthly debt payments divided by your gross monthly inco Default  Borrower fails to make required interest or principal repayments on a debt  EEEM  Eligible energy efficiency measure  FFIEC  Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council  FICO score  Fair, Isacc and Company score, i.e., credit score  GGH Program  GoGreen Home Financing Program  IOU  Investor-owned utility  Luan loss reserve: ratepayer funds set aside as an allowance for potential uncolle loans and loan payments  Low-to- Moderate-Income census tract: defined by the GGH Program as census tr which the tract median family income does not exceed 120% of the metropolitan county, or state area median family income  Low-to- Moderate-Income household: defined by the GGH Program as households combined income at or below the current annual income limits as determined by California Department of Housing and Community Development according to cour family size and adopted in Section 6932 of Division 1 of Title 25 of the California of Regulations.  Pilot period  The period covered by the previous evaluation of the REEL Pilot: July 2016–June Private capital  Investment in assets not available on public markets  POU  Publicly owned utility  Rebate/incentive  A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds  REEL Pilot  Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot  SCE  Southern California Edison	Credit-challenged	Borrowers with a credit score of 580 to 640
Default Borrower fails to make required interest or principal repayments on a debt  EEEM Eligible energy efficiency measure  FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council  FICO score Fair, Isacc and Company score, i.e., credit score  GGH Program Goreen Home Financing Program  IOU Investor-owned utility  LLR Loan loss reserve: ratepayer funds set aside as an allowance for potential uncolled loans and loan payments  Low-to- Moderate-Income census tract: defined by the GGH Program as census tract which the tract median family income does not exceed 120% of the metropolitan county, or state area median family income  Low-to- Moderate-Income household: defined by the GGH Program as households combined income at or below the current annual income limits as determined by California Department of Housing and Community Development according to county and Regulations.  Pilot period The period covered by the previous evaluation of the REEL Pilot: July 2016–June Private capital Investment in assets not available on public markets  POU Publicly owned utility  Rebate/incentive A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds  REEL Pilot Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot  SCE Southern California Edison	Credit-enhancement	Percentage of original loan amount placed into LLR, 20% for underserved borrowers, 11% for market rate borrowers
EEEM Eligible energy efficiency measure  FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council  FICO score Fair, Isacc and Company score, i.e., credit score  GGH Program GoGreen Home Financing Program  IOU Investor-owned utility  LLR Loan loss reserve: ratepayer funds set aside as an allowance for potential uncolled loans and loan payments  LOW-to- Moderate-Income census tract: defined by the GGH Program as census tractivally which the tract median family income does not exceed 120% of the metropolitan county, or state area median family income  Low-to- Moderate-Income household: defined by the GGH Program as households combined income at or below the current annual income limits as determined by California Department of Housing and Community Development according to county and specific particular of Regulations.  Pilot period The period covered by the previous evaluation of the REEL Pilot: July 2016-June Private capital Investment in assets not available on public markets  POU Publicly owned utility  Rebate/incentive A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds  REEL Pilot Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot  SCE Southern California Edison	DTI ratio	Debt-to-income ratio: - monthly debt payments divided by your gross monthly income
FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council FICO score Fair, Isacc and Company score, i.e., credit score GGH Program GoGreen Home Financing Program IOU Investor-owned utility LLR Loan loss reserve: ratepayer funds set aside as an allowance for potential uncolle loans and loan payments Low-to- Moderate-Income census tract: defined by the GGH Program as census tr which the tract median family income does not exceed 120% of the metropolitan county, or state area median family income Low-to- Moderate-Income household: defined by the GGH Program as households combined income at or below the current annual income limits as determined by California Department of Housing and Community Development according to cour family size and adopted in Section 6932 of Division 1 of Title 25 of the California of Regulations.  Pilot period The period covered by the previous evaluation of the REEL Pilot: July 2016–June Private capital Investment in assets not available on public markets  POU Publicly owned utility  Rebate/incentive A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds  REEL Pilot Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot  SCE Southern California Edison	Default	Borrower fails to make required interest or principal repayments on a debt
FICO score  GGH Program  GoGreen Home Financing Program  IOU  Investor-owned utility  Loan loss reserve: ratepayer funds set aside as an allowance for potential uncolled loans and loan payments  Low-to- Moderate-Income census tract: defined by the GGH Program as census tract which the tract median family income does not exceed 120% of the metropolitan county, or state area median family income  Low-to- Moderate-Income household: defined by the GGH Program as households combined income at or below the current annual income limits as determined by California Department of Housing and Community Development according to counfamily size and adopted in Section 6932 of Division 1 of Title 25 of the California of Regulations.  Pilot period  The period covered by the previous evaluation of the REEL Pilot: July 2016–June Private capital  Investment in assets not available on public markets  POU  Publicly owned utility  Rebate/incentive  A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds  REEL Pilot  Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot  SCE  Southern California Edison	EEEM	Eligible energy efficiency measure
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LMI census tract  which the tract median family income does not exceed 120% of the metropolitan county, or state area median family income  Low-to- Moderate-Income household: defined by the GGH Program as households combined income at or below the current annual income limits as determined by California Department of Housing and Community Development according to count family size and adopted in Section 6932 of Division 1 of Title 25 of the California of Regulations.  Pilot period  The period covered by the previous evaluation of the REEL Pilot: July 2016–June Private capital  Investment in assets not available on public markets  POU  Publicly owned utility  Rebate/incentive  A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds  REEL Pilot  Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot  SCE  Southern California Edison	LLR	Loan loss reserve: ratepayer funds set aside as an allowance for potential uncollected loans and loan payments
combined income at or below the current annual income limits as determined by California Department of Housing and Community Development according to cour family size and adopted in Section 6932 of Division 1 of Title 25 of the California of Regulations.  Pilot period The period covered by the previous evaluation of the REEL Pilot: July 2016–June Private capital Investment in assets not available on public markets  POU Publicly owned utility  Rebate/incentive A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds  REEL Pilot Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot  SCE Southern California Edison	LMI census tract	Low-to- Moderate-Income census tract: defined by the GGH Program as census tracts in which the tract median family income does not exceed 120% of the metropolitan area, county, or state area median family income
Private capital Investment in assets not available on public markets  POU Publicly owned utility  Rebate/incentive A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds  REEL Pilot Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot  SCE Southern California Edison	LMI household	Low-to- Moderate-Income household: defined by the GGH Program as households with a combined income at or below the current annual income limits as determined by the California Department of Housing and Community Development according to county and family size and adopted in Section 6932 of Division 1 of Title 25 of the California Code of Regulations.
POU Publicly owned utility  Rebate/incentive A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds  REEL Pilot Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot  SCE Southern California Edison	Pilot period	The period covered by the previous evaluation of the REEL Pilot: July 2016-June 2018
Rebate/incentive A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds  REEL Pilot Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot  SCE Southern California Edison	Private capital	Investment in assets not available on public markets
REEL Pilot Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot  SCE Southern California Edison	POU	Publicly owned utility
SCE Southern California Edison	Rebate/incentive	A portion of the purchase price offered as a discount or funds
	REEL Pilot	Residential Energy Efficiency Loan Assistance Pilot
	SCE	Southern California Edison
Signature Ioan Otherwise applicable Ioan terms absent GGH Program given borrower characteris	Signature Ioan	Otherwise applicable loan terms absent GGH Program given borrower characteristics
SoCalGas Southern California Gas	SoCalGas	Southern California Gas



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